scholarly journals El Estatuto Constitucional del no nacido: evolución y situación actual en España // The constitutional status of the unborn: evolution and current situation in Spain

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (102) ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
Ángel José Gómez Montoro

Resumen:El presente trabajo es un análisis de cómo ha evolucionado la protección del no nacido en España desde la aprobación de la Constitución de 1978. Se centra, en particular en el estudio de la legislación y de la jurisprudencia constitucional sobre dos temas especialmente relevantes y controvertidos: la regulación del aborto, de un lado, y de la fecundación in vitro y uso de embriones, sus tejidos y órganos, de otro. Tanto el legislador como la doctrina del Tribunal Constitucional se han inclinado por una protección gradualista de la vida humana en formación que deja abiertos muchos interrogantes desde la perspectiva del derecho a la vida (art. 15 CE) y la dignidad humana (art. 10.1 CE)Summary:1. The Introduction Of Abortion In Spain And The STC 53/1985: a) From Criminalization To Decriminalization In Certain Circumstances; b) STC 53/1985: i) Right To Life And Prenatal Life; ii) The Life Of The Unborn As A Constitutional Interest; iii) The Constitutionality Of The Indication System; iv) The Conditions For The Constitutionality Of Decriminalization; c) The New Regulation. 2. From The «Indication System» To The «System Of Deadlines»: Organic Law 2/2010 Of 3 March On Sexual And Reproductive Health And Voluntary Termination Of Pregnancy: a) The Evolution Of Abortion In Spain Under The 1985 Act;b) The Arguments For The Reform And The Context Of The New Regulation;c) The New Regulation. 3. An Open Debate: a) The Conditions For The Constitutionality Of Decriminalization; b) The Failed Reform Of The Act. 4. The Weak Protection Of The Embryo In The Legislation On In Vitro Fertilization And The Use Of Embryonic Organs And Tissues, And The SSTC 212/1996 And 116/1999: a) Act 35/1988 On Assisted Reproduction Techniques, And Act 42/1988 On Donation And Use Of Human Embryos And Fetuses And Their Cells, Tissues And Organs; b) Negation Of The Right To Life Of The Embryo And Consequences For Its Consideration As A Constitutionally Protected Legal Interest: i) The Embryo Does Not Hold The Right To Life; ii) Two New Categories:Pre-Embryos And Non-Viable Embryos And Their Legal Relevance; iii) Surplus Embryos; iv) The Absence Of Any Criminal Protection; v) A Weak Concept Of Dignity. 5. Legislative Evolution; 6. A Model For The Gradual (Dis)Protection Of Unborn Human Life.Abstract:This paper analyzes the evolution of the protection of the unborn human life in Spain since the enactment of the 1978 Constitution. It focuses, in particular, on the study of the laws and the constitutional jurisprudence on two relevant matters: the regulation of abortion; and the in vitro fertilization, the use of embryos their tissues and organs. The legislator and the decisions of the Constitutional Court have opted for gradualist protection of the embryo that leaves many questions open from the perspective of the right to life (Article 15 SC) and human dignity (Article 10.1 SC).

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-73
Author(s):  
Judit Vörös

Nowadays in vitro fertilisation raises relevant controversies at the point of view of jurisprudence as well. The distinct approximations of in vitro embryos, such as to be considered as personae or objects, are also resources of several theoretical and pragmatical questions. It is essential to give a compendious summary about what kind of jurisprudental environment had been contributed to the intrumental comprehension of human embryos too, otherwise it is difficult to understand the scientific quandaries connected to the subject correctly. Merely thereafter the international and the Hungarian regulation of in vitro embryo’s status seems to able to be dissected, in particular the case-law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court related to the right to life and the constitutional funds of the oncurrent re-regulation in our country.


2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Casini ◽  
Carlo Casini ◽  
Rafael Santamaria D'Angelo ◽  
Joseph Meaney ◽  
Nikolas Nikas ◽  
...  

