Otherness in Cinematography

Glimpse ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 119-123
Author(s):  
Tanit Guadalupe Serrano Arias ◽  

The dialogue in this paper is aimed at reflecting the form of representation of The Other within the cinematography from the philosophical point of view. For this, we support our study in Ethics as the first philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. The questions that trouble this study are: What is otherness? Who is the other? Why is it necessary to think about otherness in cinematography?Here we reflect on the recognition of the Other, of the different individual, of the foreign. Cinema allows to recognize the existence of other subjects, from a double look, as spectators, but also as creators. What motivates the reflection of otherness from the human relationships that are interwoven, as well as the cultural character of all perception, referring to the notion of the other as interior to the field of being.

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Carlos Alvaréz Teijeiro

Emmanuel Lévinas, the philosopher of ethics par excellence in the twentieth century, and by own merit one of the most important ethical philosophers in the history of western philosophy, is also the philosopher of the Other. Thereby, it can be said that no thought has deepened like his in the ups and downs of the ethical relationship between subject and otherness. The general objective of this work is to expose in a simple and understandable way some ideas that tend to be quite dark in the philosophical work of the author, since his profuse religious production will not be analyzed here. It is expected to show that his ideas about the being and the Other are relevant to better understand interpersonal relationships in times of 4.0 (re)evolution. As specific objectives, this work aims to expose in chronological order the main works of the thinker, with special emphasis on his ethical implications: Of the evasion (1935), The time and the Other (1947), From the existence to the existent (1947), Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority (1961) and, last, Otherwise than being, or beyond essence (1974). In the judgment of Lévinas, history of western philosophy starting with Greece, has shown an unusual concern for the Being, this is, it has basically been an ontology and, accordingly, it has relegated ethics to a second or third plane. On the other hand and in a clear going against the tide movement, our author supports that ethics should be considered the first philosophy and more, even previous to the proper philosophize. This novel approach implies, as it is supposed, that the essential question of the philosophy slows down its origin around the Being in order to inquire about the Other: it is a philosophy in first person. Such a radical change of perspective generates an underlying change in how we conceive interpersonal relationships, the complex framework of meanings around the relationship Me and You, which also philosopher Martin Buber had already spoken of. As Lévinas postulates that ethics is the first philosophy, this involves that the Other claims all our attention, intellectual and emotional, to the point of considering that the relationship with the Other is one of the measures of our identity. Thus, “natural” attitude –husserlian word not used by Lévinas- would be to be in permanent disposition regarding to the meeting with the Other, to be in permanent opening state to let ourselves be questioned by him. Ontology, as the author says, being worried about the Being, has been likewise concerned about the Existence, when the matter is to concern about the particular Existent that every otherness supposes for us. In conclusion it can be affirmed that levinasian ethics of the meeting with the Other, particular Face, irreducible to the assumption, can contribute with an innovative looking to (re)evolving the interpersonal relationships in a 4.0 context.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abimael Francisco do Nascimento

The general objective of this study is to analyze the postulate of the ethics of otherness as the first philosophy, presented by Emmanuel Levinas. It is a proposal that runs through Levinas' thinking from his theoretical foundations, to his philosophical criticism. Levinas' thought presents itself as a new thought, as a critique of ontology and transcendental philosophy. For him, the concern with knowledge and with being made the other to be forgotten, placing the other in totality. Levinas proposes the ethics of otherness as sensitivity to the other. The subject says here I am, making myself responsible for the other in an infinite way, in a transcendence without return to myself, becoming hostage to the other, as an irrefutable responsibility. The idea of the infinite, present in the face of the other, points to a responsibility whoever more assumes himself, the more one is responsible, until the substitution by other.


Semiotica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (209) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Augusto Ponzio

AbstractIt is not with the State that personal responsibility arises towards the other. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the other is every single human being I am responsible for, and I am this responsibility for him. The other, my fellow, is the first comer. But I do not live in a world with just one single “first comer”; there is always another other, a third, who is also my other, my fellow. Otherness, beginning with this third, is a plurality. Proximity as responsibility is a plurality. There is a need for justice. There is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others. This is what is hidden, unsaid, implied in legal discourse. But recourse to comparison among that which cannot be compared, among that which is incomparable is justified by love of justice for the other. It is this justification that confers a sense to law, which is always dura lex, and to the statement that citizens are equal before the law. From this point of view, State justice is always imperfect with respect to human rights understood as the rights of the other, of every other in his absolute difference, in his incomparable otherness.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-139
Author(s):  
Sophie Galabru

In Time and narrative then in Oneself as another Paul Ricœur proposes a philosophy of personal and collective identity, through research on time and narrative. According to these books, emplotment would synthesize and reconcile the temporal discordance, experienced by the selfhood. The subject’s fragmentation by the otherness of time could then define vulnerability. Our aim is to question this triad time-vulnerability-narrative thanks to the opposite positions of Emmanuel Levinas. Unlike Ricœur, Levinas severely criticizes the idea of memory and narrative in order to respect the vulnerability of the other. Yet, the Ricœurian analysis of the responsibility affirms the need for a capable and not dispossessed Self. From this point of view, Ricœur helps us to question the limits set by Levinas to narrative and leads us to wonder if the ethical plot for the vulnerability of others does not need memory and narrative.


