scholarly journals A Chronology of Levinas’s Metaphorics

2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-167
Author(s):  
Mitchell Cowen Verter

Many readers of Emmanuel Levinas understand his thought as being oriented only by transcendence and therefore denigrate the immanent dimension of metaphor within his texts. Such readings reduce the complexities of Levinas’s text to a set of polemical, orthodox proclamations such as The Other is Most High and Ethics is First Philosophy. However, Levinas’s work invites us to contemplate not only transcendence, but also the way that immanence emerges though relationships with an infinitude of others, third persons whose voices murmur within the system of language, articulated in concrete elements such as metaphor. Levinas employs metaphor to converse with the inherited ways that temporal becoming has been articulated, recurrently reorienting them to expose a variety of ethical-phenomenological constellations. To expose the dynamics that remain clandestine to the orthodox interpretation, this paper will chronologically trace the development of various families of metaphors such as those of having and doing; those of dimensionality, those of orality, those of familiarity, and those of birth, gender, and death, thereby demonstrating the multitude of roles and perspectival positions assumed by the subject during its temporal becoming.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abimael Francisco do Nascimento

The general objective of this study is to analyze the postulate of the ethics of otherness as the first philosophy, presented by Emmanuel Levinas. It is a proposal that runs through Levinas' thinking from his theoretical foundations, to his philosophical criticism. Levinas' thought presents itself as a new thought, as a critique of ontology and transcendental philosophy. For him, the concern with knowledge and with being made the other to be forgotten, placing the other in totality. Levinas proposes the ethics of otherness as sensitivity to the other. The subject says here I am, making myself responsible for the other in an infinite way, in a transcendence without return to myself, becoming hostage to the other, as an irrefutable responsibility. The idea of the infinite, present in the face of the other, points to a responsibility whoever more assumes himself, the more one is responsible, until the substitution by other.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Carlos Alvaréz Teijeiro

Emmanuel Lévinas, the philosopher of ethics par excellence in the twentieth century, and by own merit one of the most important ethical philosophers in the history of western philosophy, is also the philosopher of the Other. Thereby, it can be said that no thought has deepened like his in the ups and downs of the ethical relationship between subject and otherness. The general objective of this work is to expose in a simple and understandable way some ideas that tend to be quite dark in the philosophical work of the author, since his profuse religious production will not be analyzed here. It is expected to show that his ideas about the being and the Other are relevant to better understand interpersonal relationships in times of 4.0 (re)evolution. As specific objectives, this work aims to expose in chronological order the main works of the thinker, with special emphasis on his ethical implications: Of the evasion (1935), The time and the Other (1947), From the existence to the existent (1947), Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority (1961) and, last, Otherwise than being, or beyond essence (1974). In the judgment of Lévinas, history of western philosophy starting with Greece, has shown an unusual concern for the Being, this is, it has basically been an ontology and, accordingly, it has relegated ethics to a second or third plane. On the other hand and in a clear going against the tide movement, our author supports that ethics should be considered the first philosophy and more, even previous to the proper philosophize. This novel approach implies, as it is supposed, that the essential question of the philosophy slows down its origin around the Being in order to inquire about the Other: it is a philosophy in first person. Such a radical change of perspective generates an underlying change in how we conceive interpersonal relationships, the complex framework of meanings around the relationship Me and You, which also philosopher Martin Buber had already spoken of. As Lévinas postulates that ethics is the first philosophy, this involves that the Other claims all our attention, intellectual and emotional, to the point of considering that the relationship with the Other is one of the measures of our identity. Thus, “natural” attitude –husserlian word not used by Lévinas- would be to be in permanent disposition regarding to the meeting with the Other, to be in permanent opening state to let ourselves be questioned by him. Ontology, as the author says, being worried about the Being, has been likewise concerned about the Existence, when the matter is to concern about the particular Existent that every otherness supposes for us. In conclusion it can be affirmed that levinasian ethics of the meeting with the Other, particular Face, irreducible to the assumption, can contribute with an innovative looking to (re)evolving the interpersonal relationships in a 4.0 context.


