Civil-Military Relations Post-9/11

The People ◽

The World ◽

Special Operations Forces ◽

Military Relations ◽

Post-9/11 civil-military challenges associated with sustained military operations against assorted enemies in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and other regions around the world are examined through the Clausewitzian concept known as the "paradoxical trinity" of the people, the military establishment, and the civilian government. As America's wars are conducted by a consortium of land forces that General Peter Schoomaker once characterized as a "new strategic triad" composed of the Army and Marines with Special Operations Forces (SOF), the Clausewitzian framework is employed to help reassess three interrelated lessons drawn from the Vietnam War: the legality of war, the use of advanced weapons and their associated strategies, and the persistent debates over how best to employ military power focused on conventional versus unconventional forces' roles, missions, and tactics. Potential futures of landpower and civil-military relations are identified and discussed to challenge current political and military policies and stimulate further inquiry.

Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil–Military Relations

Armed Forces & Society ◽

10.1177/0095327x16667287 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 43 (3) ◽

pp. 395-414 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Donald S. Travis

Keyword(s):

Political Philosophy ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Establishment ◽

American Government ◽

The People ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

National Power ◽

Military Relations ◽

The U.S

How the U.S. military establishment interacts with other parts of the American government and the people impacts American national power. Because civil–military relationships are influenced by the context of the environment and the “kind of war” being waged, there are a variety of ways that military and civilian leaders can work together to improve the nation’s security. This article proposes an alternative civil–military relations model called pragmatic civilian control. It integrates Samuel Huntington’s objective civilian control theory with traditional American political philosophy and concepts established by Morris Janowitz, while accounting for current geopolitical conditions.

The New Civil-Military Relations

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055400124177 ◽

1961 ◽

Vol 55 (1) ◽

pp. 53-63 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Gene M. Lyons

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Minimum Cost ◽

The United States ◽

Fundamental Principle ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Establishment ◽

Military Leaders ◽

Military Relations ◽

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the “means of exercising civilian control” over the defense establishment was to “safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism.” This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide “the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost,” the report made it clear that this had to be achieved “without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.” Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a “Prussianized” military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.

Thailand: Camouflaged Khakistocracy in Civil–Military Relations

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1859 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Paul W. Chambers

Keyword(s):

Prime Minister ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Military Power ◽

Authoritarian Rule ◽

The World ◽

History Of ◽

Military Relations ◽

The history of civil–military relations in Thailand has paralleled the gradual post-1980 primacy of monarchical power over the country. Until 1932, the monarchy ruled absolute across Siam (Thailand). From 1932 until 1980, the military held more clout than the monarchy (though the palace slowly increased its influence after 1957). Since 1980, monarchy and military have dominated the country with the military as junior partner. The two form a khakistocracy: the military’s uniform color of khaki combined with the aristocracy (monarchy). Though there have been brief instances of elected civilian governments, all were overthrown by the military. In fact, Thailand likely holds the record for the highest number of military putsches in the world. Since the death of King Bhumipol Adulyadej in 2016, the clout of the armed forces has become more centralized under his successor and son King Maha Vajiralongkorn. At the same time, post-2019 Prime Minister (and post-2014 junta leader) General Prayuth Chanocha has sought to entrench military power across Thailand. As a result, in 2021, the monarchy and military continue to enhance authoritarian rule as a khakistocracy camouflaged behind the guise of a charade form of democracy. Civil–military relations represent exclusively a partnership between the monarch and the armed forces.

