scholarly journals Analysis on the Evolution Path of Promoting the College Students' Entrepreneurship

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 102
Author(s):  
Tian Yanan
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Phase Diagram ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolution Mechanism ◽  
Evolution Path ◽  
The Stability

Promote the deep cooperation between government and university is conducive to promoting the development of college students’ entrepreneurship. In order to study how to promote the evolution of college students 'entrepreneurship, this paper uses the theory of evolutionary game to construct the evolutionary game model of political and university collaboration and promote the stability and balance of college students' entrepreneurship. The study draws the relevant phase diagram of the system, and analyzes the influence of the relevant parameters on the evolution mechanism in the process of coordination between government and government.

scholarly journals Evaluation of the Quality Supervision System for Construction Projects in China Considering the Quality Behavior Risk Transmission

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1660
Author(s):  
Jingchun Feng ◽  
Yuting Wang ◽  
Ke Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary System ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
System A ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
The Stability

In construction projects, improper quality behavior of a participant results in quality behavior risks, which can transmit to the downstream participants and may cause detrimental effects on the quality of the entity finally constructed. Controlling the transmission of quality behavior risks is the key to effectively supervising and ensuring the quality of construction projects. In this study, the effectiveness of the quality supervision system of construction projects in China was investigated by considering the transmission of quality behavior risks. A multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of the players of quality supervision of a government department, upstream participant (UP), and downstream participant (DP) was generated. By using the system dynamics theory, the game model was simulated to determine the stability of the evolutionary system and to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s current quality supervision system under different scenarios. The results showed that there is no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the evolutionary system of the current quality supervision system in China and there are fluctuations in the evolution process. It revealed that high risk exists in the current quality supervision system in China. To resolve the problem of the low efficiency of the current Chinese supervision system, a dynamic penalty and incentive method is developed, which has been proven to be able to effectively control the quality behavior risks in construction projects and hence ensuring the quality of the entity finally constructed.

Dynamic Research of Construction Safety with Building Materials

2012 ◽  
Vol 496 ◽  
pp. 339-342
Author(s):  
Lu Jia ◽  
Fei Fei Fu
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Building Materials ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Construction Safety ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Safety Regulation ◽  
Regulation Policy ◽  
Important Approach ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
The Stability

Safety regulation is an important approach to secure the constructing process. A three-player regulation evolutionary game model is built, the stability analysis and simulation results show that evolutionary equilibrium (EE) does not exist, providing a convenient way for regulation policy making.

scholarly journals Knowledge Sharing in R&D Teams: An Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (12) ◽  
pp. 6664
Author(s):  
Jiuling Xiao ◽  
Yuting Bao ◽  
Jiankang Wang ◽  
Haiyun Yu ◽  
Zhenzhong Ma ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Knowledge Transformation ◽  
Influencing Mechanism ◽  
Knowledge Innovation ◽  
Evolution Path ◽  
Innovation Ability ◽  
Knowledge Absorption

Knowledge sharing plays an important role in promoting innovation and helping improve R&D team performance in the digital age. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study develops an evolutionary game model of knowledge sharing in R&D teams in order to explore its system evolution path, the evolutionary stability strategy, and the influencing mechanism in knowledge sharing. Then using a simulation model, this study examines the dynamic evolution process of knowledge sharing within R&D teams. The results show that the effectiveness of knowledge sharing in the R&D teams can be promoted by R&D team members’ cognitive ability, knowledge absorption ability, knowledge transformation ability, knowledge innovation ability, and the degree of knowledge complementarity within teams. The simulation results further show that reducing the environmental risk can also effectively improve R&D teams’ innovation performance. The findings of this study thus provide evidence for knowledge sharing as an important route to sustainable development.

scholarly journals Research on the Optimization Management of Cloud Privacy Strategy Based on Evolution Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Pan Jun Sun
Keyword(s):  
Cloud Computing ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Classical Dynamic ◽  
Computing Services ◽  
Dynamic Replication ◽  
Optimization Management ◽  
Cloud Computing Services ◽  
The Stability

