scholarly journals La tramitación de la reforma constitucional mediante procedimientos legislativos abreviados: un problema de límites procedimentales

2019 ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Yolanda Gómez Lugo
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Reform Initiatives ◽  
Legislative Procedures ◽  
Single Reading ◽  
Urgent Procedure ◽  
Constitutional Revision

¿Pueden las Cámaras tramitar las iniciativas de reforma constitucional aplicando simultáneamente los procedimientos parlamentarios de reforma constitucional y procedimientos legislativos abreviados? Más específicamente, ¿puede considerarse que los métodos de lectura única y urgencia son procedimientos adecuados para tramitar la revisión de la Constitución? En el Auto 9/2012 el Tribunal Constitucional parece haberse decantado por la tesis de la simultaneidad procedimental, conforme a la cual los procedimientos de reforma constitucional podrían aplicarse transversalmente junto a las técnicas procedimentales de lectura única y de urgencia. Sin embargo, haciendo una interpretación sistemática de las normas constitucionales y parlamentarias que regulan el modo de producción legislativa, es posible deducir que dichas modalidades abreviadas actúan como límites procedimentales en la tramitación parlamentaria de la revisión de la Constitución.Can the Parliament process constitutional reform initiatives applying the procedures of constitutional reform and abbreviated legislative procedures simultaneously? More specifically, can it be considered that the method of single reading and the urgent procedure are adequate for processing the revision of the Constitution? In the decision ATC 9/2012 the Constitutional Court seems to have embraced the thesis of procedural simultaneity, according to which the procedures of constitutional reform could be applied transversally along with the legislative techniques of single reading and urgency. However, making a systematic interpretation of constitutional and parliamentary rules governing the lawmaking process, it might be argued that these kind of abbreviates procedures act as procedural limits in the parliamentary processing of the constitutional revision.

Some Reflections on the Constitutional Review in Albania in a Comparison Key

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 22
Author(s):  
Ismail Tafani ◽  
Renata Tokrri
Keyword(s):  
Balkan Peninsula ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
The World ◽  
Constitutional Legitimacy ◽  
Formal Point ◽  
Constitutional Revision

In this study we will try to analyze the foundations of the Constitution as a pillar and as a guarantee for its solidity. The study will also address the need for revision of the constitution as a fundamental element of its existence and continuity. Particular emphasis will be given to the comparison of the constitutions of the most important countries in the world as regards the procedures and limits to the constitutional revision. In this sense, the constitutions of some Balkan Peninsula countries will be analyzed to draw a comparison and analyze the Albanian Constitution as regards the procedure for its revision. The study intends to analyze the procedures for the revision of the Constitution as well as the explicit and implicit limits to these revisions. In the Constitutional revision in Albania in 2016, the role of the Constitutional Court on the control of the constitutional legitimacy of constitutional revision laws was clarified. Formal constitutionality is usually emphasized since the Albanian constitutional reform underlined that the Constitutional Court in Albania could express itself on the constitutionality of the Constitutional revision law only from a formal point of view.   Received: 2 January 2021 / Accepted: 27 February 2021 / Published: 7 March 2021

The Rule of Law Paradox in the 2016 Constitutional Amendments in Albania

2020 ◽  
pp. 95-110
Author(s):  
Darinka Piqani
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Candidate Country ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
The Rule Of Law

In 2016, the Albanian constitution underwent the most comprehensive constitutional reform since its adoption in 1998. One of the purposes of this reform was to transform the judicial system in Albania in order to detach it from corruption. One of the novelties of the reform was the vetting process of judges and prosecutors at all levels, including judges of the Albanian Constitutional Court. Following termination of mandates of some of the members to the Court, dismissals, and resignations in the context of the vetting process, Albania’s Constitutional Court did not function for more than a year. Although indisputably the constitutional reform and more specifically vetting were designed as a means of guaranteeing the rule of law, it seems that they were contributing factors to the stalemate within the Constitutional Court, thus ultimately undermining the rule of law. This chapter unfolds this paradox in Albania, an EU candidate country.

scholarly journals La prohibición de partidos políticos en Alemania. Del nuevo criterio de la potencialidad y la reciente reforma constitucional para la no financiación de formaciones antidemocráticas pero constitucionales // The prohibition on political parties in Germany. The new criterion of potentiality and the recent constitutional reform for not funding anti-democratic but constitutional formations

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (102) ◽  
pp. 235
Author(s):  
Pablo Fernández de Casadevante Mayordomo
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
State Funding ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Implications ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Legislative Framework ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality ◽  
The Right ◽  
New Criterion

