scholarly journals Stoic Logic Allows Understanding a Priori Falsity in the Conditional

2021 ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
Miguel López-Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Models ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Stoic Logic

An issue to explain in cognitive science is nowadays the case of certain conditionals that people seem to deem as a priori false. Those conditionals appear to be false by virtue of semantics: the meanings of their antecedents and their consequents seem not to admit any link between them. This is a problem because, from the point of view of classical logic, they are not always false; there can be situations in which they are true (as classical logic provides, whenever their antecedents are false, those conditionals in entirety are true). There are contemporary frameworks explaining this phenomenon (e.g., the theory of mental models). However, this paper tries to make the point that the solution might be already in ancient philosophy: in particular, in Chrysippus’ logic. Thus, the paper describes in details (1) why those conditionals are controversial in classical logic and (2) the account that can be given for them from Chrysippus’ philosophy. That account is based mainly on the Stoic idea that the negation of the second clause of a conditional should not be compatible with its first clause.

scholarly journals Pseudo-conditionals and causal assertibles in Stoic logic

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 417
Author(s):  
Miguel López-Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Models ◽  
Semantic Analysis ◽  
Methodological Tool ◽  
Conditional Perfection ◽  
Stoic Logic ◽  
Mental Models Theory

http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p417The Stoics not only analyzed sentences showing to be clear conditionals. They also reviewed other kinds of sentences related to the conditional that are not exactly conditionals, for example, the pseudo-conditionals and the causal assertibles. In this paper, I try to argue that the Stoic account of such sentences reveals that certain problematic issues that contemporary cognitive science is concerned with, such as the ways the conditionals can be expressed or the pragmatic phenomenon of the conditional perfection, were already studied by the Stoics, and that they even gave their solutions to those problems. To do that, I resort to the semantic analysis of models usually made by the mental models theory, and use it as a methodological tool.

A Fatal Error of Locke’s?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galen Strawson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
John Locke ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Radical Theory ◽  
Single Person

This chapter argues that the unqualified attribution of the radical theory to John Locke is mistaken if we are to take into account the fact that the theory allows for freaks like [Sₓ]. It first considers [I]-transfer without [P]-transfer—that is, [I]-transfer preserving personal identity—before discussing Locke's response to the idea that personal identity might survive [I]-transfer from an a priori point of view. It suggests that [I]-transfer is possible in such a way that the existence of a single Person [P₁] from t₁ to t₂ can successively (and non-overlappingly) involve the existence of two immaterial substances. It also explains how Locke's claim that [I]-transfer is possible opens up the possibility that it could go wrong, in such a way as to lead to injustice. Finally, it examines Locke's notion of “sensible creature,” which refers to a subject of experience who is a person.

scholarly journals Iterative Variable Selection for High-Dimensional Data: Prediction of Pathological Response in Triple-Negative Breast Cancer

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 222
Author(s):  
Juan C. Laria ◽  
M. Carmen Aguilera-Morillo ◽  
Enrique Álvarez ◽  
Rosa E. Lillo ◽  
Sara López-Taruella ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Breast Cancer ◽  
Variable Selection ◽  
Triple Negative Breast Cancer ◽  
Triple Negative ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Simulated Data ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
High Dimensional ◽  
Whole Genome ◽  
Genome Context

Over the last decade, regularized regression methods have offered alternatives for performing multi-marker analysis and feature selection in a whole genome context. The process of defining a list of genes that will characterize an expression profile remains unclear. It currently relies upon advanced statistics and can use an agnostic point of view or include some a priori knowledge, but overfitting remains a problem. This paper introduces a methodology to deal with the variable selection and model estimation problems in the high-dimensional set-up, which can be particularly useful in the whole genome context. Results are validated using simulated data and a real dataset from a triple-negative breast cancer study.

