Logic and Cognitive Science

The paper examines the relationship between logic and cognitive science. We consider various aspects of this relationship, among which we distinguish three of the most importance, in our thought. First, it is the role of cognitive science in the justification of logic. Secondly, the mutual influence of cognitive science and modern trends of non-classical logic, which have a clearly applied character. Third, we discuss the prospects of the so-called experimental logic arising from attempts to apply the methods of cognitive science in logic. As usual, the conclusion summarizes the results of the research and focuses on the issue of the status of pure logic.

Capacity-Free Automatic Processing of Facial Expressions of Emotion

Are facial expressions of emotion processed automatically? Some authors have not found this to be the case (Tomasik et al., 2009). Here we revisited the question with a novel experimental logic – the backward correspondence effect (BCE). In three dual-task studies, participants first categorized a sound (Task 1) and then indicated the location of a target face (Task 2). In Experiment 1, Task 2 required participants to search for one facial expression of emotion (angry or happy). We observed positive BCEs, indicating that facial expressions of emotion bypassed the central attentional bottleneck and thus were processed in a capacity-free, automatic manner. In Experiment 2, we replicated this effect but found that morphed emotional expressions (which were used by Tomasik) were not processed automatically. In Experiment 3, we observed similar BCEs for another type of face processing previously shown to be capacity-free – identification of familiar faces (Jung et al., 2013). We conclude that facial expressions of emotion are identified automatically when sufficiently unambiguous.

A user’s view of the validity of acceptability judgments as evidence for syntactic theories

The primary goal of this chapter is to discuss the validity of acceptability judgments as a data type. The author’s view is that acceptability judgments have most, if not all, of the hallmarks of a valid data type: syntacticians have a plausible theory of the source of acceptability judgments, a theory of how to leverage judgments for the construction of syntactic theories using experimental logic, and a set of evaluation criteria that are similar to those used for other data types in the broader field of psychology. At an empirical level, acceptability judgments have been shown to be relatively reliable across tasks and participants, to be relatively sensitive, and to be relatively free of theoretical bias. Therefore the author’s view is that acceptability judgments are at least as valid as other data types that are used in the broader field of language science.

Conceptualizing Testbed Planning: Urban Planning in the Intersection between Experimental and Public Sector Logics

Urban planning is, in many countries, increasingly becoming intertwined with local climate ambitions, investments in urban attractiveness and “smart city” innovation measures. In the intersection between these trends, urban experimentation has developed as a process where actors are granted action space to test innovations in a collaborative setting. One arena for urban experimentation is urban testbeds. Testbeds are sites of urban development, in which experimentation constitutes an integral part of planning and developing the area. This article introduces the notion of testbed planning as a way to conceptualize planning processes in delimited sites where planning is combined with processes of urban experimentation. We define testbed planning as a multi-actor, collaborative planning process in a delimited area, with the ambition to generate and disseminate learning while simultaneously developing the site. The aim of this article is to explore processes of testbed planning with regard to the role of urban planners. Using an institutional logics perspective we conceptualize planners as navigating between a public sector—and an experimental logic. The public sector logic constitutes the formal structure of “traditional” urban planning, and the experimental logic a collaborative and testing governance structure. Using examples from three Nordic municipalities, this article explores planning roles in experiments with autonomous buses in testbeds. The analysis shows that planners negotiate these logics in three different ways, combining and merging them, separating and moving between them or acting within a conflictual process where the public sector logic dominates.

Estudio De Caso: Comportamiento Mecanico Del Hierro Fundido Gris Perlitico Sometido Al Fenómeno De Termofluencia

The application of foundries has been extended in recent times due to the advancement in casting and cooling techniques. This leads to a better control of their mechanical properties by allowing them to replace steel in multiple applications. In this work, the results of an experimental study that seeks to obtain information on the combined effect of tension (1224 Kgf / cm2) and temperature (500, 550, 600 and 650 ° C) in the pearlitic gray cast iron was addressed. The methodology used is analytical, qualitative, quantitative, deductive, and experimental logic. The tests were carried out according to the ASTM E139 standard using flat specimens of reduced section sized according to ISO 6892: 1998 (E). From the specimens tested, specimens were extracted from the fractured area to perform metallographic and microhardness tests. The results showed that for the temperatures of 500, 550 and 600°C, no complete curves characteristic of the creep phenomenon were obtained, while at 650°C, the curve obtained was complete. Regarding the metallographic study, it did not present a considerable degradation at the different study temperatures despite reaching the fracture in all cases. From the study of the hardness, a similar behavior was obtained in the curves for all the specimens as measurements were made moving away from the fracture.

Ibn Taymiyya’s Criticism of Aristotelian Definition

Aristotle wrote of two “points of definition”: one posited in negative and the other in positive terms. The negative formulation argues that concepts can be comprehended only through definition, while the positive point stresses the consequences of definition by focusing on the benefits to the sciences achieved through those “concepts.” Ibn Taymiyya criticizes these ideas on the grounds that definition neither necessarily leads to the revelation of the facts and truths of things and their quiddities, nor does it necessarily help in developing the sciences. We notice that his main criticism is directed at specific metaphysical elements of definition, such as genus, species, differences (differentia/ divisions), quiddity, and universality. He argues that these elements are purely mental and do not necessarily correspond to existence. Ibn Taymiyya differentiates between metaphysics and the concrete physical world for, in his opinion, not all that comes to mind necessarily corresponds to existing objects in the concrete physical world. Therefore, human knowledge should be established on concrete rules subject to experiment. He therefore refutes the logic of quiddity, which depends upon pure intellect, and calls for an experimental logic devoid of metaphysics.