Essences and Signification: Response to Martin Lenz

Author(s):  
Michael Ayers

This chapter argues that contrary to the thesis of the previous chapter, Locke's theory of meaning, as of knowledge, is explicitly individualistic. He understands a natural language as a construction out of its speakers' idiolects, the terms of which have sufficiently overlapping intensions and extensions for the purposes of common life and coarse communication. But the sciences and systematic natural history require a more precise and determinate ‘philosophical’ language, since both clear thought and effective collaboration in these areas are achievable only by a deliberate refinement of ordinary language in which individuals agree on fixed and common idea–term relationships—i.e., in the case of complex ideas, definitions agreed in the light of careful observation, experiment and reflection. Locke's whole discussion of language is geared to the advocacy of this programme, intended to fill a need without which science could not progress. Locke reasonably assumes shared experience of the world and the possibility of explaining one's meaning to another, in words or ostensively. Although fundamentally individualistic, the model is not readily vulnerable to the commonplace criticisms of ‘mentalism’.

Author(s):  
Oskari Kuusela

In the Introduction I made the bold claim that Wittgenstein transforms Frege’s and Russell’s logical and methodological ideas in a way that ‘can be justifiably described as a second revolution in philosophical methodology and the philosophy of logic, following Frege’s and Russell’s first revolution’. This claim was meant in a specific sense relating to the use of logical methods in philosophy, a discipline where we are often dealing with complex and messy concepts and phenomena, and having to clarify highly complicated and fluid uses of natural language. The situation is not quite the same in metamathematics, for example, and my claim was not intended to concern the employment of logical methods there, i.e. that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of logic would constitute a revolution in this area too. For, while his later philosophy of logic has no difficulty explaining the possibility of the employment of calculi to clarify other calculi, in metamathematics there is perhaps no similarly pressing need for idealization as in philosophy, when we clarify complex concepts originating in ordinary language, since the targets of clarification in metamathematics are systems governed by strict rules themselves. Thus, this area of the employment of logical methods seems not as significantly affected. But I hope that my claim concerning the use of logical methods in philosophy can now be recognized as justified, or at least worth considering seriously, on the basis of what I have said about 1) the later Wittgenstein’s account of the status of logical clarificatory models, and how this explains the possibility of simple and exact logical descriptions, thus safeguarding the rigour of logic, 2) how his account of the function of logical models makes possible the recognition of the relevance of natural history for logic without compromising the non-empirical character of the discipline of logic, and 3) in the light of Wittgenstein’s introduction of new non-calculus-based logical methods for the purpose of philosophical clarification, such as his methods of grammatical rules, the method of language-games, and quasi-ethnology....


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
John Ó Maoilearca

François Laruelle’s ‘non-philosophical’ practice is connected to its performative language, such that to the question 'what is it to think?, non-philosophy responds that thinking is not “thought”, but performing, and that to perform is to clone the world “in-Real”’ (François Laruelle, ‘What is Non-Philosophy?’ in From Decision to Heresy [2012], 233).Non-philosophy is equally described by Laruelle as ‘transcendental practice’, an ‘immanent pragmatics’, or a ‘universal pragmatics’ that is ‘valid for ordinary language as well as for philosophy:’ He insists that we look at ‘that-which-I-do-in-saying and not just what I say’ – for the latter is simply what happens when thought is ‘taken hold of again by philosophy.’ Resisting this hold, non-philosophy performs re-descriptions of philosophy that, in doing so, produce effects on how philosophical texts are seen. Of course, whether these effects are always desired or are merely nominally considered ‘effects’ such as any description might create (misunderstanding, disbelief, dismay, boredom) is entirely debatable (and a matter for this paper). In accordance with this, however, it is notable that Laruelle objects to the focus on activity within the concept of a speech act, and instead emphasizes the ‘descriptive passivity’ that an immanent pragmatics obliges. Laruelle calls this a ‘Performed-Without-Performation’ which would be an action of the Real: philosophical language seen as a performed, but without a ‘we’ – or any others – performing (or ‘cloning’) it. It is this notion of the performative without either active human or philosophical adumbration, which is the topic of this paper.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-182
Author(s):  
T. B. Radbil