Cloud computing services have great convenience, but privacy security is a big obstacle of popularity. In the process result of privacy protection of cloud computing, it is difficult to choose the optimal strategy. In order to solve this problem, we propose a quantitative weight model of privacy information, use evolutionary game theory to establish a game model of attack protection, design the optimal protection strategy selection algorithm, and make the evolutionary stable equilibrium solution method from the limited rational constraint. In order to study the strategic dependence of the same game group, the classical dynamic replication equation is improved by using the incentive coefficient, an improved evolutionary game model of attack protection is constructed, the stability of equilibrium point is further analyzed by Jacobian matrix method, and the optimal selection strategy is obtained under different conditions. Finally, the correctness and validity of the model are verified by experiments, different strategies of the same group have the dual effects of promotion and inhibition, and the advantages of this paper are shown by comparing with other articles.

scholarly journals Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Reward and Punishment Mechanism for Green Credit

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Zhu ◽  
Kaimin Zheng ◽  
Yilin Wei
Keyword(s):  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Obvious Effect ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Credit Mechanism ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Stability

To get rid of the development dilemma of green credit, we constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model of local government, commercial banks, and loan enterprises. We gave sufficient conditions for the stability of strategy based on the stability discriminant theorem of It o ^ ' s stochastic differential equation (SDE). Then, we discussed the impacts of incentive and penalty parameters on green credit. Through the above analysis, we got the following conclusions: (1) rewards and punishments always benefit green production and green credit, but increasing incentives is not conducive to the governments’ performance of regulatory duties; (2) punishments can better improve the convergence rate of players’ strategy than rewards; and (3) both rewards and punishments can exert an obvious effect in improving the changing degree of players’ strategy. Finally, we put forward some suggestions to optimize the green credit mechanism.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (15) ◽  
pp. 2775 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wang ◽  
Shi
Keyword(s):  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Trajectory ◽  
Evolution Path ◽  
Punishment Mechanism

In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control.

scholarly journals Research on Optimization of Array Honeypot Defense Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. 805
Author(s):  
Leyi Shi ◽  
Xiran Wang ◽  
Huiwen Hou
Keyword(s):  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Defense Strategies ◽  
Active Defense ◽  
Defense Technology ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Honeypot has been regarded as an active defense technology that can deceive attackers by simulating real systems. However, honeypot is actually a static network trap with fixed disposition, which is easily identified by anti-honeypot technology. Thus, honeypot is a “passive” active defense technology. Dynamic honeypot makes up for the shortcomings of honeypot, which dynamically adjusts defense strategies with the attack of hackers. Therefore, the confrontation between defenders and attackers is a strategic game. This paper focuses on the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism of bounded rationality, aiming to improve the security of the array honeypot system through the evolutionarily stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model of array honeypot, which is composed of defenders, attackers and legitimate users. Secondly, we formally describe the strategies and revenues of players in the game, and build the three-party game payoff matrices. Then the evolutionarily stable strategy is obtained by analyzing the Replicator Dynamics of various parties. In addition, we discuss the equilibrium condition to get the influence of the number of servers N on the stability of strategy evolution. MATLAB and Gambit simulation experiment results show that deduced evolutionarily stable strategies are valid in resisting attackers.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

scholarly journals The stability and electronic and photocatalytic properties of the ZnWO4 (010) surface determined from first-principles and thermodynamic calculations

RSC Advances ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (38) ◽  
pp. 23477-23490
Author(s):  
Yonggang Wu ◽  
Jihua Zhang ◽  
Bingwei Long ◽  
Hong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Phase Diagram ◽  
Density Functional Theory ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Density Functional ◽  
Thermodynamic Calculations ◽  
Photocatalytic Properties ◽  
Thermodynamic Approach ◽  
Functional Theory ◽  
Stability Phase Diagram ◽  
The Stability

The ZnWO4 (010) surface termination stability is studied using a density functional theory-based thermodynamic approach. The stability phase diagram shows that O-Zn, DL-W, and DL-Zn terminations of ZnWO4 (010) can be stabilized.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

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