Goodbye Filibuster? Institutioneller Wandel im polarisierten US-Senat

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 830-851
Author(s):  
Florian Gawehns

The Filibuster, more a historical coincidence than a deliberate innovation, is one of the most powerful tools of minorities in the U .S . Senate . Historically known for never-ending talking marathons, it transformed the contemporary Senate into a supermajority institution undermined by partisan obstruction . The unilateral elimination of the Filibuster for nominations in 2013 and 2017, while symbolizing the breakdown of institutional norms in the Senate, demonstrates the enormous pressure faced by majorities to deliver substantial partisan successes to their base . Given the prospects for comprehensive rules reform, the future of the Filibuster is in doubt . A majoritarian Senate, while strengthening a majority party in unified control of government, could induce a broader reform movement, as it might reveal a “crisis of legitimacy” of equal federal representation in a polarized two-party system . [ZParl, vol . 50 (2019), no . 4, pp . 830 - 851]

1980 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rowland J. Harrison

This paper reviews recent developments with respect to constitutional jurisdiction over natural resources. Particular reference is made to discussions between the federal and pro vincial governments directed towards reallocation of authority. It also examines poten tial implications of the constitutional reform movement for the future regulation of the petroleum industry.


2015 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 84-104
Author(s):  
Simona Kustec Lipicer ◽  
Andrija Henjak

The main goal of this paper is to provide a descriptive analytical overview of the existing evolution of the Slovenian parliamentary arena since its transition to democracy and independence. The paper is divided into two main parts: (1) an overview of a normative insight into the parliamentary and party system, and (2) an analytical assessment of the structure of the parliamentary arena as it is reflected in electoral and parties’ choices and policy preferences. A look at the contemporary democratic parliamentary arena in Slovenia shows that it, in itself, has been quite stable, while, on the contrary, its main integral parts – political parties – have gradually become less stable and less predictable, especially in the second decade of democracy, which can potentially influence the future stability of parliamentary arena, too.


1982 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-50
Author(s):  
C. Edwin Gilmour

A central theme of contemporary literature on American political parties—a theme with a broad consensus that is uncommon in the discipline—is that the party system of the United States is in transition due to significant changes within the past two decades that distinguish the operation of today's party system from what it was before 1960. However, consensus is lacking as to the implications of these changes for the future status of the American party system. This paper has four broad objectives: 1. to review briefly the phenomenon of party re-alignment in American history as a useful perspective on the present party era; 2. to identify and discuss significant alterations in the party system since 1960 ; 3. to note various scenarios in the literature concerning the future of the parly system in ‘the United States and 4. to hazard a personal assessment of the scenarios as to their plausibility and probability.


2000 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ludger Helms

There are few Chapters of the Federal Republic'S History that could be written without a prominent reference to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Since 1949 Christian Democratic chancellors have led German governments for no less than 37 years. Even when in opposition, the Christian Democrats - composed at the national level of the CDU and the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU)1 - constituted more often than not the strongest parliamentary party group (Fraktion) in the Bundestag, such as after the federal elections of 1969, 1976 and 1980. Also at state level and in the Bundesrat, which represents the individual states (L-nder) in the national decision-making process, the Christian Democrats quite often held a dominant position justifying occasional remarks of a ‘CDU/CSU bias’ within the German party system.


2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 473-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard N. Magliocca

This essay places George W. Bush's presidency and the Bush administration in some historical context by applying the model of “political time” developed in recent books by Stephen Skowronek (2008) and Keith Whittington (2007). My thesis is that Bush's political failure during his second term was largely the result of structural tensions created by the attacks of September 11, 2001, that no leader could have overcome. This argument is an extension of Skowronek's and Whittington's views that the executive branch's relationship to other governing institutions is shaped primarily by the president's relative position in the party system. In essence, 9/11 undermined the coalition forged by Ronald Reagan by pushing President George W. Bush to pursue radical change. These actions could not be squared with his need, as the leader of the majority party, to maintain electoral stability. A presidency divided against itself in this way cannot, and did not, stand.


Author(s):  
James R. Clapper

This article discusses the intelligence-reform movement since the 9/11 attack. It particularly places emphasis on Defense Intelligence reforms. The article also explores the role of the Defense Intelligence in shaping and implementing law and executive guidance and policy. It also discusses how long-term, trusted relationships between key intelligence officials in place during 2007 to 2008 were a critical factor in events moving successfully through a number of contentious policy issues. The article ends with some views on the future directions of research in this field in order to bring the intelligence-reform movement to fruition.


Author(s):  
Agustí Bosch

This chapter examines the Spanish electoral system, meaning—first and foremost—the one used to elect the lower house (Congreso de los Diputados). After a brief description of its components, the chapter assesses how its scarce proportionality has traditionally led Spanish politics towards a two-party system. The chapter also assesses some other of its alleged outcomes (such as the malapportionment, the weight of the regional parties, or the robustness of democracy) and its prospects for the future. Finally, the chapter also examines the ‘other’ Spanish electoral systems—that is, the ones used to elect the Senate, the local councils, the regional parliaments, and the Spanish seats in the European Parliament.


2006 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 152-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Lodge
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Fiona Yap

In nations where the executive has budgetary control, how are spending decisions and allocations affected? Is intraparty conflict relevant? This article sets out to show that institutional rules and leadership roles affect budgetary outcomes. It makes the following argument: if intraparty conflict exists in a one-party dominant or majority-party system, the executive reduces spending to punish the party in the legislature; if no intraparty conflict exists, then the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party leader. If intraparty conflict exists in a minority government or majority-coalition within a competitive multiparty system, the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party or coalition leader. Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan between the 1970s and 2000 supports the theory. This study advances scholarship in three ways. First, it shows that institutional rules that provide the executive with agenda control also lead to the strategic use of the budgetary process and outcomes to generate loyalty to the executive as leader. Second, it reveals that this strategy affects spending outcomes in election years; this is an important caveat to electoral spending manipulations. Third, the strategic use of the budget to control intraparty conflict occurred prior to and following democratization; this reveals that institutional changes need to include modifications in rules for policy transformations.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document