The work presents the foundations of cognitive interpretation of the category of artistry with regard to its text realization by means of a natural language. The purpose is to formulate the theoretic principles of distinction between narration and lyric as two versions of cognitive modeling of the reality. The theoretical basis of the study is elaborated by the author “philosophy of literary word” and interdisciplinary, general humanitarian narration theory on the basis of communicative and cognitive-oriented approach. The methodology of the study is the cognitive-discursive analysis of a text. The study shows that verbal way of embodiment of the category of artistry reflects a special type of consciousness oriented towards linguo-creative and heuristic modeling of otherness which is transcendent in relation to the speaker’s reality, to that we call “simply life” which involves to two additionally distributed modes of existence – being in event and being in experience. In accordance with this, two ways of verbal cognitive modeling of aesthetic kind: (1) the narration cognitive model; (2) the lyric cognitive model. Narration is based on the model of objectification, i.e. unfolding in temporal sequence of something that happens out of subject’s zone, when so-called “outside world” is the focus; lyric realizes the model of registration of reactive non-reflected intentional experience of things which a subject feels himself, when inner world is the focus. The author distinguished consistently narration1 and lyric1 as phenomena of human everyday existence and, accordingly, narration2 and lyric2 as turning natural things into semiotic ones, nature into culture due to aesthetic transformation. Both versions of cognitive modeling of the reality are conditioned by some peculiarities of a natural language. Aesthetic transformation of “simply life” in its two versions is realized by a natural language by the use of universal mechanisms of a conceptual (cognitive) metaphor of pictorial or expressive types. In this, lyric is a kind of dominance of modus over dictum, and narration is, vice-versa, a kind of prevalence of dictum over modus. Findings are that there is not any special “aesthetic language” – we deal with the most ordinary language, simply in especial conditions of its functioning, in especial mode of communication and with especial intentionality, simply used in especial function of cognitive modeling of probabilistic states of the world and / or mind.


Discourse ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 109-117
Author(s):  
O. M. Polyakov

Introduction. The article continues the series of publications on the linguistics of relations (hereinafter R–linguistics) and is devoted to an introduction to the logic of natural language in relation to the approach considered in the series. The problem of natural language logic still remains relevant, since this logic differs significantly from traditional mathematical logic. Moreover, with the appearance of artificial intelligence systems, the importance of this problem only increases. The article analyzes logical problems that prevent the application of classical logic methods to natural languages. This is possible because R-linguistics forms the semantics of a language in the form of world model structures in which language sentences are interpreted.Methodology and sources. The results obtained in the previous parts of the series are used as research tools. To develop the necessary mathematical representations in the field of logic and semantics, the formulated concept of the interpretation operator is used.Results and discussion. The problems that arise when studying the logic of natural language in the framework of R–linguistics are analyzed. These issues are discussed in three aspects: the logical aspect itself; the linguistic aspect; the aspect of correlation with reality. A very General approach to language semantics is considered and semantic axioms of the language are formulated. The problems of the language and its logic related to the most General view of semantics are shown.Conclusion. It is shown that the application of mathematical logic, regardless of its type, to the study of natural language logic faces significant problems. This is a consequence of the inconsistency of existing approaches with the world model. But it is the coherence with the world model that allows us to build a new logical approach. Matching with the model means a semantic approach to logic. Even the most General view of semantics allows to formulate important results about the properties of languages that lack meaning. The simplest examples of semantic interpretation of traditional logic demonstrate its semantic problems (primarily related to negation).


2008 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony G Picciano ◽  
Robert V. Steiner

Every child has a right to an education. In the United States, the issue is not necessarily about access to a school but access to a quality education. With strict compulsory education laws, more than 50 million students enrolled in primary and secondary schools, and billions of dollars spent annually on public and private education, American children surely have access to buildings and classrooms. However, because of a complex and competitive system of shared policymaking among national, state, and local governments, not all schools are created equal nor are equal education opportunities available for the poor, minorities, and underprivileged. One manifestation of this inequity is the lack of qualified teachers in many urban and rural schools to teach certain subjects such as science, mathematics, and technology. The purpose of this article is to describe a partnership model between two major institutions (The American Museum of Natural History and The City University of New York) and the program designed to improve the way teachers are trained and children are taught and introduced to the world of science. These two institutions have partnered on various projects over the years to expand educational opportunity especially in the teaching of science. One of the more successful projects is Seminars on Science (SoS), an online teacher education and professional development program, that connects teachers across the United States and around the world to cutting-edge research and provides them with powerful classroom resources. This article provides the institutional perspectives, the challenges and the strategies that fostered this partnership.


Author(s):  
David K. Skelly

This chapter presents two examples to demonstrate that natural history is the necessary basis of any reliable understanding of the world. More than a half century ago, Rachel Carson revolutionized the public’s view of pesticides. The foundation of her success was the careful use of natural history data, collated from across North America. The examples she assembled left little doubt that DDT and other pesticides were causing a widespread decline in birds. More recently, the case for the impact of atrazine on wildlife was based on laboratory experiments, without the advantage of natural history observations. For atrazine, natural history observations now suggest that other chemical agents are more likely to be responsible for feminization of wildlife populations. Developing expectations for scientists to collect natural history information can help to avoid over-extrapolating lab results to wild populations, a tendency often seen when those lab results conform to preconceptions about chemicals in the environment.


Author(s):  
TIAN-SHUN YAO

With the word-based theory of natural language processing, a word-based Chinese language understanding system has been developed. In the light of psychological language analysis and the features of the Chinese language, this theory of natural language processing is presented with the description of the computer programs based on it. The heart of the system is to define a Total Information Dictionary and the World Knowledge Source used in the system. The purpose of this research is to develop a system which can understand not only Chinese sentences but also the whole text.


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