scholarly journals De la lex scantinia aux récents amendements du Code criminel: homosexualité et droit dans une perspective historique

2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 777-800
Author(s):  
Robert Demers

This paper deals with the legal approach to homosexuality throughout history, focussing on Roman law, French law up to the Revolution, English law till the mid-60's and finally, Canadian law from the French period up to the amendments to the Criminal Code in 1969. What lessons can be drawn from this analysis? A first conclusion is the increasing intolerance towards homosexuals as evidenced by laws that become more and more preoccupied with private morality and control of individual behaviour. Here, we notice the inverse trend in the Roman law tradition and the common law one, where cultural and religious differences explain much of this curious evolution. A second conclusion is the link established between deviant behaviour and all forms of « deviance » from official policies-thus, accusations of homosexuality are to be found in troubled periods of religious (heresies) and political turmoil. Finally, one notes that although the Medieval period is often considered as being particularly cruel in its treatment of homosexuals, this view would need important qualifications in light of the 20th century treatment of such persons, witness of course, the Nazi extermination.

2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P Theroux ◽  
April D Grosse

Force majeure clauses are intended to allocate risk for future events that, if they occur, will affect the ability of one party to perform its obligations under the contract. This article undertakes a comprehensive review of the Canadian law of force majeure and its application in the energy sector. The article begins by examining the legal foundations of force majeure found in the common law, Canadian jurisprudence, and other legal regimes. It then describes the operation of a force majeure clause and analyzes how such a clause is likely to be interpreted by the courts. Along with analyzing specific aspects of force majeure, such as triggering events, foreseeability and control, and issues relating to impact and causation, the authors incorporate many practical suggestions that will be useful to drafters of force majeure clauses.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 656-670
Author(s):  
Kate Sutherland

Professor Joseph Weiler will soon stand trial for criminal libel in France for refusing to remove a book review from a website associated with an academic journal for which he serves as editor. His case has disturbing implications for all those who write, edit, and publish critical scholarly work. In this article, I explore those implications for Canadian scholars at home and as members of a global scholarly community. I assess the likelihood of success of a similar complaint under Canadian defamation law, and I consider the impact of libel chill and libel tourism. I conclude that although the defendant in such a case would have a good chance of prevailing under Canadian law through the defense of fair comment, a threat to academic freedom remains that requires action on the part of individuals and institutions committed to its preservation and enhancement.


Author(s):  
Thomas Kuehn

The period between the mid-14th and the mid-17th centuries saw the consolidation of both major European legal traditions. One was based on Roman and canon law and held sway as a common law (ius commune) on much of the European Continent. The other was rooted in royal writs and judgments that constituted the “common law” of England. The Romano-canonical law was based on venerable texts, chiefly those of the Corpus iuris civilis, compiled at the behest of the Emperor Justinian in the early 6th century, and the Corpus iuris canonici, assembled in the course of the Middle Ages by legal teachers and popes, with the process of assembly ending in the early 14th century. These texts served as the basis for a highly sophisticated and technical education in law in the medieval universities of Italy and southern France, whose graduates spread throughout Europe. The establishment of new universities from the 14th century—in Italy but also spreading to Germany, Spain, and elsewhere—only served to foster the geographical reach of the Romano-canonical law. This was also the point at which the teaching methods in the universities changed from the logical elaboration of authoritative texts (the so-called school of the glossators) in the direction of contemporary issues and practices (the era of the post-glossators and commentators). The greatest exponent of this trend was Bartolus of Sassoferrato (b. 1313–d. 1357), whose influence was such that it was said that to be a jurist was to be a “bartolist” (nemo iurista nisi bartolista) (see Jurisprudence and Legal Methodologies). The English law consisted of royal writs, Parliamentary statutes, customs, and precedents set in courts. These became in some regards increasingly rigid by the 14th and 15th centuries, but flexibility was introduced by means of the Royal Court of Chancery, which drew to some degree on Roman law notions. This was the so-called law of equity. The influence of royal courts and their remedies led to the waning of manorial and other local courts. The trend toward legal centralization in England was further fueled by the Crown’s break with Catholicism. By the 17th century the common law tradition, including much of the intervening developments in equity, served as the bastion of those who would resist the pretensions of the Stuart monarchs, especially Charles I (b. 1600–d. 1649). Developments in the commercial economy of Europe, intellectual and cultural trends, and religious turmoil would all pose problems in areas such as property law, contracts, marital relations and family prerogatives, and judicial procedures, and would call forth adjustments to resolve them.


