scholarly journals Parliamentary Deliberation on Constitutional Limits in the Legislative Process

2017 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabrielle Appleby ◽  
Anna Olijnyk

Like the other branches of government, parliaments are ‘responsible constitutional agent[s]’. They play a formative part ‘in expressing and pursuing’ constitutional government. A dimension of this agency is that parliaments, and more specifically parliamentarians, have a responsibility to consider whether proposed laws overstep the constitutional boundaries of their powers.[3] When, as is the wont of constitutional principles, the relevant limits are uncertain, the task of deliberating about constitutional validity can be challenging. Difficulties increase when a proposed law is an innovative attempt to respond to emerging problems at the edge of doctrine espoused in previous constitutional decisions.

2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (7) ◽  
pp. 784-813 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMIE KREPPEL

This article examines the influence of the European Parliament (EP) within the legislative process of the European Union. Although debate over the impact of the cooperation and co-decision I procedures continues, this article argues that, in part, the current theoretical debate is a false one that has caused many of the other important variables that affect EP legislative influence to be ignored. This article briefly revisits the current debate, then proceeds to an analysis of the success of more than 1,000 EP amendments under the cooperation and co-decision procedures. This evidence suggests that numerous other variables, such as internal EP unity and type of amendment made, have a significant impact on EP success, even controlling for procedure. In addition, this comparison points out some empirical differences between the two procedures that have been largely ignored in the theoretical debate but that nonetheless have a significant impact of EP success and merit further study.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3(164) ◽  
pp. 143-165
Author(s):  
Piotr Stanisz

The purpose of the present study is to analyse the restrictions on the freedom of religious worship introduced by the Polish executive authorities in the face of the spreading COVID-19 epidemic. The analysis aims to answer questions not only concerning the conformity of these actions with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and statutory laws, but also pertaining to the issue of the level of preparation of Polish law for an epidemic. In reference to these questions, the author concludes that the introduction of restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion by acts of worship in the regulations issued by the Minister of Health and the Council of Ministers exceeds the bounds of statutory authorisation and is inconsistent with the Polish Constitution. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, passing a law remains the only admissible way of introducing restrictions on the freedom of manifestation of religion, and there are no exceptions to this rule even in states of emergency. On the other hand, the author also points out that if the effectiveness of combating this kind of epidemic really depends on possibility of introducing the above-mentioned restrictions without a long legislative process, it means that Polish executive authorities have been confronted by the constitutional legislator and the legislature with a choice between being efficient and acting in conformity with the Constitution and statutory laws. Therefore, the article postulates that it is necessary to make deep changes to the current law. Elaborating a broad concept of these changes requires further analysis, and the relevant discussion needs to take into account the experience gained so far in combating the coronavirus epidemic, the importance of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the solutions adopted in other countries. A clear and balanced, as well as properly sequenced and democratically justified specification of the rules that should be followed by the executive when introducing restrictions related to the spread of the epidemic, even with regard to such important values as the freedom to manifest religion through acts of worship, is undoubtedly more appropriate than formally ruling out the possibility of taking action that may turn out necessary in the future.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (12) ◽  
pp. 1460-1485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian F. Crisp

Mixed-member systems have been characterized as encouraging politicians to balance the activities that enhance their personal reputations and those of their parties. Another literature challenges that legislators from one tier are not likely to behave differently from those of the other. After summarizing this debate, data from Venezuela are used to look for evidence supporting either side in a series of behaviors that span the entire legislative process—from bill initiation to committee consideration to final vote. The author concludes that the “best of both worlds” versus “contamination” debate has led to a focus on mixed-member institutions, to the exclusion of other incentive structures confronting legislators and that we need to engage in more careful theorizing about when and where they should expect the electoral tier to have an impact on legislator behavior.


1906 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Maurice Low

A century of constitutional government in the United States has served to emphasize the wisdom of Hamilton's warning of “the tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other.” He clearly foresaw and attempted to guard against, dangers that today are only too apparent. “In governments purely republican,” he wrote, “this tendency is almost irresistible. The representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either the executive or the judiciary, were a breach of their privilege and an outrage to their dignity. They often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the other departments; and, as they commonly have the people on their side, they always act with such momentum as to make it very difficult for the other members of the government to maintain the balance of the Constitution.”Never did human ingenuity devise a more nicely balanced system of government than when the framers of the Constitution allocated to the executive and to the legislature the exercise of powers not to be infringed by the other; but like many things human the intent has been perverted. Every person familiar with the Constitution, the debates in the convention, and the writings of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay in The Federalist, must know that the purpose of the framers of the Constitution was to create a system of government by which the President should become neither the creature nor the controller of the legislature; and by vesting certain exclusive powers in the popular branch and certain other powers in the Senate to provide that the line of demarcation between the two houses should not be overstepped.


2003 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 695
Author(s):  
Ben Goschik

This paper examines the New Zealand’s Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993. The first part of the paper examines the democratic nature of the ‘direct democracy’ of citizens initiated referenda. The second part of the paper tackles certain of the practical concerns that flow from the legislation and the process that the legislation requires. In particular, the paper considers the uneasy relationship between the Clerk of the House and the role that the Clerk plays in determining the referendum question. Then, the paper examines problems concerning the referendum question itself, considering the limitation of only allowing a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, as well as questions that ‘demand’ one answer over the other or raise more than one issue. The author argues that there is a real concern surrounding the ability of citizens initiated referenda to improve the democratic process through involving people in the legislative process.