ON ROBERTS’ PROOF OF THE TURAEV-WALKER THEOREM

1996 ◽  
Vol 05 (04) ◽  
pp. 427-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICCARDO BENEDETTI ◽  
CARLO PETRONIO
Keyword(s):  
Euler Characteristic ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Algebraic Approach ◽  
Fusion Rule ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Witten Invariant ◽  
Manifolds With Boundary ◽  
3 Dimensional ◽  
Skein Theory ◽  
Natural Way

In this paper we discuss the beautiful idea of Justin Roberts [7] (see also [8]) to re-obtain the Turaev-Viro invariants [11] via skein theory, and re-prove elementarily the Turaev-Walker theorem [9], [10], [13]. We do this by exploiting the presentation of 3-manifolds introduced in [1], [4]. Our presentation supports in a very natural way a formal implementation of Roberts’ idea. More specifically, what we show is how to explicitly extract from an o-graph (the object by which we represent a manifold, see below), one of the framed links in S3 which Roberts uses in the construction of his invariant, and a planar diagrammatic representation of such a link. This implies that the proofs of invariance and equality with the Turaev-Viro invariant can be carried out in a completely “algebraic” way, in terms of a planar diagrammatic calculus which does not require any interpretation of 3-dimensional figures. In particular, when proving the “term-by-term” equality of the expansion of the Roberts invariant with the state sum which gives the Turaev-Viro invariant, we simultaneously apply several times the “fusion rule” (which is formally defined, strictly speaking, only in diagrammatic terms), showing that the “braiding and twisting” which a priori may exist on tetrahedra is globally dispensable. In our point of view the success of this formal “algebraic” approach witnesses a certain efficiency of our presentation of 3-manifolds via o-graphs. In this work we will widely use recoupling theory which was very clearly exposed in [2], and therefore we will avoid recalling notations. Actually, for the purpose of stating and proving our results we will need to slightly extend the class of trivalent ribbon diagrams on which the bracket can be computed. We also address the reader to the references quoted in [2], in particular for the fundamental contributions of Lickorish to this area. In our approach it is more natural to consider invariants of compact 3-manifolds with non-empty boundary. The case of closed 3-manifolds is included by introducing a correction factor corresponding to boundary spheres, as explained in §2. Our main result is actually an extension to manifolds with boundary of the Turaev-Walker theorem: we show that the Turaev-Viro invariant of such a manifold coincides (up to a factor which depends on the Euler characteristic) with the Reshetikhin-Turaev-Witten invariant of the manifold mirrored in its boundary.

Logic and Cognitive Science

Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (8 (106)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Natalia Zaitseva
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Mutual Influence ◽  
Pure Logic ◽  
The Status ◽  
Experimental Logic ◽  
The Relationship

The paper examines the relationship between logic and cognitive science. We consider various aspects of this relationship, among which we distinguish three of the most importance, in our thought. First, it is the role of cognitive science in the justification of logic. Secondly, the mutual influence of cognitive science and modern trends of non-classical logic, which have a clearly applied character. Third, we discuss the prospects of the so-called experimental logic arising from attempts to apply the methods of cognitive science in logic. As usual, the conclusion summarizes the results of the research and focuses on the issue of the status of pure logic.

scholarly journals The Regularized Weak Functional Matching Pursuit for linear inverse problems

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Kontak ◽  
Volker Michel
Keyword(s):  
Inverse Problems ◽  
Matching Pursuit ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Computation Time ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Computational Point ◽  
Linear Inverse Problems ◽  
Infinite Dimensional ◽  
Frame Condition ◽  
Ill Posed

Abstract In this work, we present the so-called Regularized Weak Functional Matching Pursuit (RWFMP) algorithm, which is a weak greedy algorithm for linear ill-posed inverse problems. In comparison to the Regularized Functional Matching Pursuit (RFMP), on which it is based, the RWFMP possesses an improved theoretical analysis including the guaranteed existence of the iterates, the convergence of the algorithm for inverse problems in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, and a convergence rate, which is also valid for the particular case of the RFMP. Another improvement is the cancellation of the previously required and difficult to verify semi-frame condition. Furthermore, we provide an a-priori parameter choice rule for the RWFMP, which yields a convergent regularization. Finally, we will give a numerical example, which shows that the “weak” approach is also beneficial from the computational point of view. By applying an improved search strategy in the algorithm, which is motivated by the weak approach, we can save up to 90  of computation time in comparison to the RFMP, whereas the accuracy of the solution does not change as much.

scholarly journals CONVENTIONAL AND CONSENSUAL CONCEPTIONS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE NATURE

