The Secret Ballot

Author(s):  
Randall P. Bezanson

This chapter examines the expansion of free speech to the largely mute act of voting in elections and to the protection of a person's affiliations and associations with others from public disclosure at the hands of the government. It does so through the recent Doe v. Reed case and a gay rights referendum in Washington State. It addresses the following questions: How should the freedom of speech be interpreted to protect such undeniably important acts as voting and joining with others—say, in a church or a charitable cause? Is it possible to read “freedom of speech” as protecting them without at the same time losing all pretense of restraint on the Supreme Court's power to interpret the Constitution? In addressing these larger questions, the chapter shows the parts of the First Amendment that were first pulled apart—speaker, speech, purpose—stitched back together in the form of constitutional doctrine. Is the resulting web of free speech doctrine and theory coherent or symmetrical, or is it just a tangled mess?

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-256
Author(s):  
Karolina Palka

This article is about the limits of the right to free speech. The first section provides a brief introduction to this topic, primarily in the context of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The second section describes the case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which was fundamental to the topic of this paper because the United States Supreme Court created the so-called "fighting words" doctrine based on it. In the next two sections, two court cases are presented that perfectly demonstrate the limits of the right to free speech in the United States: Snyder v. Phelps and Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America. The fifth part shows the right to freedom of speech in the context of Polish civil, criminal, and constitutional law, as well as acts of international law binding on Poland. The last part is a short summary.


Author(s):  
Timothy Zick

This chapter focuses on parades, pickets, and demonstrations, which are forms of civic engagement that communicate aspirations, ideas, and, quite often, dissenting opinions to fellow citizens, governments, and broader audiences. For many, gathering together in public, in these and similar forms, is a cathartic act of self-fulfilment and a demonstration of solidarity. Collective action in the form of public gatherings is an integral part of any system of communicative freedom. In the United States, in addition to the freedom of speech, rights to ‘peaceably assemble’ and to ‘petition the Government for a redress of grievances’ are explicitly provided for in the First Amendment to the Constitution. Ultimately, parades, pickets, and demonstrations all further basic expressive values relating to self-governance, the search for truth, and individual autonomy. Nevertheless, Americans seeking to engage in collective modes of expression face a variety of doctrinal, legal, social, and political challenges. The chapter then details how digital connectivity has facilitated expressive opportunities by connecting individuals and supporting new forms of associational activity.


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott W. Gaylord

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.” Given the myriad ways in which freedom of speech can be implicated, the United States Supreme Court has not adopted a single standard for reviewing First Amendment speech claims. With respect to compelled speech, the Court has instructed that “context” is dispositive. When the government attempts to “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein,” the Court applies strict scrutiny. When, however, “the State has a significant role to play in regulating” a particular context, government-compelled disclosures may be subject to a lower standard of review: “When a state regulation implicates First Amendment rights, the court must balance those interests against the State’s legitimate interest in regulating the activity in question.”


Author(s):  
Mallorie McCue

Each year, the global food and beverage industry, made up of food suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers, generates more than $5.7 trillion in the business of developing food and selling it for consumption.[1] To maintain their profit level, agribusiness companies lobby the government, donating nearly $58 million to candidates for federal office in the 2010 election cycle alone.[2] In a time when the health and safety of our food is called into question, one wonders who is protecting the interests of consumers.[3] With the advent of Citizens United v. FEC, corporations are entitled to greater First Amendment protection than ever before, as the government is prohibited from making distinctions or imposing regulations based upon the identity of the speakers who are exercising their First Amendment rights.[1] Additionally, the decision set forth that corporations have no cap on spending for the election or defeat of candidates.[2] President Obama commented that the ruling "opens the floodgates for an unlimited amount of special interest money into our democracy . . . giv[ing] lobbyists new leverage to spend millions on advertising to persuade elected officials to vote their way-or to punish those who don't."[3]  At the heart of the matter is our First Amendment right to free speech. The First Amendment includes guarantees that Congress will make no law prohibiting or abridging the exercise of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or the petitioning of the Government for a redress of grievances. Corporations assert that their donations to candidates for public office are an exercise of their right to free speech and further their corporate speech.[4] However, whistleblowers insist that corporations are not individuals, and should not be protected as such; and that corporate contributions should be limited to protect against corruption.[5] This Note argues that with Citizens United, special interests such as agribusiness now wield the greatest political and economic power in history, allowing them to further drown individual free speech with agricultural disparagement statutes and lobbying.[6] Private advocacy nonprofits rely on voluntary donations to enhance the impact of individual voices on elections. Yet corporations can simply make a large, tax-deductible donation to their chosen candidate at a crucial moment in the election, saving or defeating the candidate and preserving their corporate interest.[1] Paired with corporate practices that emphasize profits over the interests and welfare of the American people, such as utilizing agricultural disparagement statutes, industries such as agribusiness have been granted carte blanche to suppress individual free speech. With unlimited corporate funds flowing to favorable candidates, the ruling has the potential effect of suppressing public opinion by using corporate funding to further agricultural disparagement statutes. Section I will discuss commercial speech, food labeling, and the constitutionality of veggie libel laws, as well their effect of insulating agribusiness from criticism. Section II contains an analysis of Citizens United and its potential effect on agribusiness. Section III sets forth a proposed solution for dulling the impact of Citizens United with transparency, campaign finance reform and disclosure.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-223
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Roark