Author(s):  
Susan Petrilli

AbstractIdentity as traditionally conceived in mainstream Western thought is focused on theory, representation, knowledge, subjectivity and is centrally important in the works of Emmanuel Levinas. His critique of Western culture and corresponding notion of identity at its foundations typically raises the question of the other. Alterity in Levinas indicates existence of something on its own account, in itself independently of the subject’s will or consciousness. The objectivity of alterity tells of the impossible evasion of signs from their destiny, which is the other. The implications involved in reading the signs of the other have contributed to reorienting semiotics in the direction of semioethics. In Levinas, the I-other relation is not reducible to abstract cognitive terms, to intellectual synthesis, to the subject-object relation, but rather tells of involvement among singularities whose distinctive feature is alterity, absolute alterity. Humanism of the other is a pivotal concept in Levinas overturning the sense of Western reason. It asserts human duties over human rights. Humanism of alterity privileges encounter with the other, responsibility for the other, over tendencies of the centripetal and egocentric orders that instead exclude the other. Responsibility allows for neither rest nor peace. The “properly human” is given in the capacity for absolute otherness, unlimited responsibility, dialogical intercorporeity among differences non-indifferent to each other, it tells of the condition of vulnerability before the other, exposition to the other. The State and its laws limit responsibility for the other. Levinas signals an essential contradiction between the primordial ethical orientation and the legal order. Justice involves comparing incomparables, comparison among singularities outside identity. Consequently, justice places limitations on responsibility, on unlimited responsibility which at the same time it presupposes as its very condition of possibility. The present essay is structured around the following themes: (1) Premiss; (2) Justice, uniqueness, and love; (3) Sign and language; (4) Dialogue and alterity; (5) Semiotic materiality; (6) Globalization and the trap of identity; (7) Human rights and rights of the other: for a new humanism; (8) Ethics; (9) The World; (10) Outside the subject; (11) Responsibility and Substitution; (12) The face; (13) Fear of the other; (14) Alterity and justice; (15) Justice and proximity; (16) Literary writing; (17) Unjust justice; (18) Caring for the other.


1938 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Corder ◽  
I. A. Richmond

The Roman Ermine Street, having crossed the Humber on the way to York from Lincoln, leaves Brough Haven on its west side, and the little town of Petuaria to the east. For the first half-mile northwards from the Haven its course is not certainly known: then, followed by the modern road, it runs northwards through South Cave towards Market Weighton. In the area thus traversed by the Roman road burials of the Roman age have already been noted in sufficient quantity to suggest an extensive cemetery. The interment which is the subject of the present note was found on 10th October 1936, when men laying pipes at right angles to the modern road, in the carriage-drive of Mr. J. G. Southam, having cut through some 4 ft. of blown sand, came upon a mass of mixed Roman pottery, dating from the late first to the fourth century A.D. Bones of pig, dog, sheep, and ox were also represented. Presently, at a depth of about 5 ft., something attracted closer attention. A layer of thin limestone slabs was found, covering two human skeletons, one lying a few feet from the west margin of the modern road, the other parallel with the road and some 8 ft. from its edge. The objects described below were found with the second skeleton, and the first to be discovered was submitted by Mr. Southam to Mr. T. Sheppard, F.S.A.Scot., Director of the Hull Museums, who visited the site with his staff. All that can be recorded of the circumstances of the discovery is contained in the observations then made, under difficult conditions. ‘Slabs of hard limestone’, it was reported, ‘taken from a local quarry of millepore oolite and forming the original Roman road, were distinctly visible beneath the present roadway—one of the few points where the precise site of the old road has been located. On the side of this… a burial-place has been constructed. What it was like originally it is difficult to say, beyond that a layer of thin … slabs of limestone occurred over the skeletons. This had probably been kept in place or supported by some structure of wood, as several large iron nails, some bent at right angles, were among the bones.’ If this were all that could be said about the burials, they would hardly merit a place in these pages. The chief interest of the record would be its apparent identification of the exact course of the Roman road at a point where this had hitherto been uncertain. Three objects associated with the second skeleton are, however, of exceptional interest.