2009 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luisa Béjar

RESUMEN: El principal argumento de este escrito es que la heterogeneidad de los diseños institucionales que prima en el campo electoral en América Latina (Carroll y Shugart, 2005) también se reproduce en el parlamentario. El perfil morfológico del sistema de comisiones propio de cada Congreso y el lugar que la ley les asigna en el proceso legislativo son prueba evidente de ello. Mientras el marco normativo de algunas legislaturas no deja lugar a dudas en cuanto a la intención de delegar en los partidos las decisiones encomendadas a estos cuerpos; en otros casos, ello ocurre en menor medida. En los casos formalmente ceñidos a una lógica de partido, por otra parte, se alientan esquemas de delegación de corte muy diverso. En este escrito se revisa el acomodo institucional del sistema de comisiones de la Cámara Baja en: Argentina; Bolivia; Brasil; Colombia; Chile; México; Paraguay; República Dominicana y Uruguay. En este sentido, el estudio examina tanto la importancia concedida a su trabajo, como algunos aspectos de su morfología que afectan la estructura de incentivos que acota el desarrollo del proceso legislativo. Asimismo, se analizan los procedimientos utilizados en cada Congreso para enfrentar los problemas de acción colectiva. Por último, se presentan algunas ideas para la elaboración de una futura taxonomía sobre la relación que guardan en la región los partidos y las comisiones permanentes del Congreso.ABSTRACT: The main argument of this paper is that the heterogeneity of the institutional framework that prevails in Latin America’s electoral field (Carroll y Shugart, 2005), also reproduces itself in the parliamentary one. This is proved by the morphologic profile of each Congress’ commission system and the place that the law assigns to the system. While some legislative frameworks clearly intend to delegate to parties the decisions entrusted to this bodies; in other cases, this takes place in a less important way. In the cases formally related with a party logic, on the other hand, diverse delegation schemes are encouraged. In this article we analyze the institutional framework of the commission systems of the low chamber in: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Colombia; Chile; Mexico; Paraguay; Dominican Republic and Uruguay. In this sense, this work examines the importance given to their job and some aspects of its morphology that affect the structure of incentives that narrows the development of the legislative process. We also analyze the procedures used by each Congress to solve its problems of collective action. Lastly, some ideas for the elaboration of a future taxonomy on the relationship between parties and permanent commissions in the region are presented.


2021 ◽  
pp. 49-87
Author(s):  
Martin Wight

This essay presents the three main traditions of thinking about international relations in Western societies since the sixteenth century, with particular attention to the ‘middle ground’ between extremes. These extremes are typified by thinkers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes at one pole, and Kant and Wilson at the other. The via media is associated with the development of constitutional government and the rule of law, as represented by thinkers such as Grotius and Gladstone. The essay illustrates the differences among these three traditions by analysing their distinct positions concerning international society, the maintenance of order, intervention, and international morality. ‘Western values’ are most effectively supported by thinkers and leaders who neither deny the existence of international society nor exaggerate its foreseeable prospects for gaining greater cohesion and strength. The middle course—the mainstream of the ‘Western values’ tradition—respects moral standards and sees moral challenges as complex, instead of regarding them as simple or nonexistent.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Robertson Ferguson

American chief executives are popularly believed to play a crucial leadership role in the legislative process, but this role is not well understood by scholars. This article develops a model of executive leadership success in the legislative arena based on personal, institutional, political, and economic factors and tests that model with data on the legislative priorities of the 50 state governors in 1993–94. Institutional features of the executive, which have been the focus of much scholarship, are found to have little effect on a governor's legislative success. On the other hand, the nature of the legislature is quite important here, with more professional legislatures actually encouraging executive leadership. A governor's personal characteristics, political party, and a state's economy also influence a governor's legislative success. These findings point to the importance of examining chief executives in the context in which they work if we are to understand their role as legislative leader.


Author(s):  
Stéphane Bernatchez

AbstractIn the debate over the legitimacy of judicial review, Jürgen Habermas put forward two justifications for the role of constitutional judges within deliberative democracy. Judicial review must examine the procedural conditions of the legislative process and participate within a learning process that would ensure the continuous redefinition of the Constitution. This procedural concept of constitutional justice remains subject to the scrutiny of the other procedural theories. Whereas the theory of contextual proceduralization questions the concept of the legal judgment and more specifically the habermassian conception of the application of a legal norm, the systemic theory offers the conceptual framework required to explain this learning process and the function of judicial review in the legal system. Therefore, Habermas' procedural theory is extended in line with alternative theories of the proceduralization of law.


Lentera Hukum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 319
Author(s):  
Bayu Dwi Anggono ◽  
Fahmi Ramadhan Firdaus

Recently, omnibus law has become a critical discourse in Indonesia, both academically and practically. This discourse emerges from the relatively fast drafting and ratification of the Job Creation Law. This law's formation uses the omnibus law method because it contains many laws' substance into one law. One of Indonesia's fundamental issues is the absence of rules, methods, and techniques for forming the omnibus law. On the other hand, the techniques and methods of forming these omnibus laws have been practiced in various countries to accelerate the legislative process and organize regulations. However, public participation becomes one of the fundamental shortcomings to draft the legislation under omnibus law. This article aims to review and compare the omnibus law concept applied in selected countries, referencing the United States and Ireland as the model. This article also analyzes how to form the ideal omnibus law by learning from the omnibus law application in other countries that have successfully implemented it first. This study finds that omnibus laws in the United States and Ireland contribute to ushering hyper-regulation symptoms that are vulnerable and hamper economic development. The above comparison needs to be adjusted to the Indonesian context to enact the omnibus law. KEYWORDS: Omnibus Law, Indonesian Law, Comparative Omnibus Law.


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