scholarly journals Evaluation of the Quality Supervision System for Construction Projects in China Considering the Quality Behavior Risk Transmission

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1660
Author(s):  
Jingchun Feng ◽  
Yuting Wang ◽  
Ke Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary System ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
System A ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
The Stability

In construction projects, improper quality behavior of a participant results in quality behavior risks, which can transmit to the downstream participants and may cause detrimental effects on the quality of the entity finally constructed. Controlling the transmission of quality behavior risks is the key to effectively supervising and ensuring the quality of construction projects. In this study, the effectiveness of the quality supervision system of construction projects in China was investigated by considering the transmission of quality behavior risks. A multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of the players of quality supervision of a government department, upstream participant (UP), and downstream participant (DP) was generated. By using the system dynamics theory, the game model was simulated to determine the stability of the evolutionary system and to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s current quality supervision system under different scenarios. The results showed that there is no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the evolutionary system of the current quality supervision system in China and there are fluctuations in the evolution process. It revealed that high risk exists in the current quality supervision system in China. To resolve the problem of the low efficiency of the current Chinese supervision system, a dynamic penalty and incentive method is developed, which has been proven to be able to effectively control the quality behavior risks in construction projects and hence ensuring the quality of the entity finally constructed.

scholarly journals An Incentive Mechanism for Reporting Phishing E-Mails Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mengli Wang ◽  
Lipeng Song
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Important Link ◽  
E Mail

The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

scholarly journals Green Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui He ◽  
Siyi Zhang ◽  
Lilong Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Product ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Strategy Combination

Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.

Behavior Analysis of Together-Conspired Bidding Based on the Evolutionary Game

2012 ◽  
Vol 209-211 ◽  
pp. 1513-1516
Author(s):  
Qian Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Behavior Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Periodic Fluctuation ◽  
Construction Market

Based on the “replication dynamics” ideas, the paper establishes asymmetric evolutionary game model of together-conspired bidding using evolutionary game theory, and obtains its evolutionary stable strategy under the present governmental supervision that surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder’s proportion is periodic fluctuation of the center stability, explains the reason why together-conspired bidding is difficult to be prevented effectively. In order to find the decisive factor of the evolutionary drift, further investigation shows that the evolutionary drift is converged to the different evolutionary stable properties when evolution conditions change, such as the supervision target, supervision strength. Through the analysis to the punishment extent on surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder, the conclusion is arrived that the strength of punishment and execution on the surround-bidder can effectively control together-conspired bidding, which provides the theoretical basis to governmental supervision department for the management and research work on together-conspired bidding in the construction market.

Dynamic Research of Construction Safety with Building Materials

2012 ◽  
Vol 496 ◽  
pp. 339-342
Author(s):  
Lu Jia ◽  
Fei Fei Fu
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Building Materials ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Construction Safety ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Safety Regulation ◽  
Regulation Policy ◽  
Important Approach ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
The Stability

Safety regulation is an important approach to secure the constructing process. A three-player regulation evolutionary game model is built, the stability analysis and simulation results show that evolutionary equilibrium (EE) does not exist, providing a convenient way for regulation policy making.

scholarly journals Factors Affecting Quality Management of Construction Project Using Industrialized Building System: a Review

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4.35) ◽  
pp. 307 ◽  
Author(s):  
N.S. Azman ◽  
M. Z. Ramli ◽  
M. H. Zawawi
Keyword(s):  
Quality Management ◽  
Construction Industry ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Success Factors ◽  
Construction Project ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
System A ◽  
Building System ◽  
Significant Factors

Quality management is essential to improve success in project implementation by using Industrialized Building System (IBS). The development of construction industry in Malaysia is encountering a relocation from ordinary techniques to a more efficient and automated strategy which is by utilizing IBS.There are a few issues in overseeing IBS construction projects which prompt low qualities such as hiring non-expertize in construction, using low quality of materials and problem with management. Therefore, this paper aim is to determine the various success factors affecting the quality management of construction project that using IBS and ranked the success factors. Found that 87 factors from review papers and two most significant factors affecting quality management in IBS are high ranked which is appointment of high experience technical team, using high quality components and materials with overall percentage 2.48% and 1.86%. However, some of the factors are repeatedly listed due to high affecting to quality.

scholarly journals Research on Evolutionary Model and Dynamic Analysis for Internet Public Opinion Spreading

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Yong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Evolutionary System ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Internet Users ◽  
Internet Media ◽  
The Cost ◽  
And Control

Internet public opinion has developed rapidly in recent years, which has more influence on society. The relevant problems of Internet public opinion have become the hotspots of research. The complexity of Internet public opinion spreading brings difficulties to research and analysis. For the problems of Internet public opinion spreading, an evolutionary model of Internet public opinion spreading is built based on evolutionary game theory in this paper, considering three subjects including Internet media, Internet users, and government. Then, the evolutionary stable strategies of the Internet public opinion spreading system are studied. Finally, the influences of the stable strategy of the Internet public opinion spreading system are analyzed through simulation. Relevant conclusions are obtained. The results show that there are multiple possible stable strategies in the evolution of Internet public opinion. The different initial probabilities of the strategy lead to the different stable strategies of the evolutionary system. The stable strategy is influenced by some factors, such as the punished loss of Internet media, the gain of Internet users from government controlling, and the cost of government. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to Internet public opinion management and control.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Simulation on Government Incentive Strategies of Prefabricated Construction: A System Dynamics Approach