Author(s):  
Neal Robinson

Ibn al-‘Arabi was a mystic who drew on the writings of Sufis, Islamic theologians and philosophers in order to elaborate a complex theosophical system akin to that of Plotinus. He was born in Murcia (in southeast Spain) in AH 560/ad 1164, and died in Damascus in AH 638/ad 1240. Of several hundred works attributed to him the most famous are al-Futuhat al-makkiyya (The Meccan Illuminations) and Fusus al-hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom). The Futuhat is an encyclopedic discussion of Islamic lore viewed from the perspective of the stages of the mystic path. It exists in two editions, both completed in Damascus – one in AH 629/ad 1231 and the other in AH 636/ad 1238 – but the work was conceived in Mecca many years earlier, in the course of a vision which Ibn al-‘Arabi experienced near the Kaaba, the cube-shaped House of God which Muslims visit on pilgrimage. Because of its length, this work has been relatively neglected. The Fusus, which is much shorter, comprises twenty-seven chapters named after prophets who epitomize different spiritual types. Ibn al-‘Arabi claimed that he received it directly from Muhammad, who appeared to him in Damascus in AH 627/ad 1229. It has been the subject of over forty commentaries. Although Ibn al-‘Arabi was primarily a mystic who believed that he possessed superior divinely-bestowed knowledge, his work is of interest to the philosopher because of the way in which he used philosophical terminology in an attempt to explain his inner experience. He held that whereas the divine Essence is absolutely unknowable, the cosmos as a whole is the locus of manifestation of all God’s attributes. Moreover, since these attributes require the creation for their expression, the One is continually driven to transform itself into Many. The goal of spiritual realization is therefore to penetrate beyond the exterior multiplicity of phenomena to a consciousness of what subsequent writers have termed the ‘unity of existence’. This entails the abolition of the ego or ‘passing away from self’ (fana’) in which one becomes aware of absolute unity, followed by ‘perpetuation’ (baqa’) in which one sees the world as at once One and Many, and one is able to see God in the creature and the creature in God.


Glimpse ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 119-123
Author(s):  
Tanit Guadalupe Serrano Arias ◽  

The dialogue in this paper is aimed at reflecting the form of representation of The Other within the cinematography from the philosophical point of view. For this, we support our study in Ethics as the first philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. The questions that trouble this study are: What is otherness? Who is the other? Why is it necessary to think about otherness in cinematography?Here we reflect on the recognition of the Other, of the different individual, of the foreign. Cinema allows to recognize the existence of other subjects, from a double look, as spectators, but also as creators. What motivates the reflection of otherness from the human relationships that are interwoven, as well as the cultural character of all perception, referring to the notion of the other as interior to the field of being.


1983 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 127-148
Author(s):  
C. Stephen Finley

The poet – speaker of Book 1 ofThe Ring and the Bookbelieved that the first two monologues of his grand poem balanced one another. In his preview of the monologues, he writes that Half-Rome and Other Half-Rome are equally unsuccessful in their efforts to find the truth of the murder story. The speakers possess an “opposite feel” for the truth, but each achieves a “like swerve, like unsuccess” (I.883–84). Although Other Half-Rome succeeds in being on the right side of the issue, Browning as poet-speaker considers his defense of Pompilia to be the result only of luck or a “fancy-fit.” This “fancy-fit” is a mood which inclines the speaker to choose Pompilia as it might incline him to choose between two runners in a race according to the colors of their scarves (1.885–92). Browning sets this speech by a Bernini fountain, one where Triton blows water through a conch: “Puffs up steel sleet which breaks to diamond dust” (1.900). The poet may have intended this setting to suggest the way in which he views the language and imagery that Other Half-Rome uses to tell his story. The speaker's mixture of Christian and classical mythology and his concern for the painterly qualities of Pompilia's deathbed scene do suggest an aesthetic temperament. The poet may have considered the speech of such a man to be “diamond dust” signifying nothing. In any case, the poet-speaker of Book 1 concludes his description of Other Half-Rome by saying, with apparent sarcasm, that to this speaker Pompilia “seemed a saint and martyr both” (1.909). This assessment of Other Half-Rome has been the subject of disagreement among commentators on the poem.


Antichthon ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 58-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Burton

AbstractThis paper discusses a series of archaic poems in which one poet responds directly to the work of another, identifying the other by name or by direct allusion (for example, Simonides frag. 542 PMG, Solon frag. 20 West, Sappho frag. 137 Voigt). Such responses often disagree with their models, and this disagreement is frequently constructed in terms of a correction, not only to the subject matter, but also to the way in which the original is composed. These responses, therefore, not only reflect the pattern of improvisation and ‘capping’ common to much Greek poetry, but form an ongoing debate on the nature and role of the poet and his poetry. The construction of such responses also serves to underline both the importance of improvisation and the permanency of the fame conveyed by the completed poem.


Satya Widya ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-61
Author(s):  
Ika Wulansari

This study aims to find out how caregivers in helping children to develop or build discipline from an early age conducted by 3 caregivers of the Orphanage of the White Cross on the Orphanage Children of the White Cross especially against one early childhood. The type of this research is descriptive qualitative with case study method, data collection by interview and data analysis with qualitative. In this study there are 3 subjects that help one child in building discipline. The results of the study show that the discipline of children is increasing from previously unattended discipline until now already have good discipline, in building discipline. The way in which the subject tends to be different from the other caregivers. Subjects do not use corporal punishment and it is done in a better way. The way the subject tends to be a subtle way with good advice, real stories, habits, good examples, daily schedules made, gift giving to children.  


