scholarly journals Biological export controls: defending Australia from WMD proliferation

2003 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 33
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Export Control ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Export Controls ◽  
Policy Objectives

The current world climate has reinforced the need for vigilance in ensuring that goods originating from Australia are not diverted for use in a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme. Australia?s export control system plays a vital role in ensuring that we uphold our commitment to being a responsible exporter of defence and strategic goods and that any items exported are consistent with our strategic and security policy objectives.

Exportkontrolle zwischen europäischen und nationalen Interessen

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Bazan
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Export Control ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Institutional Power ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
European Trade ◽  
European Export

The European export control system of dual-use goods is a pillar in the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and for the protection of human rights. But who actually decides in the complex entanglement of national security interests, European trade policy and international prevention regimes which goods are allowed for export out of the European Union? In his study, which was awarded the “Aquila ascendens” knowledge prize of the DialogForum Sicherheitspolitik, Jonas Bazan analyses institutional power shifts in the European export control system and reveals whether a structural Europeanisation has taken place or whether the European institutions remain subordinate to national interests of the member states.

scholarly journals Controlling the Export of Digital and Emerging Technologies

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Machiko Kanetake
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Emerging Technologies ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Export Control ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Export Controls ◽  
The Us ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Regulatory Challenges

Abstract Dual-use export control regulates the trade of items which serve both civilian and military purposes. Justification for imposing export controls has been furnished by the need for safeguarding regional and international security, especially the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The rationale for applying export controls has been subject to challenges, however. This Security and Human Rights special issue addresses the underlying justification for imposing export controls by focusing on their technological fronts. Scott A. Jones’ piece sheds light on the regulatory challenges that have arisen for the US’ control over so-called “emerging” technologies. Cindy Whang moves on to compare the US’ approach with that of the EU’s dual-use export control. Ben Wagner proposes a set of policy options for the design of export controls on digital technologies, so that they can serve as an effective vehicle for promoting the protection of human rights.

ECONOMIC CONTRADICTIONS ARE RELATED TO THE USE AND TRANSFER OF DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Boguslavskyy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
New Technologies ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Export Controls ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Modern Economy ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Means Of Production

The article is devoted to the study of economic contradictions related to the use and transfer of dual-use goods and technologies. The article highlights different approaches to defining the categories «technology» and «dual-use technology». Types of dual-use technologies are outlined. The main economic contradictions related to the use and transfer of dual- use goods and technologies are identified: 1) contradictions related to the creation of new technologies that can be both useful in the civilian and military spheres; 2) contradictions related to the manufacture and use of dual-use goods; 3) Contradictions are related to the creation of new means of production that can be used both for the production of civilian goods and for CBRN; 4) contradictions in the use of technological processes for the civilian and military spheres; 5) contradictions related to the development of transport and improvement of methods of delivery of CBRN; 6) contradictions between the interests of economic development of different countries on the basis of the introduction of new technologies and non-proliferation of CBRN; 7) interstate political and economic contradictions regarding the CBRN; 8) contradictions between groups of countries and individual countries regarding the non-proliferation of CBRN; 9) contradictions related to environmental pollution in the process of manufacturing and testing of CBRN; 10) contradictions in the realization of economic and political interests between countries that have modern weapons of mass destruction and countries that do not possess these weapons; 11) contradictions regarding the protection of their national interests etc. The peculiarities of the transfer of dual-use goods and technologies in the modern economy are shown and it is determined that it acquires a network character. The need to apply export controls to the transfer of dual-use goods and technologies is emphasized.

Arms Export Controls under Siege of Globalisation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John N. T. Helferich
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
International Security ◽  
National Level ◽  
Export Control ◽  
Ir Theory ◽  
Export Controls ◽  
Arms Exports ◽  
Arms Export ◽  
German Security Policy ◽  
Control Regime

While defence industrial production is increasingly transnationalised, the control of arms exports still takes place almost exclusively on a national level. With the example of the German export control regime, this work analyses if the current situation yields arms export control risks that could undermine German security policy principles. Furhermore, inferences about IR theory are drawn based on the current regulation and its implementation. Looking at three particular case studies, this work finds that transnational production and trade indeed creates a number of arms diversion risks, however, these risks are predominantly a result of political choice rather than a phenomenon of hyper-globalisation. This work contributes to key discourses in International Security.