Il contributo esamina il “Caso n. 12.361 Gretel Artavia Urilla et Al. vs. Costa Rica” sul quale si attende una pronuncia della Corte interamericana dei diritti umani. La vicenda ha origine dalla sentenza della Corte costituzionale costaricana (del 15 marzo 2000 n. 2000-02306) che aveva annullato, per ragioni di forma e di sostanza, il Decreto Ejecutivo n. 24029-S1 (del 3 febbraio 1995) sulla procreazione artificiale umana. La vicenda prosegue davanti alla Commissione interamericana chiamata in causa da una “Petición” che accusa la Repubblica del Costa Rica di aver violato i diritti di alcune coppie in attesa di realizzare il loro “progetto parentale”. Il divieto di fecondazione artificiale confliggerebbe, in sintesi, con il diritto alla privacy e alla vita familiare, con il diritto di fondare una famiglia con il principio di uguaglianza contenuti nella Convenzione americana dei diritti umani (“Patto di San Josè”). Al termine di un lungo percorso e di un ampio dibattito, la Commissione ha ritenuto che tali diritti fossero stati violati e ha rimesso il caso alla Corte interamericana dei diritti dell’uomo. Con riferimento a questa nuova fase, nell’articolo si dà conto del “Escrito de Amici Curiae” presentato alla Corte dal Movimento per la vita italiano, dall’Istituto di Bioetica, dall’Asociación Crece Familia-CreceFam, dal Coordinamento di Human Life International e da Bioethics Defend Found. Nell’“Escrito” si afferma che il divieto del Costa Rica non viola la Convenzione americana sui diritti umani che afferma: “Ogni persona ha diritto al rispetto della propria vita. Tale diritto è protetto dalla legge e, in generale, è tutelato a partire dal momento del concepimento. Nessuno può essere privato arbitrariamente della vita (art. 4/1). Nel parere, inoltre, si avanzano argomenti di ordine scientifico e giuridico a sostegno del divieto di procreazione artificiale, in nome del riconoscimento della dignità umana e del conseguente diritto alla vita dell’essere umano nella fase più giovane della sua esistenza. Questo diritto, primo fra tutti, è già ampiamente accolto nella Convenzione americana sui diritti dell’uomo sottoscritta e ratificata dalla Repubblica del Costa Rica. ---------- The article deals with the “Case n. 12.361 Gretel Artavia Urilla et Al. vs. Costa Rica” which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is going to decide. This case has its roots in the Supreme Court of Costa Rica’s decision (n. 2000-02306, March 15, 2000) which annulled the Decree n. 24029-S1 (February, 3, 1995) on human artificial procreation because of both formal and substantial aspects. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the Costa Rica considered that in vitro fertilization constituted a threat against human life before birth. Afterwards, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights received a “Petición” which charged Costa Rica with a violation of the rights of some couples who wanted to achieve parenthood by medically assisted procreation. In short, according to Petitioner, the ban on in vitro fertilization violated the right to privacy and family life, the right to raise a family and equality before the law and equal protection established in the American Convention on human rights (“Pact of Saint José”). At the end of a long iter and an extended debate, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted the case to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights claiming the violation of said rights and asking the Court to rule and declare the international responsability of the Costa Rican Republic. Regarding this new stage, the article relates the “Escrito de Amici Curiae” sent to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by the Italian Movement for the Life, the Institute of Bioethics of teh Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Asociación Crece Familia-CreceFam, Human Life International and the Bioethics Defense Fund. This “Escrito” argues that Costa Rica’s ban does not violate the American Convention on Human Rights which says that “Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” (article 4/1). Besides the “Escrito” presents scientific and legal arguments corroborating the ban on artificial human procreation in the light of modern idea of human rights, recognition of human dignity and the right to life of human beings in the youngest stages of their lives. This right, the primary or first right, is already widely recognized in the American Convention on Human Rights, signed and ratified by Costa Rica’s Republic.


Sympozjum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (2 (41)) ◽  
pp. 45-63
Author(s):  
Konrad Glombik

The problem of consent in the question of the right to life Under particular questions in the field of the right to life occurs the problem of consent which is discussed mainly in the context of legalization of abortion, euthanasia, in vitro fertilization and capital punishment. The question of consent in filed of the right to life is important for the discussions to this theme and is related to the understanding of nature of the right to life, both in juridical and moral perspective. The common accordance in the right to life has an impact on the actual solutions in the range of respect for life and concrete activities and choices of people in this field. The presented paper explains the nature of the consent in the question of the right to life, indicates problematic aspects in this regard and shows some arguments in the process of achievement of common accordance in the problem of the right to life. Wśród szczegółowych zagadnień w obszarze problematyki ochrony prawa do życia występuje zagadnienie konsensu, które jest dyskutowane głównie w kontekście legalizacji ustawodawstwa dotyczącego aborcji, eutanazji, sztucznego zapłodnienia, kary śmierci. Zagadnienie konsensu w kwestii prawa do życia jest kluczowym dla społecznych dyskusji na ten temat i wiąże się z rozumieniem natury prawa do życia, zarówno w perspektywie prawniczej, jak i moralnej. Problem ten ma także znaczenie dla przyjmowanych rozstrzygnięć w zakresie poszanowania życia ludzkiego oraz konkretnych działań i wyborów ludzi w tym obszarze. Niniejszy tekst jest próbą wyjaśnienia istoty konsensu w kwestii prawa do życia, wskazuje na kwestie problematyczne w dyskusjach na ten temat i przedstawia niektóre argumenty w procesie dochodzenia do powszechnej zgody w zakresie prawa do życia.