2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Sheedy

This piece is a short discussion on the English; and more widely the common law concept of the trust and its traditional exclusion from civil law systems.  It seeks to unearth that the apparent distaste civil law systems have for the common law trust is rooted in each system’s respective attitude to rights in property and at least some degree of mistranslation.  This apparent gulf in understanding can be bridged by incorporating the trust into the more ancient Roman law concept of the patrimony, thereby making the trust sit more comfortably in civil law jurisdictions.  In bridging the divide, this new appreciation for the trust challenges us as common lawyers to reconsider the traditional common law premise of the trust as being less about proprietary interest as it is about personal rights and obligations.


Author(s):  
Kamaliah Salleh ◽  
Noor ‘Ashikin Hamid ◽  
Noraida Harun ◽  
Asiah Bidin ◽  
Zuhairah Ariff Abd Ghadas

The members own the company by virtue of their shareholding and the directors manage and exercise control over the company’s affairs through the company’s board meeting. Despite segregation of powers and roles between the members and directors, there has been an inclination on the part of the members to participate to a greater extent in the company’s affairs. This paper aims to establish the legal position as between the directors and members that reflect the separation of control and ownership in the company under the common law and the Malaysian law. The method used in this study is the content analysis of the reported Malaysian and international law cases as well as the statutory provisions in order to examine the legal position established under the common law, the previous Companies Act 1965 and the newly introduced Companies Act 2016. The study reveals that the separation between the two has long been recognized and upheld by the common law as well as the Malaysian Acts. The introduction of section 195 of the Companies Act 2016, however, allows members to raise their voice in relation to matters which are within the powers of directors, hence the separation becomes slightly vague. In the absence of the latest judicial decisions to test the application of section 195, further review on its application may be required in order to determine methods to measure if a members’ recommendation is truly made in the best interests of the company.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 138-163
Author(s):  
Jane Thomson

Discrimination has long been identified as detrimental to the basic functioning of multicultural countries like Canada. While governments have adopted constitutional law and passed human rights legislation to combat and control discrimination, these laws are inapplicable to a significant portion of Canadian law. Areas of private law, such as wills and trusts are therefore more vulnerable to use by individuals seeking to perpetuate discrimination. The main way that courts in Canada have dealt with this issue is through the use of the doctrine of public policy. As early as the 19th century, private law provisions viewed as restraining another’s freedom of religion or perpetuating discrimination on grounds such as race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation have been found contrary to public policy by Canadian courts and voided accordingly. While the uniquely Canadian jurisprudence in this area continues to evolve, until quite recently, its trajectory appeared to be one of expansion. However, the latest appellate level decision in this area,Spence v. BMO Trust Co., appears to have changed the course of this jurisprudence.  In Spence, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that certain testamentary clauses, no matter how discriminatory in nature, can never be subject to a public policy review. This article argues that while the result of Spence was likely correct on its particular facts, the reasoning of that decision goes too far in its attempt to limit the doctrine’s applicability with respect to discrimination in the private law. Parts of the decision in Spence ignore the key message of past decisions in this area concerning the danger of uncensored discrimination in Canadian society. While reasonable people may disagree on the outcome of any given public policy inquiry, a point that should attract consensus is that the private law should never be an unexamined and impenetrable shelter for discrimination. However, Spence effectively creates an area of the private law immune to legal scrutiny by precluding the use of the common law doctrine that has been used to directly confront and censure discrimination in Canadian private law.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
André Mukheibir