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baoquan Cheng ◽  
Yuhu Wei ◽  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Xintao Zhou ◽  
Huihua Chen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Construction Technology ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Game Simulation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Rational Range

Prefabricated construction is a state-of-the-art construction technology of both socio-economic and environmental benefits, but sometimes, it is not welcome due to its high cost. Governments play an important role in deeply promoting prefabricated construction, but its effects are not clear. This paper developed a system dynamics model for investigating and simulating the impacts of government incentive strategies on prefabricated construction by considering the evolutionary game process between the government and contractors. Data of Shanghai, China, is collected for demonstration and validation of the developed simulation model. Results show that (1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in static game process; (2) the rate of adopting prefabricated construction is affected by the level of penalties and subsidies; (3) dynamic incentive strategies can better improve the stability of the evolutionary game process; and (4) the rational range of incentive rate can be obtained. Findings of this study facilitate governments to formulate and improve the incentive strategies of prefabricated construction, thus boosting the development of construction industrialization.

Research on lateral-directional stability augmentation system of flying wing aircraft based on reliability model

2018 ◽  
Vol 233 (11) ◽  
pp. 4214-4221
Author(s):  
Yalin Pan ◽  
Jun Huang
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Energy Consumption ◽  
Reliability Model ◽  
Optimization Strategy ◽  
Directional Stability ◽  
System A ◽  
Stability Augmentation ◽  
Consumption Index ◽  
The Stability

Poor lateral-directional stability is a great risk to the design of flying wing aircraft due to the absence of vertical stabilizer. In order to improve the lateral-directional flying quality of this configuration aircraft, eigenstructure assignment technique by state feedback is adopted to design the stability augmentation system. The influence of eigenstructure on energy consumption of the control system is analyzed by citing energy consumption index in this paper. In addition, a reliability model is established to measure the reliability of the control system under uncertain factors. In order to assign eigenvalues and eigenvectors to obtain the control law of the system, a nested optimization model based on coupling degree, energy consumption and reliability is proposed. The outer optimization is used to optimize the eigenstructure, and inner optimization is used to compute the reliability of the control system in optimization process. A flying wing aircraft is used as a basis for the design of the stability augmentation system through the suggested optimization strategy. The optimization results demonstrate the validity of the method, and the lateral-directional flying quality of the aircraft has been improved greatly.

scholarly journals Research on Strategy Control of Taxi Carpooling Detour Route under Uncertain Environment

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Ruichun He ◽  
Qiang Xiao ◽  
Changxi Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Travel Time ◽  
Traffic Congestion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Success Probability ◽  
Route Choice ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Uncertain Environment

For the problem of route choice in taxi carpooling detour, considering the uncertainty of traffic and the characteristic of passengers’ noncomplete rationality, an evolutionary game model of taxi carpooling detour route is built, in which prospect theory is introduced and revenue of strategy is replaced by prospect value. The model reflects more really decision-making psychology of passengers. Then the stable strategies of the model are studied, and the influences of detour distance and traffic congestion on detour carpooling success are analyzed, respectively. The results show that when at least one route of which prospect values for two passenger sides are both positive exists, carpooling route can reach an agreement. The route is stable strategy of evolutionary game, and the passengers requiring short travel time tend to select the nondetour route. With the increase of detour distance and traffic congestion rate, the possibility of reaching an agreement decreases gradually; that is, possibility of carpooling failure increases. So taxi carpooling detour is possible under the certain condition, but some measures must be carried out such as constraints of detour distance and mitigation of traffic congestion to improve carpooling success probability. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to the formulation of taxi carpooling policy.

scholarly journals Research on the Optimization Management of Cloud Privacy Strategy Based on Evolution Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Pan Jun Sun
Keyword(s):  
Cloud Computing ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Classical Dynamic ◽  
Computing Services ◽  
Dynamic Replication ◽  
Optimization Management ◽  
Cloud Computing Services ◽  
The Stability

Cloud computing services have great convenience, but privacy security is a big obstacle of popularity. In the process result of privacy protection of cloud computing, it is difficult to choose the optimal strategy. In order to solve this problem, we propose a quantitative weight model of privacy information, use evolutionary game theory to establish a game model of attack protection, design the optimal protection strategy selection algorithm, and make the evolutionary stable equilibrium solution method from the limited rational constraint. In order to study the strategic dependence of the same game group, the classical dynamic replication equation is improved by using the incentive coefficient, an improved evolutionary game model of attack protection is constructed, the stability of equilibrium point is further analyzed by Jacobian matrix method, and the optimal selection strategy is obtained under different conditions. Finally, the correctness and validity of the model are verified by experiments, different strategies of the same group have the dual effects of promotion and inhibition, and the advantages of this paper are shown by comparing with other articles.

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