Resumen:El año 2017 fue testigo de importantes acontecimientos en relación con el fenómeno de la ideología de ultra derecha en Alemania. Si en enero, el Tribunal Constitucional Federal fallaba en contra de la prohibición del  NPD pese a reconocer el carácter antidemocrático de sus objetivos, en julio entraba en vigor una reforma constitucional para excluir de la financiación estatal a formaciones políticas que, siendo contrarias al orden democrático, no sean objeto de prohibición al carecer del potencial necesario para alcanzar sus objetivos. A modo de colofón, septiembre finalizaba con la celebración de elecciones federales y la entrada de la AfD en el Bundestag como tercera fuerza política. A la luz de todo ello, en el presente trabajo se apuesta por el análisis de las principales implicaciones jurídicas derivadas de dichos hechos, ello con el ánimo de ofrecer al lector una visión actualizada sobre el control jurídico aplicable a la ideología de los partidos políticos en Alemania.Summary1. Introduction. 2. The right of every democratic system to its self-defence. 2.1. Theoretical approach. 2.2. Express intangibility clauses and ideological control. 3. The defense of democracy and political parties in the German legal system. 3.1. The German concept of militant democracy. 3.2. Legal regime applicable to anti-democratic political parties. 3.2.1. Constitutional framework. 3.2.2. Basic legislative framework. 4. The German jurisprudential adaptation to the ECHR conventionality control: the NPD case. 4.1. The necessity test according to the ECHR jurisprudence. 4.2. Potentiality as a substitute for the principle of proportionality. 4.3. Anti-democratic but constitutional. 5. Main observations after the recent constitutional reform. 6. Conclusions. Bibliography.Abstract:2017 witnessed important events in relation to the phenomenon of the right-wing ideology in Germany. First, in January, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled against the prohibition of the NPD, despite recognizing the anti-democratic nature of its objectives; then, in July, a constitutional reform came into effect to exclude from the state funding those political formations that, contravening the democratic order, are not prohibited as they lack the necessary potential to achieve their objectives. To conclude, September ended with the holding of federal elections and the entry of the AfD into the Bundestag, as the country’s third largest force. In light of all this, the present work is committed to the analysis of the main legal implications derived from these events, this with the aim to offer the reader an updated view on the legal control applicable to theideology of political parties in Germany.

scholarly journals Compromesso astorico: the role of the Senate after the Italian constitutional reform

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Tsebelis
Keyword(s):  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Agenda Setter ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Policies ◽  
Selection Of

The article examines the content of the constitutional amendments with respect to the Senate. While symmetric bicameralism would be abolished with respect to policymaking, it would be preserved and even exacerbated with respect to constitutional revisions. The consequences of the first would be a reduction of the number of institutional veto players, which would lead to the facilitation of policy change, and an increase in the power of the government (who is the agenda setter). The content of the new policies remains unknown, as are the economic consequences of the proposed changes. Constitutional revisions would become more difficult, because the ideological distance between the Chamber of Deputies and Senate would be likely to increase (because of the mode of selection of Senators), while article 138, which specifies the requirements for amendment to the constitution, would remain the same. As a result, the role of the Italian Constitutional Court would also likely increase.

scholarly journals Constitution Review- between necessity and opportunity

2020 ◽  
pp. 11-26
Author(s):  
ANCA-JEANINA NIȚĂ
Keyword(s):  
Political Elite ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Democratic Regime ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
The Government ◽  
Institutional Actors ◽  
Constitutional Revision

The present article aims to rediscuss the variables of constitutional revision. This effort stems from the recent initiatives purporting “to reform the Constitutional Court of Romania” and observations regarding the “major deficit of parliamentary democracy in the legislative procedure”, generated by the special procedures of “tacit adoption”, “assuming responsibility” and the excess of legislative power on part of the Government, as expressed through ordinances. Given a constitution needs a certain level of stability and the possibility to adapt to new, political and social realities, this article showcases the procedural rules and limits in relation to constitutional revision. It selectively presents possible outcomes of a future constitutional revision – stemming from the observation of disfunctions manifested in the functioning of the constitutional-statal mechanism (particularly the parliamentary practice of tacitly adopting bills and legislative proposals and the governmental practices in the field of assuming responsibility before Parliament and of adopting emergency ordinances). It showcases the constitutional and infraconstitutional framework regulating the organization and functioning of the Constitutional Court of Romania and remarks a recent bill to amend Law No. 47/1992. Last but not least, it analyses whether constitutional amendments would actually play a part in consolidating the democratic regime of Romania if not paired with a reform of the political elite, reshaping the conduct of the main political and institutional actors

scholarly journals PELIBATAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI DALAM PERUBAHAN (ULANG) UUD 1945 YANG PARTISIPATIF MELALUI KOMISI KONSTITUSI

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ni’matul Huda
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Election ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court

