scholarly journals NIHILIZMAS IR PRASMĖS PROBLEMA: E. LEVINAS

Problemos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Šerpytytė

Straipsnyje svarstoma Emmanuelio Levino mąstymo įrašymo į nihilizmo kontekstą galimybė. Levinas priklauso tai epochai, kuri, žvelgiant iš vakarietiškos perspektyvos, gali būti įvardyta nihilistine „par excellence“. Tad koks yra Levino mąstymo santykis su nihilizmu? Ar didysis Levino iššūkis Vakarų filosofijai nėra iššūkis prieš jos nihilizmą? Levinui, kaip ir Heideggeriui, nihilizmas yra „įvykis“, paliečiantis ne tik tam tikros epochos dvasią –moralę, religiją, politiką ir t. t., bet ir priskirtinas pačiam mąstymui kaip būties mąstymui. Tad nihilizmo „topos“ Levinui yra ta pati jau Vakarų mąstymo identifikuota dvasios ir būties „sfera“. Bet ar galima sakyti, kad Levino požiūris į nihilizmo fenomeną yra sutampantis su pačios Vakarų filosofijos nihilizmo savimone? Nors Vakarų filosofijoje įmanu įžvelgti ne vieną nihilizmo modelį, Vakarų mąstymui, pačiai jo tapatybei bei jos savivokai ypač svarbus yra nihilizmas, suprantamas kaip Überwindung (peržengimo, įveikos) teorija. Straipsnyje atskleidžiama, kad Levino filosofija reikalauja ne įveikti nihilizmą, o „pabėgti“ iš paties tokia „logika“ grindžiamo mąstymo. Mąstymas, kurį „grindžia“ nihilizmo „logika“, yra totalizuojantis būties mąstymas. Tad Levinui pabėgimas reiškia „pabėgimą“ „iš smaugiančios būties kilpos“, būties plotmės „apleidimą“. Ar Levinui pavyksta įvykdyti tai, ko nėra pavykę visai Vakarų metafizikai – atlikti (nihilizmo) įveikos, peržengimo judesį? Levinas vartoja tas pačias Vakarų metafizikos nihilistinę patirtį įprasminančias meta-fizikos, transcendento sąvokas, bet nukreipia jas prieš pačią nihilistinę Vakarų mąstymo „logiką“. Totalybės nuotrūkis (suardymas) Levinui įvyksta ne grynojo mąstymo plotmėje. Prasmė nėra „atgaunama“ kaip tai, ką Vakarų ontologijos nihilistinė „savimonė“ laikė esant prarasta. Ji aptinkama kitaip nei būtis – kaip Kitas. Tad leviniškasis Kito kaip kito mąstymas nėra įvykęs nihilizmo Überwindung: tai mąstymas, kuris steigiasi kaip pabėgimas iš paties tokio Vienio nostalgijos valdomo reikalavimo. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: nihilizmas, Būtis, Vakarų mąstymas, Überwindung, différance.Nihilism and the Problem of Sense: E. LevinasRita Šerpytytė SummaryIn the article, attempt is made to reveal the relation between Emmanuel Levinas’ thinking and nihilism. Levinas belongs to the epoch, which, from the Western perspective, can be called nihilistic par excellence. What is the relation of Levinas’ thought to nihilism then? Can the great challenge of Levinas to Western philosophy be interpreted as a challenge to (its) nihilism? Levinas, like Heidegger, does not regard nihilism as an “event” that concerns just the spirit – morality, religion, politics and so on – of a certain epoch, but assigns it to the thought itself as the thought of Being. Thus the topos of nihilism for Levinas is the very same “sphere” of spirit and Being identified already by the Western thought. Is it possible, however, to say that Levinas’ attitude to the phenomenon of nihilism coincides with the actual self-consciousness of nihilism in Western philosophy? Although in Western philosophy we may notice different models of nihilism, the understanding of nihilism as the theory of Überwindung (transgression, overcoming) is highly important for the Western thought, its identity, and its self-consciousness.In Levinas’ point of view, the Western thought, based on the nihilistic “logic”, by itself is the thinking from the perspective of totality. The requirement of overcoming nihilism is based on the nihilistic “logic” as well. Levinas’ philosophy requires not the overcoming of nihilism, but “escaping” from one’s own thinking based on such logic. Thinking “based on” the “logic” of nihilism is the totalizing thinking of Being. Therefore, escaping for Levinas means the “escaping” from the “strangling noose of Being” and the “desolation” of the level of Being. Does Levinas succeed in accomplishing what Western metaphysics has never accomplished, i.e. in performing the movement of overcoming and transgression of nihilism? Levinas applies the same conceptions of metaphysics and trans-cendent that gives sense to the nihilistic experience of Western metaphysics, although he maintains them against the nihilistic “logic” of Western thinking itself. The break (demolition) of totality appears for Levinas not in the plane of pure thinking. The meaning cannot be “regained” as something that, according to nihilistic “self-consciousness” of Western ontology, was lost. Otherwise than Being, it can be detected as the Other. Therefore Levinasian thinking of the Other as other is not the accomplishment of nihilistic Überwindung: it is a thinking that establishes itself as escaping from the requirement controlled by the nostalgia of the same One. Keywords: nihilism, Being, Western thought, Überwindung, différance.