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 45-51
Author(s):  
Nerijus Čepulis

Metafizikos terminas yra priskiriamas Aristoteliui, nors pačiuose jo tekstuose nepasirodo. Istoriškai jis buvo pradėtas vartoti grupuojant Aristotelio veikalus. Graikiškai t„ met„ t„ fusik@ ir reikštų tai, kas eina po fizikos. Metafizikos autorius teorinę filosofiją suskirsto į tris šakas: matematiką, fiziką ir teologiją. Teoriniai mokslai yra iškilesni už visus kitus mokslus, tuo tarpu paskutinioji iš teorinių yra iškilesnė už pirmąsias dvi. Jei nebūtų jokios esmės, kuri viršytų gamtą, tada fizikai tektų pirmoji vieta tarp mokslų. Jei tačiau egzistuoja kokia nors nekintama esmė, tai mokslas apie ją, be abejo, iškils virš visų kitų ir bus vadinamas pirmąja filosofija (filosof%a pr_th). Būtent šis mokslas turi žiūrėti į būtybę kaip tokią, graikiškai tariant, kaθ ’aÑtÊ.Anot Levino, metafizinis mąstymas siekia mąstyti būtybę kaip radikaliai atskirtą, pavienę ir vienintelę (kaθ ’aÑtÊ), o tam reikalingas ypatingas dėmesys absoliučiam išoriškumui ir nesutotalinamam Kitkam. Metafizinis judesys yra transcendentinis, nes kaip gėrio ir dosnumo geismas neįveikia ir nesiekia įveikti pirmapradės distancijos iki Kitko. Metafizinis santykis su Kitkuo Levinui yra socialinio pobūdžio. Absoliučiai Kitkas visų pirma yra Kitas – kitas žmogus, su kuriuo manęs nesieja nei pasisavinimo, nei sąvokos, nei apskritai kokio nors bendro lygmens sąsaja. Tarp mūsų plyti neužlyginamas atstumas, skiriantis Tą Patį ir Kitką. Galimybė ar būdas susisiekti per šį atstumą, nepanaikinant ir neįveikiant jo, yra kalba (le langage). To Paties santykyje su absoliučiai Kitkuo anapus totalybės Levinas aptinka religijos esmę. Čia religija sutampa ar bent jau glaudžiai siejasi su metafizika. Iš to plauktų, kad religija gali užimti pirmosios filosofijos vietą, nepamirštant, kad tiek metafizikos, tiek religijos esmę sudaro pamatinis socialumas.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Levinas, pirmoji filosofija, religija, metafizika, Kitas.RELIGIOUS AS A FIRST PHILOSOPHY ACCORDERING TO LEVINASNerijus ČepulisSummary The term metaphysics is ascribed to Aristotle, although it does not appear in his own texts. Historically it was introduced while sorting Aristotle’s works. In Greek t„ met„ t„ fusik@ means that which follows after physics. The author of the Metaphysics groups theoretical philosophy into three branches: mathematics, physics and theology. Theoretical sciences are more elevated than the other sciences, while the last one of the three is more elevated than the other two. If there were no substance that would superseed the nature, then physics would be the first among the sciences. If, however, there is sume unchanging substance, then the science of it undoubtedly will rise above all the other and will be called the first philosophy (filosof%a pr_th). Precisely this science has to look at the being as such,kaθ ’aÑtÊ in Greek.According to Levinas, the metaphtysical thinking seeks to think the being as radically separated, solitary and single (kaθ ’aÑtÊ), and this requires a special attention to the absolute exteriority and the other that refuses to be totalized. The metaphysical movement is transcendental, because as a desire for the goodness and generosity does not overcome and does not seek to overcome the primordial distance from the other. The metaphysical relation to the other for Levinas is a social one. The absolutely other first of all is the Other – the other person that is not bound with me neither by appropriation, nor by term, nor by any general level. Between us there is a distance separating the same and the other that is not to be covered. The possibility or the way to relate in this distance without abolishing or overcoming it is language. In the relation of the same to the absolutely other beyond the totality Levinas finds the essence of religion. Here religion coincides or at least closely relates to metaphysics. From this follows that religion can take the place of the first philosophy, without forgetting that the essence of both metaphysics and religion is the fundamental sociability.Keywords: Levinas, first philosophy, religion, metaphysics, the other.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document