Untying the Gordian Knot: Evaluating the Legal Dimensions of the UN Weapons Inspection Programme in Iraq and Rethinking the Future

1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-322
Author(s):  
Rex J. Zedalis
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Global Security ◽  
World Community ◽  
Legal Problems ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

A variety of legal problems exist with the UN weapons inspection régime applicable to Iraq. These problems hinder the assurance that Iraq can be disarmed of the ability to produce biological or chemical weapons. Given this fact, the stalemate produced by the mid-December 1998 air strikes against that country might be best resolved by a reconfigured inspection program which aims at addressing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction efforts in the context of global security policy regarding such weaponry, with due account taken of the desires of Iraq's neighbors and the importance of reintegrating that nation into the world community.

6. Strategic Culture

2018 ◽  
pp. 89-107
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Lantis ◽  
Darryl Howlett
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
International Security ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Strategic Culture ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
State Behaviour ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theoretical Issues

This chapter discusses the ways that strategic culture can be relevant to scholarship and policymaking with regard to international security. It first provides an overview of three main approaches to the study of culture and strategy, paying attention to political culture as well as the relationship between strategic culture and nuclear deterrence. It then examines various sources of strategic culture identified in the literature, along with theoretical issues related to strategic culture. In particular, it explores the link between constructivism and strategic culture, the question of continuity in state behaviour and how strategic cultural dilemmas can cause changes in security policy, and the ‘keepers’ of strategic culture. The chapter also asks whether non-state, state, and multistate actors can possess distinctive strategic cultures before concluding with an analysis of the role of strategic culture in the acquisition of — and threats to use — weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

Israel’s National Security Policy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuck Freilich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Control Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Regional Power ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Demographic Challenges

Israel has responded to the uniquely harsh strategic environment it has faced ever since its establishment by developing defensive capabilities totally disproportionate to its size and has become a regional power, its existence no longer truly in doubt. Nevertheless, Israel continues to face the severe threats of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, rockets, and cyberattacks, primarily from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas; the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians; and demographic challenges. This article presents both the fundamental changes that have taken place in Israel’s strategic environment, from conventional, state-based threats to primarily asymmetrical ones, and the responses it has developed to date. It also addresses Israel’s relations with the United States and other primary international actors, as well as Israel’s nuclear and regional arms control policy.

scholarly journals Les contrôles américains sur les exportations stratégiques : historique et évolution

2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-727
Author(s):  
André Martel ◽  
Albert Legault
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Historical Survey ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Large Area ◽  
Export Controls ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Different Levels

A brief historical survey of the u.s. export controls on strategic goods indicate the importance of the Cold War in achieving these objectives as well as the importance of polycentrism across and within the institutions and agencies concerned. The proliferation of controls has brought about a large area of freedom for the implementation of foreign policy by the executive branch of the Government. After the end of the Cold War, one can surmise that the emphasis mil be felt at three different levels : a greater discretion by national actors in the implementation of export controls policy, a greater harmonization of multilateral efforts designed at promoting the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and greater cleavages between those who want to relax export controls for economic reasons and those who want to strengthen them for security reasons. On the whole, the multiplicity of legislative actions and organizations concerned can only reinforce the freedom of action of the executive branch of the Government.

Trade controls and non-proliferation: compliance costs, drivers and challenges

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Salisbury
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
International Market ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Market Place ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Export Controls ◽  
National Authority ◽  
Enabling Services ◽  
The Relationship

The private sector clearly has an increasingly important and well-defined role to play in slowing the flow of technology and preventing the provision of enabling services to states pursuing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and destabilising military capabilities. Exporters of proliferation-sensitive technology are frequently targeted by Iran and other countries. These countries are highly dependent on technology from the international market place to sustain their WMD and military programmes. Compliance with export controls only goes someway to ensuring that proliferation is prevented; a form of “over-compliance” is required to ensure that goods are not transferred to programmes of concern. This paper uses a significant quantity of primary data to consider the costs of compliance and over-compliance, the drivers for such processes, and the relationship between the national authority and firms and how this could be improved.

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