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Carlos Alvaréz Teijeiro

Emmanuel Lévinas, the philosopher of ethics par excellence in the twentieth century, and by own merit one of the most important ethical philosophers in the history of western philosophy, is also the philosopher of the Other. Thereby, it can be said that no thought has deepened like his in the ups and downs of the ethical relationship between subject and otherness. The general objective of this work is to expose in a simple and understandable way some ideas that tend to be quite dark in the philosophical work of the author, since his profuse religious production will not be analyzed here. It is expected to show that his ideas about the being and the Other are relevant to better understand interpersonal relationships in times of 4.0 (re)evolution. As specific objectives, this work aims to expose in chronological order the main works of the thinker, with special emphasis on his ethical implications: Of the evasion (1935), The time and the Other (1947), From the existence to the existent (1947), Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority (1961) and, last, Otherwise than being, or beyond essence (1974). In the judgment of Lévinas, history of western philosophy starting with Greece, has shown an unusual concern for the Being, this is, it has basically been an ontology and, accordingly, it has relegated ethics to a second or third plane. On the other hand and in a clear going against the tide movement, our author supports that ethics should be considered the first philosophy and more, even previous to the proper philosophize. This novel approach implies, as it is supposed, that the essential question of the philosophy slows down its origin around the Being in order to inquire about the Other: it is a philosophy in first person. Such a radical change of perspective generates an underlying change in how we conceive interpersonal relationships, the complex framework of meanings around the relationship Me and You, which also philosopher Martin Buber had already spoken of. As Lévinas postulates that ethics is the first philosophy, this involves that the Other claims all our attention, intellectual and emotional, to the point of considering that the relationship with the Other is one of the measures of our identity. Thus, “natural” attitude –husserlian word not used by Lévinas- would be to be in permanent disposition regarding to the meeting with the Other, to be in permanent opening state to let ourselves be questioned by him. Ontology, as the author says, being worried about the Being, has been likewise concerned about the Existence, when the matter is to concern about the particular Existent that every otherness supposes for us. In conclusion it can be affirmed that levinasian ethics of the meeting with the Other, particular Face, irreducible to the assumption, can contribute with an innovative looking to (re)evolving the interpersonal relationships in a 4.0 context.


Author(s):  
Meir Sendor

This chapter analyses the common and unfortunate trend in interfaith dialogue of ‘neutralizing’ the Other. In an attempt to find commonality, neutralization introduces syncretism and relativism into interfaith discourse. Worse still, it does violence to the unique character of each religion and its practitioners who participate in the dialogue. According to Emmanuel Levinas, to proceed in this way is to doom the possibility of real relationship from the start and to fall prey to the most insidious and destructive habit of Western thought: the deception of the Neutral that derives from the tyranny of the Same. Meanwhile, Jacques Derrida repeatedly explored the nature of hospitality at length, employing it as a paradigm for the dynamics of interfaith relations. Finally, Paul Ricoeur's notion of the conscience, of the reciprocity of Otherness, of the response within responsibility, contributes an essential element to the groundwork for an authentic relationship outlined by Levinas and Derrida.


Semiotica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (209) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Augusto Ponzio

AbstractIt is not with the State that personal responsibility arises towards the other. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the other is every single human being I am responsible for, and I am this responsibility for him. The other, my fellow, is the first comer. But I do not live in a world with just one single “first comer”; there is always another other, a third, who is also my other, my fellow. Otherness, beginning with this third, is a plurality. Proximity as responsibility is a plurality. There is a need for justice. There is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others. This is what is hidden, unsaid, implied in legal discourse. But recourse to comparison among that which cannot be compared, among that which is incomparable is justified by love of justice for the other. It is this justification that confers a sense to law, which is always dura lex, and to the statement that citizens are equal before the law. From this point of view, State justice is always imperfect with respect to human rights understood as the rights of the other, of every other in his absolute difference, in his incomparable otherness.