2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacques Suaudeau

Un’ampia polemica si è sviluppata attorno alle cellule staminali: alcuni rivendicano una totale libertà di reperire le cellule staminali embrionali umane (hES) dagli embrioni provenienti dalla fecondazione in vitro o dal trasferimento nucleare (clonazione terapeutica), altri insistono sull’impiego di cellule staminali somatiche e di cellule del sangue del cordone ombelicale (UCB). Il fulcro di questa polemica è etica: infatti, il reperimento del primo tipo di cellule, in quanto richiede il sacrificio programmato di embrioni umani, solleva, a differenza del secondo tipo, questioni etiche. Molti tra coloro che reputano la ricerca sulle cellule hES eticamente accettabile ritengono che gli embrioni umani, prima dell’impianto uterino, non possono essere considerati ancora organismi individuali. Essi fondano la loro tesi su due considerazioni: l’elevata percentuale di perdita naturale di embrioni precoci e il verificarsi della gemellarità monozigotica. Recenti studi hanno, tuttavia, messo in crisi simile tesi, mostrando che l’embrione dei mammiferi funziona come unità biologica sia a livello citologico (gap junctions, tight junctions, compaction) sia a livello genetico (zigotic gene activation). Altri si dichiarano a favore della ricerca sulle cellule ES, giustificandola con la seguente argomentazione: un “essere” umano non può essere riconosciuto come tale dal punto di vista antropologico, finché non abbia raggiunto un elevato grado di “umanizzazione”. Tuttavia, l’errore di simile “prospettiva dello sviluppo” proviene dalla mancanza di un’attenta riflessione sul piano ontologico. Altri, pur riconoscendo che l’embrione umano, in quanto persona potenziale, merita grande rispetto, giustificano la distruzione di embrioni umani per reperire le cellule ES, ricorrendo all’argomento del “fine buono”. In questo caso, il principio morale intangibile che deve essere applicato è quello per il quale il fine non giustifica i mezzi. Ne deriva che la distruzione di embrioni umani per ottenere cellule ES è una eliminazione diretta e deliberata di un essere umano innocente, non giustificabile attraverso alcun argomento. Va, infine, posto il seguente quesito: è lecito usare linee di hES fornite da altri ricercatori o disponibili sul mercato? Tuttavia, una simile utilizzazione rientra nella categoria della cooperazione moralmente illecita ad atti ingiusti, sia in termini di cooperazione materiale immediata sia in termini di cooperazione formale. D’altra parte, la proposta di reperire linee di cellule ES da un singolo blastomero, ottenuto attraverso la biopsia di un embrione, sarebbe, senza dubbio, più rispettosa della vita umana nascente, ma comporterebbe altri problemi etici: essa, infatti, implicherebbe il ricorso alla fecondazione in vitro ed esporrebbe l’embrione a un rischio non indifferente. Quanto poi alla “riprogrammazione” di cellule somatiche a livello di cellule ES, pur essendo eticamente lecita, resta, allo stato corrente, un’ipotesi teorica. Il realismo pratico ed il rispetto della vita umana nascente ci spingono, dunque, a considerare come primaria la ricerca sulle cellule staminali adulte e sulle cellule del sangue del cordone ombelicale, che, nel campo della medicina rigenerativa, ha già dato risultati incoraggianti. ---------- A wide polemic has developed around stem cells: some claim a full freedom for deriving human embryonic stem cells (hES) from embryos coming from in vitro fertilization or from nuclear transfer (therapeutic cloning), others insist on the interest of somatic stem cells or stem cells from umbilical cord blood (UCB). The core of this polemic is ethical: in fact, getting the first type of cells, because of it needs the programmed sacrifice of human embryos, raise, unlike the second type, ethical questions. Many among those who think hES research as ethically acceptable consider that human embryos before implantation cannot be considered as individual organisms. They support their opinion on two considerations: the elevated percentage of natural loss of early embryos and the occurrence of monozygotic twinning. But, recent studies have removed a lot of their substance from these arguments, showing in particular that the mammalian embryo works as a biological unity at the cytological level (gap junctions, tight junctions, compaction) as well as at the genetic level (zigotic gene activation). Others pronounced themselves in favor of hES research, with the argument that a biological human “being” cannot be recognized as such from an anthropological standpoint until he has reached a consistent level of “humanization”. But, the error of this “developmental perspective” comes from its ignorance of a careful ontological reflection. Others, although they do recognize that the human embryo, as a possible person, deserves great respect, justify the destruction of human embryos human to get ES cells with the argument of the “good end”. In this case, the intangible moral principle that must be applied is that the goal doesn’t justify the means. It follows that the destruction of human embryos to get hES cells is a direct and deliberate elimination of an innocent human being that no argument can justify. Another question is: is it permissible to use hES cell lines from other researchers or available on the market? But, this use enters into the category of the illegitimate cooperation in evil, both in terms of immediate material cooperation, and in terms of formal cooperation. On the other hand, the proposal to derive hES cell lines from a single blastomere separated mechanically from an embryo while leaving alive this embryo would be more respectful of early human life, but brings in other ethical problems: it implicates the practice of in vitro fertilization in vitro, and exposes the embryo to a substantial risk. Regarding the “reprogramming” of somatic cells to the level of ES cells, although it is ethically permissible, is now more a theoretical hypothesis. Practical realism and respect of early human life invite therefore to give prime attention to research on adult stem cells and on stem cells from umbilical cord blood, that, in the field of the regenerative medicine, have given encouraging results.