<p align="center"><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p><em>c</em><em>urrently reappears demands change as a result of the 1945 constitution as a evaluation 10 years after the 1945 constitution implementation after change. In this period there have been several issues submitted to the constitutional court about the testing of individual candidates in the presidential election, additional authority in perppu, constitutional complaint and the constitutional question by the court, the role of legislation optimalization dpd. This paper initiated a change the 1945 constitution more participatory through the constitutional commission more independent than the previous constitutional commission, with a mandate to prepare draft changes the 1945 constitution. Learning from the experience of various countries are also undergoing transition to democracy and constitutional reform, we should initiate to engage the court in a change in  1945 constitution.</em></p><p><strong><em>Keywords: </em></strong><em>c</em><em>onstitutional court, participatory, constitutional commission.</em></p><p align="center"><strong>Abstrak</strong></p><p>Saat ini muncul kembali tuntutan perubahan (ulang) terhadap UUD 1945 sebagai hasil evaluasi 10 tahun lebih implementasi UUD 1945 pasca perubahan. Dalam kurun waktu tersebut sudah ada beberapa persoalan yang diajukan ke Mahkamah Konstitusi pengujian tentang calon perseorangan dalam pemilihan presiden, tambahan kewenangan Perppu, constitutional complaint dan constitutional question oleh MK, optimlisasi peran legislasi DPD, dan lain-lain. Tulisan ini menggagas perubahan (ulang) UUD 1945 yang lebih partisipatoris melalui Komisi Konstitusi yang lebih independen dibandingkan Komisi Konstitusi yang sebelumnya, dengan mandat menyiapkan draft perubahan (ulang) UUD 1945. Belajar dari pengalaman berbagai Negara yang juga mengalami transisi demokrasi dan reformasi konstitusi, ada baiknya kita menggagas untuk melibatkan MK dalam perubahan (ulang) UUD 1945.</p><p><strong>Kata Kunci: </strong>Mahkamah Konstitusi, Partisipatif, Komisi Konstitusi</p>

scholarly journals El control de constitucionalidad de las reformas constitucionales : ¿un oximorón constitucional? : comentario al ATC 9/2012

2012 ◽  
pp. 483
Author(s):  
Ignacio Villaverde Menéndez
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
Chamber Of Deputies

En este artículo su autor analiza el ATC 9/2012 que inadmitió a trámite el recurso de amparo interpuesto por varios parlamentarios contra las resoluciones y acuerdos de la Mesa del Congreso de los Diputados que dieron trámite a la proposición de reforma del artículo 135 CE. El autor sostiene que, dado que la Constitución española no posee cláusulas de intangibilidad, e incluso existiendo, al Tribunal Constitucional tan sólo le es posible juzgar la conformidad constitucional de los actos parlamentarios de elaboración de la reforma constitucional con lo dispuesto en el artículo 23.2 CE; aunque la hipotética declaración de nulidad de dichos actos por vulneración de dicho artículo no se extendería a la reforma misma. Señala también el autor que el Tribunal Constitucional debió admitir a trámite el recurso de amparo y resolverlo mediante Sentencia.In this article the author analyses ATC 9/2012 that refuse to process the application for liberties warrant lodged by several parliamentarians against the resolutions and agreements of the Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies which gave the reform of article 135 EC proposal pending. The author argues that, because the Spanish Constitution does not have clauses of intangibility, and even exist, the Constitutional Court it is just possible constitutional conformy of parliamentary acts of preparation of constitutional reform pursuant to article 23(2) EC. Although a hypothetical Declaration of invalidity of such acts for infringement of that article would not extend to the reform. Also notes the author that the Constitutional Court was admissible the demand and resolve it by a judgment.

The African Union and the Advancement of Democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 61-91
Author(s):  
Adem K Abebe ◽  
Charles M Fombad
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Critical Element ◽  
African Union ◽  
Reform Initiatives ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Governmental Power ◽  
Venice Commission ◽  
Coups D'etat

The African Union (AU) has as one of its goals the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights, and constitutionalism. A critical element of this goal is the rejection of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), particularly in the form of coups d’état. While there have been some inconsistencies, the AU has rejected coups d’état and called for the reinstatement of democratic dispensations. Nevertheless, the UCG framework has been unable to stem subtler mechanisms of retaining power, such as the suspension of elections or the imposition of ostensibly proper constitutional reform initiatives. This chapter calls for increased attention to the latter forms of extending governmental power. Specifically, it recommends the establishment of formal mechanisms through which the AU can engage directly and offer assistance at moments when reform proposals are debated so as to ensure that domestic actors take cognizance of both the relevant AU frameworks and the comparative continental and global experience. Such a mechanism would be comparable in its workings to the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.

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