2020 ◽  
pp. 7-26
Author(s):  
Сергей Александрович Лебедев ◽  
Сергей Николаевич Коськов
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Work ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Main Subject ◽  
Pure Experience ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
The One ◽  
Methodology Of Science

В статье излагается содержание двух базовых концепций неклассической философии и методологии науки: конвенционалистской и консенсуалистской теории природы научного знания и научной истины. Каждая из них является альтернативой двум основным парадигмам классической философии и методологии науки: эмпиризму (позитивизму) и рационализму. С точки зрения конвенционализма научное знание не есть ни описание чистого опыта, ни его обобщение. Но оно не является также и результатом некой априорной интуиции и чистого разума. Согласно конвенционализму научное знание - это система доказательной информации, исходные принципы которой имеют характер условных, конвенциональных истин. Отсюда следует, что любая истина в науке не категорична, а условна и имеет форму «если, то». Консенсуалистская концепция природы научного знания возникла в философии науки второй половины XX в. Она была, с одной стороны, обобщением конвенционализма, а с другой - его отрицанием. Если в конвенционализме основным субъектом научного познания является отдельный ученый, то в консенсуалистской эпистемологии таким субъектом является социальный субъект - научное сообщество. Научное познание имеет принципиально коллективный характер как в плане его получения в силу разделения научного труда, так и в плане его легитимации и оценки. Последние операции всегда являются результатом консенсуса научного сообщества. The article examines the content of two basic conceptions of non-classical philosophy and methodology of science: the conventionalist and consensual theory of the nature of scientific knowledge. Each of them is an alternative to the two main paradigms of classical philosophy and the methodology of science: empiricism (positivism) and rationalism. From the point of view of conventionalism, scientific knowledge is neither a description of pure experience nor a generalization of it. But it is also not the result of some a priori intuition and pure reason. According to conventionalism, scientific knowledge is a system of evidence-based information, the initial principles of which have the character of conditional, conventional truths. It follows that any truth in science is not categorical, but conditional and has the form «if, then». The consensual concept of the nature of scientific knowledge emerged in the philosophy of science of the second half of the twentieth century. It was, on the one hand, a generalization of conventionalism; on the other, a negation of it. If in conventionalism the main subject of scientific knowledge is an individual scientist, then in consensual epistemology such a subject is a social subject - the scientific community. Scientific knowledge has a fundamentally collective character, both in terms of its acquisition by virtue of the division of scientific work, and in terms of its legitimization and evaluation. The latest operations are always the result of a consensus of the scientific community.

Between philosophy, science, politics: Anthropology of Marxism by C. Robinson

2020 ◽  
pp. 132-136
Author(s):  
G.A. Shuliko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
Social Consciousness ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Conceptual History ◽  
Short Introduction ◽  
Political Ideas ◽  
History Of ◽  
Socialist Movement

Presented is a review of latest edition of book by C. Robinson’s (1946–2016) “An anthropology of Marxism". The article begins with a short introduction to why Robinson’s work might be of interest to Russian reader. What follows is a critical analysis of how Robinson views Marxist views of his own conceptual history. Skillfully combining the civilizational approach and the principle of historicism, Robinson comes to the conclusion, that there are a number of weaknesses in the materialist conception of history. One of the key weaknesses, from Robinson’s point of view, is the history of pre-capitalist European socialism, i.e. Marxism, due to specific perception of capitalism, is divorced from the centuries-old history of European actions of social lower classes. Rethinking the historical place of Marxism can productively affect both the study of Marxism itself and socio-political ideas about humanity as a whole. Using a number of historical examples, Robinson shows the importance of various pre-capitalist forms of social consciousness (ancient philosophy, religion, etc.) for formation of the socialist movement in its classical forms.

Knowledge, belief, and moral psychology

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Mikhail
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Representations ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Strong Case ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
The Law

Abstract Phillips et al. make a strong case that knowledge representations should play a larger role in cognitive science. Their arguments are reinforced by comparable efforts to place moral knowledge, rather than moral beliefs, at the heart of a naturalistic moral psychology. Conscience, Kant's synthetic a priori, and knowledge attributions in the law all point in a similar direction.

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