Glimpse ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 119-123
Author(s):  
Tanit Guadalupe Serrano Arias ◽  

The dialogue in this paper is aimed at reflecting the form of representation of The Other within the cinematography from the philosophical point of view. For this, we support our study in Ethics as the first philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. The questions that trouble this study are: What is otherness? Who is the other? Why is it necessary to think about otherness in cinematography?Here we reflect on the recognition of the Other, of the different individual, of the foreign. Cinema allows to recognize the existence of other subjects, from a double look, as spectators, but also as creators. What motivates the reflection of otherness from the human relationships that are interwoven, as well as the cultural character of all perception, referring to the notion of the other as interior to the field of being.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-139
Author(s):  
Sophie Galabru

In Time and narrative then in Oneself as another Paul Ricœur proposes a philosophy of personal and collective identity, through research on time and narrative. According to these books, emplotment would synthesize and reconcile the temporal discordance, experienced by the selfhood. The subject’s fragmentation by the otherness of time could then define vulnerability. Our aim is to question this triad time-vulnerability-narrative thanks to the opposite positions of Emmanuel Levinas. Unlike Ricœur, Levinas severely criticizes the idea of memory and narrative in order to respect the vulnerability of the other. Yet, the Ricœurian analysis of the responsibility affirms the need for a capable and not dispossessed Self. From this point of view, Ricœur helps us to question the limits set by Levinas to narrative and leads us to wonder if the ethical plot for the vulnerability of others does not need memory and narrative.


2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciro Augusto Floriani ◽  
Fermin Roland Schramm

AbstractHospitality is commonly referred as one of the meanings of hospes, the Latin word which is also the root of hospice. This article explores the semantics of the word hospice - the seal of identity of modern hospice movement - and attempts to integrate the meaning of hospitality into the modern hospice movement, understood as unconditional reception. Therefore, the article analyzes the concept of unconditional hospitality, developed by Jacques Derrida and that of ethical responsibility proposed by Emmanuel Levinas based on the phenomenological experience of the other. From this point of view, these two concepts tie in with the meaning of hospice, bringing substantial grounding elements to the hospice movement for the construction of a protective ethos.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 84-101
Author(s):  
Nerijus Čepulis

Šiuo straipsniu siekiama permąstyti tradicinę tapatumo sąvoką. Į tapatumą Vakarų mąstymo istorijoje buvo žiūrima visų pirma ontologiniu požiūriu. Moderniųjų laikų posūkis į subjektą susitelkia į Aš kaip bet kokio tapatumo centrą, pagrindą ir gamintoją. Fenomenologinė analizė tapatumo ištakas pagilina iki Aš santykio su išore, su pasauliu, su kitybe. Tačiau kitybė, tapdama sąmonės turiniu, nėra absoliuti kitybė. Būdas, kuriuo tapatumas, įsisavindamas savinasi pasaulį ir naikina kitybę, yra reprezentacija, siekianti akivaizdumo. Reprezentacija kaip intencionalus įžvalgumas bet kokį objektą lokalizuoja sąmonės šviesoje. Šviesa ir regėjimas – tai paradigminės Vakarų mąstymo tradicijos metaforos. Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kodėl ir kaip šviesa bei akivaizdumas netoleruoja absoliučios kitybės. Iš akivaizdumo kerų tapatumas atsitokėti gali tik per atsakingą santykį su Kitu, tai yra etiką. Čia tapatus subjektas praranda pirmumo teisę kito asmens imperatyvo atžvilgiu. Begalybės idėja, draskydama totalų tapatumą iš vidaus, neleidžia jam nurimti ir skatina atsižvelgti į transcendenciją, į kitybę, idant ji būtų laisva nuo prievartinio tapimo egocentrinio tapatumo turiniu ir manipuliacijos auka. Atsakomybė kito žmogaus veido akivaizdoje eina pirma akivaizdaus suvokimo ir įteisina jį.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: tapatumas, akivaizdumas, kitybė, socialumas.Charms of Evident IdentityNerijus Čepulis SummaryIn this article I seek to rethink the traditional notion of identity. In the tradition of Western thought identity was viewed first and foremost from an ontological point of view. After the turn toward the subject, the I is thought of as the centre, the base and the producer of any identity. Phenomenological analysis deepens the origin of identity to the relation of the I to the world, i.e. to the alterity. Yet the alterity, by becoming the content of consciousness, is not an absolute alterity. The way, in which identity assimilates, possesses the world and annihilates alterity, is representation. Representation seeks evidence. Representation as intentional perceptivity localizes every object in the light of consciousness. Light and vision are paradigmatic metaphors of the traditional Western thought. Hence in this article I seek to show why and how light and evidence do not tolerate absolute alterity. Identity can be sobered from the charms of evidence only by responsible relation to the Other, i.e. by ethics. Here identical subject loses the right of priority in front of the imperative of the other person. Idea of infinity worries total identity from within. Infinity does not permit identity to quiet down and induces to heed transcendence and alterity. Only in this way alterity can escape the violence to become a content of egocentrical identity and the victim of manipulation. Responsibility in the face of the other person precedes evident perception and legitimates the latter.Keywords: identity, evidence, alterity, sociality.