Retirement Day

Boy on the Bridge ◽

10.5810/kentucky/9780813178028.003.0021 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 291-303

Author(s):

Andrew Marble

Keyword(s):

First Century ◽

Military Operations ◽

Partnership For Peace ◽

Us Military ◽

The Us ◽

Military Relations ◽

Operations Other Than War ◽

Historic Change ◽

The chapter is set at Fort Myer, Virginia, on September 30, 1997, the day General John Shalikashvili retired from the US military. The chapter overviews the retirement ceremony from Shalikashvili’s perspective as he reviews the honor guard with President William J. Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen and thinks back to that night when he first laid eyes on US soldiers in Pappenheim and the role that luck has played in his attaining the American dream. The chapter also thumbnails his accomplishments as chairman: (1) confronting historic change, especially by realizing Partnership for Peace and NATO expansion, (2) was more supportive of non-traditional military missions (military operations other than war, MOOTW), (3) prepared the US military for the challenges of the twenty-first century, particularly by downsizing the military yet upgrading their capability and readiness, including by emphasizing joint education, joint planning, and joint training, and (4) rebalanced civil-military relations. The chapter ends with Shalikashvili’s closing remarks, emphasizing his love for soldiers and their families.

Crisis in the Civil-Military Triangle?

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0011 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 191-206

Author(s):

William E. Rapp

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

Us Military ◽

The People ◽

The Us ◽

High Regard ◽

The Government ◽

Military Relations ◽

Despite the high regard for the US military by the American public, a number of tensions continue to grow in civil-military relations in the United States. These are exacerbated by a lack of clarity, and thus productive debate, in the various relationships inherent in civil and military interaction. By trisecting civil military relations into the relations between the people and the military, the military and the government, and the people and the government on military issues, this chapter examines the potential for crisis in coming years. Doing so allows for greater theoretical and popular understanding and thus action in addressing the tensions, for there is cause for concern and action in each of the legs of this interconnected triangle.

Civil-Military Affairs and Security Institutions in the Southern Cone: The Sources of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation

Latin American Politics and Society ◽

10.1111/j.1548-2456.2004.tb00292.x ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 46 (4) ◽

pp. 29-60 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez

Keyword(s):

Political Institutions ◽

Southern Cone ◽

Democratic Peace ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Establishment ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

International Participation ◽

Military Relations ◽

AbstractThis paper analyzes the conditions in which the governments of Argentina and Brazil founded security institutions in the early 1990s, while they were democratizing. It advances the hypothesis that international cooperation in the security field is often linked to the evolution of civil-military relations. Civilian leaders in both countries established institutions and sought international participation deliberately to achieve civilian control and gain leverage over the military establishment, which they sorely distrusted. The need to stabilize civil-military relations at home was therefore the prime motivating force behind the emergence of security institutions in the Southern Cone. Three mechanisms were at work: omnibalancing, policy handling, and managing uncertainty. These mechanisms are derived from three different schools of thought: realism, organizational-bureaucratic models, and theories of domestic political institutions. Besides explaining the sources of nuclear bilateral cooperation, this argument also serves as a critique of two prominent theories in international relations that attempt to explain cooperation and peaceful relations among democracies: neoliberal insti-tutionalism and democratic peace theory.

The Military and Civil Supremacy in Indonesian Democracy: Towards an Ideal Model in Siyāsah Sharʻiyyah Perspective

Al-Risalah ◽

10.30631/al-risalah.v19i2.488 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 19 (2) ◽

pp. 159

Author(s):

Agus Suntoro

Keyword(s):

Dual Function ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Operations ◽

Function Concept ◽

Ideal Model ◽

Military Reform ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Military ◽

The Ideal

In the history of Indonesia, civil-military relations changed in the reformasi era with the separation of the military and the police, resulting in the removal of the dual-function doctrine and military reform. Despite so, two decades after reformasi has not formed a standard and ideal mechanism to govern civil-military relations within the framework of objective civilian control. This paper addresses issues regarding (a) how the dual-function concept and internal reform within the military; (b) regulatory issues that govern military operations other than war; (c) the ideal model of civil-military relations in Indonesia to ensure democratic life and an overview of the siyāsah sharʻiyyah aspects. Using descriptive qualitative method and conducting discussions with military and human rights experts, this paper demonstrates that military reform in Indonesia after the New Order has not yet been fruitful to accomplish the mission to form professional soldiers. The military is still involved in political and civilian life under the pretext that there is no military assistance law. As a consequence, the ideal model of civilian control that puts the military under the control of civilian authority according to siyāsah sharʻiyyah principle has not been fully successful and effective.