Author(s):  
Olha Peresada ◽  

The article considers topical issues of definition and qualification of crimes against human life in Ukraine and abroad. It is proved that the problematic issue of criminal law protection of human life is a significant differentiation of approaches to determining the moment of its onset, which reflects the medical and social criteria for the formation of an individual who has the right to life. It is shown that Ukrainian criminal law gives a person the right to life from birth, while the correct approach is to recognize the beginning of human life and appropriate criminal protection from the moment of onset 10 days after conception, which is consistent with European experience (in particular, France) and sufficiently reflects the medical features of the period of formation of a full-fledged embryo. The article also addresses the issue of the fact that Section II of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine combines encroachment on two different generic objects - public relations for the protection of life and public relations for the protection of personal health. This provision of the criminal law of Ukraine does not correspond to the international practice on this issue. In addition, it is reasonable to believe that the two relevant categories of the object of criminal encroachment cannot be considered similar, as such an approach in certain cases can significantly complicate the classification of a criminal offense. It is emphasized that, given the exceptional importance of criminal law protection of human life, it is necessary to formulate a separate section of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which covers only crimes against life as the main object of criminal encroachment.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itay Erlich ◽  
Assaf Ben-Meir ◽  
Iris Har-Vardi ◽  
James A Grifo ◽  
Assaf Zaritsky

Automated live embryo imaging has transformed in-vitro fertilization (IVF) into a data-intensive field. Unlike clinicians who rank embryos from the same IVF cycle cohort based on the embryos visual quality and determine how many embryos to transfer based on clinical factors, machine learning solutions usually combine these steps by optimizing for implantation prediction and using the same model for ranking the embryos within a cohort. Here we establish that this strategy can lead to sub-optimal selection of embryos. We reveal that despite enhancing implantation prediction, inclusion of clinical properties hampers ranking. Moreover, we find that ambiguous labels of failed implantations, due to either low quality embryos or poor clinical factors, confound both the optimal ranking and even implantation prediction. To overcome these limitations, we propose conceptual and practical steps to enhance machine-learning driven IVF solutions. These consist of separating the optimizing of implantation from ranking by focusing on visual properties for ranking, and reducing label ambiguity.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Figoli ◽  
Marcelo Garcea ◽  
Claudio Bisioli ◽  
Valeria Tafintseva ◽  
Volha Shapaval ◽  
...  

Abstract The identification of the most competent embryos for transfer to the uterus constitutes the main challenge of in-vitro fertilization (IVF). We established a metabolomic-based approach applying Fourier Transform Infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) on 130 samples of 3-days embryo culture supernatants from 26 embryos that implanted and 104 that failed. Examining the internal structure of the data by unsupervised multivariate analysis, it was observed that the supernatants of nonimplanted embryos contained highly heterogeneous spectral features. These features were overlapping with metabolic-implantation fingerprints, thus demonstrating that in establishing embryo-assessment models a one-class modelling involving only the samples with positive-implantation outcomes should be applied. Analysis of variance confirmed that the women´s age (>40 years) undermined the implantation of the embryos exhibiting implantation metabolomics, and also that constituted a condition triggering embryos to express nonimplantation metabolomics. We conclude that IVF-success rates can be significantly improved if FTIR spectroscopy is used as an embryo-selection criterion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-67
Author(s):  
Antonia Baraggia ◽  
Maria Elena Gennusa

Abstract International and constitutional law, originally distinct realms with limited areas of intersection, are getting closer and closer, particularly in the European landscape within the human rights protection field, where these mere contacts between the two systems have become intersections and overlaps. The present article will try to shed light on the still unsolved and problematic issues to which overlapping human rights protection systems give rise, by focusing on an analysis of the heterologous in vitro fertilization case, where both the Strasbourg Court and the Italian Constitutional Court delivered relevant judgments on very similar matters (ECtHR’s S.H. Judgment; Judgment No. 162/2014 from the Italian CC). Such analysis revealed useful in highlighting connections and disconnections between the different levels of protection of rights, and led us to argue that the development of a multilevel protection of rights is also, at least partially, a tale of Courts, each competing to have the last word on human rights adjudication.


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