Humanities ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 114
Author(s):  
Mette Blok

This essay aims to give an overview of the topic ethics and literature in Stanley Cavell’s complete oeuvre. It argues that Cavell’s preoccupation with literature is, from beginning to end, primarily ethical, even though he takes his point of departure in epistemological skepticism. Recent research on the affinities between Cavell’s early writing on Shakespearean tragedy and the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas has helped to establish this but the question of how this part of Cavell’s work is related to his later development of Emersonian perfectionism is rarely touched upon. Consequently, this essay further argues that skepticism and perfectionism in Cavell’s thinking are two sides of one and the same ethics, which are bound together by the genre of romanticism. While Cavell’s work on skepticism is primarily concerned with the other, his work on perfectionism is primarily concerned with the self. Finally, this essay marks the point where Cavell’s and Levinas’ overall thinking part ways due to the fact that Cavell embraces Emersonian perfectionism.


2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciro Augusto Floriani ◽  
Fermin Roland Schramm

AbstractHospitality is commonly referred as one of the meanings of hospes, the Latin word which is also the root of hospice. This article explores the semantics of the word hospice - the seal of identity of modern hospice movement - and attempts to integrate the meaning of hospitality into the modern hospice movement, understood as unconditional reception. Therefore, the article analyzes the concept of unconditional hospitality, developed by Jacques Derrida and that of ethical responsibility proposed by Emmanuel Levinas based on the phenomenological experience of the other. From this point of view, these two concepts tie in with the meaning of hospice, bringing substantial grounding elements to the hospice movement for the construction of a protective ethos.


2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-167
Author(s):  
Mitchell Cowen Verter

Many readers of Emmanuel Levinas understand his thought as being oriented only by transcendence and therefore denigrate the immanent dimension of metaphor within his texts. Such readings reduce the complexities of Levinas’s text to a set of polemical, orthodox proclamations such as The Other is Most High and Ethics is First Philosophy. However, Levinas’s work invites us to contemplate not only transcendence, but also the way that immanence emerges though relationships with an infinitude of others, third persons whose voices murmur within the system of language, articulated in concrete elements such as metaphor. Levinas employs metaphor to converse with the inherited ways that temporal becoming has been articulated, recurrently reorienting them to expose a variety of ethical-phenomenological constellations. To expose the dynamics that remain clandestine to the orthodox interpretation, this paper will chronologically trace the development of various families of metaphors such as those of having and doing; those of dimensionality, those of orality, those of familiarity, and those of birth, gender, and death, thereby demonstrating the multitude of roles and perspectival positions assumed by the subject during its temporal becoming.