Military Intervention in Politics: Contrasting Cases of Pakistan and India

India Quarterly A Journal of International Affairs ◽

10.1177/097492848203800303 ◽

1982 ◽

Vol 38 (3-4) ◽

pp. 302-316

Author(s):

Veena Kukereja

Keyword(s):

Political Systems ◽

British India ◽

Military Establishment ◽

Military Organization ◽

Explanatory Variables ◽

Several Variables ◽

Military Relations ◽

Civilian Authority ◽

It is interesting to note that, although the Pakistani and Indian political systems share many common features relating to history, military organization and an overall areal culture, the two systems have displayed contrasting patterns of civil-military relations. The armies of both the countries inherited the British Indian military traditions of non-involvement in politics, but in Pakistan the Army eroded this tradition by intervening decisively and frequently whereas in India, the principle of civilian supremacy remains intact. Their post-independence development, composition, and relationship with the civilian authority has been markedly different. This had a direct bearing upon the divergent roles of the armies of the two countries. Given the variety of hypotheses that have been suggested as explanations for the contrasting behaviour of the two successor armies of British India, this article would examine several variables and relationships in comparative perspective under two sets of theoretical explanatory variables that are too often kept separate. These are: 1 the internal features of the military establishment1 and 2 the external or environmental variables.2

Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries

India Quarterly A Journal of International Affairs ◽

10.1177/097492848904500202 ◽

1989 ◽

Vol 45 (2-3) ◽

pp. 154-192 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Veena Kukreja

Keyword(s):

Developing Countries ◽

Political System ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The Other ◽

Future Research ◽

The Political ◽

The World ◽

Military Relations ◽

Students of civil-military relations, particularly those in the developing countries, admit having to work on myopic assumptions, meagre data, sloppy conceptualization and inelegant explanations. The relative newness of this area of studies could be one reason for this. The study of civil-military relations in the narrow sense referring mainly to military coups and interventions, has attained importance after World War II. But the study of civil-military relations in the broader perspective of multiplicity of relationships between military men, institutions and interests, on the one hand, and diverse and often conflicting non-military organizations and political personages and interests on the other, has begun to draw academic interest only in the last two decades or so. In the twentieth century, the armed forces, being an universal and integral part of a nation's political system, no longer remain completely aloof from politics in any nation. If politics is concerned, in David Easton's celebrated words, with the authoritative allocation of values and power within a society, the military as a vital institution in the polity can hardly be wished out of participatory bounds, at least for legitimate influence as an institutional interest group with a stake in the political decision-making. The varying roles the military may play in politics range from minimal legitimate influence by means of recognized channels inherent in their position and responsibilities within the political system to the other extreme of total displacement of the civilian government in the forms of illegitimate overt military intervention in politics. This paper seeks to attempt an overview of the existing scholarship on civil-military relations; second, it examines civil-military relations in the world with special reference to major political systems of the world; third, it surveys the literature on civil-military relations in general, and finally, it attempts to develop a general, complex, and hopefully fruitful causal model for analyzing the dynamics of civil-military relations; exploring implications for future research on civil-military relations.

Turkey

10.1093/oso/9780198790501.003.0009 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Yaprak Gursoy

Keyword(s):

Armed Forces ◽

Political Islam ◽

Military Operations ◽

Military Relations ◽

International Peacekeeping ◽

Peacekeeping Missions ◽

The Military ◽

Coup Attempt

Since 1991, the Turkish armed forces (TAF) have experienced major transformations in the spheres of civil–military relations, military operations, and military capabilities; yet there have also been elements of continuity. While the military has come under the control of civilians, the 2016 coup attempt showed that old patterns of behaviour continue and reflect conflict among various groups and issues, including political Islam. In the sphere of military operations, TAF has participated in international peacekeeping missions, but has also become embroiled in the Syrian war and carried out unilateral operations in Iraq against Kurdish groups. Finally, Turkey has increased its military capabilities, but it is still dependent on Western powers for technological expertise. Overall, there is a mismatch between Turkey’s power aspirations and the domestic and regional circumstances it faces, leading to continuities despite the changes.