Problemos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audronė Žukauskaitė

Straipsnyje analizuojama Jeano Luco Nancy knygoje Corpus suformuluota kūno samprata, nurodoma jos priklausomybė nuo fenomenologinės Emmanuelio Levino ir Maurice’o Merleau-Ponty tradicijos. Straipsnyje taip pat siekiama atskleisti Nancy kūno sampratos radikalumą, jos artimumą tiek Jacques’o Derrida įteisintoms rašymo, paskirstymo erdvėje temoms, tiek Gilles’o Deleuze’o ir Felixo Guattari sukurtai materialistinei kūno koncepcijai. Nancy kūną siekia išlaisvinti nuo reikšmės ir bet kokio organizavimo principo. Tačiau norėdamas paaiškinti, kaip kūnai egzistuoja, jis priverstas išrasti naujas sąvokas: išstatymas, kūnų paskirstymas erdvėje, areališkumas, technē, kūrimas be kūrėjo. Būtent pastaroji sąvoka leidžia Nancy projektą vadinti „krikščionybės dekonstrukcija“; kita vertus, ši sąvoka savotiškai kompromituoja Nancy teorijos radikalumą, atskleisdama bet kurios kūno filosofijos priklausomybę nuo krikščioniškosios tradicijos. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: fenomenologinis suvokimas, prisilietimas, kūnas, technē, krikščionybės dekonstrukcija.Body and Signification in J.-L. Nancy’s CorpusAudronė Žukauskaitė SummaryThe author explores the notion of the body in Jean-Luc Nancy’s Corpus. On the one hand, she shows how Nancy’s project still depends on the phenomenological tradition of Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. On the other hand, she seeks to demonstrate the radical character of this notion and its similarity to Jacques Derrida’s concept of writing and spacing as well as to the materialistic concept of the body elaborated by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. This similarity is based on the assumption that the body could be thought of and described as beyond any meaningful principle of organization. In order to explain how such bodies exist, Nancy is forced to invent new concepts such as spacing out, expeausition, areality, technē, creation without creator. It is exactly the latter concept that enables Derrida to describe Nancy’s project as “deconstruction of Christianity”. This concept also indicates a compromise in Nancy’s radical thinking, revealing that any “philosophy of the body” in Western thought still belongs to the tradition of Christianity.Keywords: phenomenological perception, touching, the body, technē, deconstruction of Christianity.;"> 


2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-141
Author(s):  
Rodolphe Olcèse

This text aims to show how, in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, the moment of jouissance is constitutive of the selfhood of the ego and conditions the very possibility of a sensitivity to the other man, and so the possibility of the ethical relation itself. These considerations on the enjoyment invited us to think artistic creation and poetry as a way to respond to anesthesia of our sensibility through knowledge, which is a characteristic of western thought for Emmanuel Levinas.


2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (123) ◽  
pp. 107
Author(s):  
Silvestre Grzibowski

O presente estudo examina a partir de Emmanuel Levinas o sujeito sem identidade. Segundo o pensador, o sujeito da filosofia ocidental foi constituído a partir do ego. A racionalidade apoderou-se desse conceito e assim arquitetou o edifício filosófico. Só que esse conceito anula completamente a subjetividade. Porque a ditadura da razão não possibilita pensar de outro modo, pensar diferente. Diante disso, Levinas sustenta a tese do sem identidade, ou seja, o indivíduo sem identidade. O ponto central será a subjetividade, no entanto, não a subjetividade como concebe a filosofia ocidental. A subjetividade parte da sensibilidade do sujeito, sensibilidade que é aproximação, exposição ao outro. Aproximação que é vulnerabilidade e responsabilidade infinita para com o outro.Abstract: Following Emmanuel Levinas, this study examines the subject without identity. According to the thinker, in Western philosophy, the subject has been built upon the ego. The rationality took hold of this concept and devised the philosophical edifice accordingly. However, this concept completely nullifies subjectivity, since the dictatorship of reason does not allow for a different way of thinking. In view of this, Levinas maintains the thesis of the self with no identity, that is, the individual without identity. The focus will be on subjectivity, although conceived differently than in Western philosophy. Subjectivity here derives from the subjectÊs sensitivity, which is approach to the other and exposure to the other, and therefore vulnerability and infinite responsibility towards others. 


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