The First Amendment protects one of our most precious rights as citizens of the United States—the freedom of speech. Such protection has withstood the test of time, even safeguarding speech that much of the population would find distasteful. There is one form of speech which cannot be protected: the true threat. However, the definition of what constitutes a "true threat" has expanded since its inception. In the new era of communication—where most users post first and edit later—the First Amendment protection we once possessed has been eroded as more and more speech is considered proscribable as a "true threat." In order to adequately protect both the public at large and our individual right to free speech, courts should analyze a speaker’s subjective intent before labeling speech a "true threat." Though many courts have adopted an objective, reasonable listener test, the U.S. Supreme Court now has the opportunity, in deciding Elonis v. United States, to take a monumental step in protecting the First Amendment right to free speech. By holding that the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a true threat conviction, the Court will restore the broad protection afforded by the First Amendment and repair years of erosion caused by an objective approach.


Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

This introductory chapter provides an overview of value democracy. According to value democracy, all viewpoints should be protected by rights of free speech from coercive bans or punishment. However, the state also has an obligation in value democracy that extends beyond protecting freedom of speech. It should engage in democratic persuasion, actively defending the democratic values of freedom and equality for all citizens when it “speaks.” The notion of state speech is common in First Amendment jurisprudence. It often refers to the various non-coercive functions of the state, ranging from pure expression, such as speeches, to issues of funding. By using democratic persuasion to articulate the reasons for rights, value democracy aims to answer the critics who contend that liberalism cannot defend its most basic values or counter the threat to equality that might come from hate groups in civil society.


Author(s):  
Timothy Zick

This chapter discusses the controversies over “hate speech” that have dogged President Trump’s early years in office. It provides a brief primer on the First Amendment doctrine relating to “hate speech,” under which derogatory expression is mostly considered protected speech. The chapter examines both the harms associated with “hate speech” and the principal justifications for protecting it. It criticizes the Trump administration’s handling of issues relating to “hate speech.” It also addresses the special problems associated with governmental “hate speech.” The chapter concludes with a consideration of the extent to which the government can use its own expressive powers to educate Americans about the need to preserve both freedom of speech and the security and equal dignity that “hate speech” undermines.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jud Campbell

Free speech doctrine generally protects only expression, leaving regulations of nonexpressive conduct beyond the First Amendment’s scope. Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that abridgments of the freedom of speech “may operate at different points in the speech process.” This notion of protection for nonexpressive conduct that facilitates speech touches on many of the most contentious issues in First Amendment law— restrictions on photography and audiovisual recording, limits on campaign contributions, putative newsgathering privileges for journalists, compelled subsidization of speech, and associational rights, to name just a few. Scholars, however, have generally approached these topics in isolation, typically focusing on downstream effects on speech as the touchstone for First Amendment coverage. The usual conclusion is that the Supreme Court’s decisions are in disarray. This Article argues that key features of doctrine are easily overlooked when employing a granular focus on particular rights. Instead, the Article presents an overarching framework that brings together, descriptively and normatively, otherwise disparate strands of free speech law. The guiding principle of this framework is that First Amendment coverage for nonexpressive conduct depends on whether the government uses a rule that targets speech (e.g., a special tax on newspapers), not on whether expression is indirectly burdened by particular applications of otherwise constitutional rules (e.g., a child labor law applied to newspapers). Applications of this “anti-targeting” principle vary by context, but the general concept offers a surprisingly comprehensive account of most Supreme Court decisions. Tracing the development of the anti-targeting principle also reveals an underappreciated shift in the way that the Court has dealt with claims based on nonexpressive conduct. This historical argument shows that the reasoning in many of the Court’s foundational cases—including Buckley v. Valeo, Branzburg v. Hayes, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, and Roberts v. United States Jaycees—is now out of step with current doctrine.


Author(s):  
John Attanasio

Ideas matter. Constitutional jurisprudence decisions reflect overarching intellectual trends in society. The Buckley Constitution reflects the influence of modern individualistic libertarianism in contemporary American society. Some prominent authors have glimpsed more inclusive approaches to free speech. For example, renowned First Amendment theorist Alexander Meiklejohn sought to illustrate an inclusive approach to freedom of speech in his timeless metaphor of a town meeting. This chapter begins by outlining several wrong turns that the campaign finance cases have taken which render an inclusive approach impossible. One involves equating spending money with speaking. Spending money to speak is at most a combination of speech and action. Moreover, monetary limitations on political campaigning are similar to content neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. Some authors concerned with the distribution of speech rights have overtly offered a more egalitarian free speech approach. They include Jürgen Habermas, Bruce Ackerman, and Ronald Dworkin.


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