Problemos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Šerpytytė

Straipsnyje svarstoma Emmanuelio Levino mąstymo įrašymo į nihilizmo kontekstą galimybė. Levinas priklauso tai epochai, kuri, žvelgiant iš vakarietiškos perspektyvos, gali būti įvardyta nihilistine „par excellence“. Tad koks yra Levino mąstymo santykis su nihilizmu? Ar didysis Levino iššūkis Vakarų filosofijai nėra iššūkis prieš jos nihilizmą? Levinui, kaip ir Heideggeriui, nihilizmas yra „įvykis“, paliečiantis ne tik tam tikros epochos dvasią –moralę, religiją, politiką ir t. t., bet ir priskirtinas pačiam mąstymui kaip būties mąstymui. Tad nihilizmo „topos“ Levinui yra ta pati jau Vakarų mąstymo identifikuota dvasios ir būties „sfera“. Bet ar galima sakyti, kad Levino požiūris į nihilizmo fenomeną yra sutampantis su pačios Vakarų filosofijos nihilizmo savimone? Nors Vakarų filosofijoje įmanu įžvelgti ne vieną nihilizmo modelį, Vakarų mąstymui, pačiai jo tapatybei bei jos savivokai ypač svarbus yra nihilizmas, suprantamas kaip Überwindung (peržengimo, įveikos) teorija. Straipsnyje atskleidžiama, kad Levino filosofija reikalauja ne įveikti nihilizmą, o „pabėgti“ iš paties tokia „logika“ grindžiamo mąstymo. Mąstymas, kurį „grindžia“ nihilizmo „logika“, yra totalizuojantis būties mąstymas. Tad Levinui pabėgimas reiškia „pabėgimą“ „iš smaugiančios būties kilpos“, būties plotmės „apleidimą“. Ar Levinui pavyksta įvykdyti tai, ko nėra pavykę visai Vakarų metafizikai – atlikti (nihilizmo) įveikos, peržengimo judesį? Levinas vartoja tas pačias Vakarų metafizikos nihilistinę patirtį įprasminančias meta-fizikos, transcendento sąvokas, bet nukreipia jas prieš pačią nihilistinę Vakarų mąstymo „logiką“. Totalybės nuotrūkis (suardymas) Levinui įvyksta ne grynojo mąstymo plotmėje. Prasmė nėra „atgaunama“ kaip tai, ką Vakarų ontologijos nihilistinė „savimonė“ laikė esant prarasta. Ji aptinkama kitaip nei būtis – kaip Kitas. Tad leviniškasis Kito kaip kito mąstymas nėra įvykęs nihilizmo Überwindung: tai mąstymas, kuris steigiasi kaip pabėgimas iš paties tokio Vienio nostalgijos valdomo reikalavimo. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: nihilizmas, Būtis, Vakarų mąstymas, Überwindung, différance.Nihilism and the Problem of Sense: E. LevinasRita Šerpytytė SummaryIn the article, attempt is made to reveal the relation between Emmanuel Levinas’ thinking and nihilism. Levinas belongs to the epoch, which, from the Western perspective, can be called nihilistic par excellence. What is the relation of Levinas’ thought to nihilism then? Can the great challenge of Levinas to Western philosophy be interpreted as a challenge to (its) nihilism? Levinas, like Heidegger, does not regard nihilism as an “event” that concerns just the spirit – morality, religion, politics and so on – of a certain epoch, but assigns it to the thought itself as the thought of Being. Thus the topos of nihilism for Levinas is the very same “sphere” of spirit and Being identified already by the Western thought. Is it possible, however, to say that Levinas’ attitude to the phenomenon of nihilism coincides with the actual self-consciousness of nihilism in Western philosophy? Although in Western philosophy we may notice different models of nihilism, the understanding of nihilism as the theory of Überwindung (transgression, overcoming) is highly important for the Western thought, its identity, and its self-consciousness.In Levinas’ point of view, the Western thought, based on the nihilistic “logic”, by itself is the thinking from the perspective of totality. The requirement of overcoming nihilism is based on the nihilistic “logic” as well. Levinas’ philosophy requires not the overcoming of nihilism, but “escaping” from one’s own thinking based on such logic. Thinking “based on” the “logic” of nihilism is the totalizing thinking of Being. Therefore, escaping for Levinas means the “escaping” from the “strangling noose of Being” and the “desolation” of the level of Being. Does Levinas succeed in accomplishing what Western metaphysics has never accomplished, i.e. in performing the movement of overcoming and transgression of nihilism? Levinas applies the same conceptions of metaphysics and trans-cendent that gives sense to the nihilistic experience of Western metaphysics, although he maintains them against the nihilistic “logic” of Western thinking itself. The break (demolition) of totality appears for Levinas not in the plane of pure thinking. The meaning cannot be “regained” as something that, according to nihilistic “self-consciousness” of Western ontology, was lost. Otherwise than Being, it can be detected as the Other. Therefore Levinasian thinking of the Other as other is not the accomplishment of nihilistic Überwindung: it is a thinking that establishes itself as escaping from the requirement controlled by the nostalgia of the same One. Keywords: nihilism, Being, Western thought, Überwindung, différance.


2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reimer Kornmann

Summary: My comment is basically restricted to the situation in which less-able students find themselves and refers only to literature in German. From this point of view I am basically able to confirm Marsh's results. It must, however, be said that with less-able pupils the opposite effect can be found: Levels of self-esteem in these pupils are raised, at least temporarily, by separate instruction, academic performance however drops; combined instruction, on the other hand, leads to improved academic performance, while levels of self-esteem drop. Apparently, the positive self-image of less-able pupils who receive separate instruction does not bring about the potential enhancement of academic performance one might expect from high-ability pupils receiving separate instruction. To resolve the dilemma, it is proposed that individual progress in learning be accentuated, and that comparisons with others be dispensed with. This fosters a self-image that can in equal measure be realistic and optimistic.


Author(s):  
I. R. Khuzina ◽  
V. N. Komarov

The paper considers a point of view, based on the conception of the broad understanding of taxons. According to this point of view, rhyncholites of the subgenus Dentatobeccus and Microbeccus are accepted to be synonymous with the genus Rhynchoteuthis, and subgenus Romanovichella is considered to be synonymous with the genus Palaeoteuthis. The criteria, exercising influence on the different approaches to the classification of rhyncholites, have been analyzed (such as age and individual variability, sexual dimorphism, pathological and teratological features, degree of disintegration of material), underestimation of which can lead to inaccuracy. Divestment of the subgenuses Dentatobeccus, Microbeccus and Romanovichella, possessing very bright morphological characteristics, to have an independent status and denomination to their synonyms, has been noted to be unjustified. An artificial system (any suggested variant) with all its minuses is a single probable system for rhyncholites. The main criteria, minimizing its negative sides and proving the separation of the new taxon, is an available mass-scale material. The narrow understanding of the genus, used in sensible limits, has been underlined to simplify the problem of the passing the view about the genus to the other investigators and recognition of rhyncholites for the practical tasks.


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