It is trite that the South African law of delict follows a generalising approach. This entails that liability will only ensue when all the elements of delict are present. South African law does not recognise individual “delicts”. The generalising approach followed in South African law is qualified in that there are three main delictual actions, namely the actio legis Aquiliae for patrimonial loss; the actio inuriarum for loss arising from intentional infringements of personality rights; and the Germanic action for pain and suffering, in terms of which a plaintiff can claim compensation for negligent infringements of the physical-mental integrity. This approach is further qualified in that numerous actions dating back to Roman law still exist in our law today. Included in this mix are the actions for harm caused by animals, such as the actio de pauperie, the actio de pastu, and the actio de feris, each with its own requirements. There have been questions as to whether these actions, in particular the actio de pauperie, still form part of South African law. In Loriza Brahman v Dippenaar (2002 (2) SA 477 (SCA) 487) the defendant claimed that the actio was no longer part of the South African law. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) per Olivier JA held that the actio de pauperie had been part of South African law for more than 24 centuries and not fallen into disuse. Olivier JA held that the fact that the action is based on strict liability (one of the arguments raised against it) is no reason to ban it from South African law as strict liability was increasing and in suitable instances fulfils a useful function.The SCA, again, recently confirmed the continued existence of the action in South African law in the case of Van Meyeren v Cloete ((636/2019) [2020] ZASCA 100 (11 September 2020) 40). In this case, the SCA had to decide whether to extend the defences against liability in terms of the actio de pauperie to the negligence of a third party that was not in control of the animal. The defendant held that the court should develop the common law in this regard. Considering both case law and the requirements for the development of the common law, the SCA held that such an extension could not be justified.


Author(s):  
Thomas Izbicki

During the Middle Ages, law loomed large in efforts to manage life situations, beginning with the adaptation of late imperial law to the successor or barbarian kingdoms of the West. Alongside local law and custom, the learned law was increasingly used to answer questions and settle disputes about family issues such as marriages and dowry, property and inheritance, contracts, and crime. Study of the law, not only as taught at the universities but as used to advise judges who lacked formal training, illuminates the status of women and children under patriarchy. Although Roman law was geared more to private than public law, political issues were addressed. Moreover, Romanistic procedure had a wide influence across Europe. Even where Roman law was not received, it had its influence via canon law and specialized courts. This is evident in England, where the common law governed real property, but canon law introduced the possibility of testamentary disposition of certain possessions. Similarly, the admiralty courts dealt with issues such as navigation and salvage on the basis of civil law. Roman law began in the Republic, beginning with the Twelve Tables of the Law (450 bce), resulting from struggles between patricians and plebeians. Under the Republic certain men knew the laws; but there were no legal careers. The most important judicial document was the praetor’s edict about procedure, the foundation of later jurisprudence. Both the popular assemblies and the Senate legislated for both the private and the public spheres, and the jurisconsults of the imperial period commented on their enactments. The Roman Empire produced jurisconsults able to give authoritative advice, and some wrote on the laws. Emperors legislated, and collections of their laws were compiled. The most important, the Theodosian Code (438–439 ce), influenced the Latin churches and the codes of the Western barbarian kingdoms. In the East, the study of law continued. Eventually Justinian I ordered systematization of centuries of jurisprudence. The Institutes served as a textbook. The works of the jurisconsults were divided topically in the Digest (Pandects). Imperial decrees were collected in Justinian’s Code with supplements in the Novellae. This Corpus iuris civilis (529–534 ce) was diffused throughout Justinian’s empire but had little influence in the West for centuries. The largest part of Justinian’s corpus is concerned with private, rather than public, law. Later jurists retained that focus in most of their writings. Revived study of Roman law in the West is tied traditionally to recovery of the Digest (c. 1070 ce). The teaching of law took root at the University of Bologna. The Glossators expounded texts and annotated (glossed) them. The Bolognese curriculum divided the Digest into Old Digest, Infortiatum, and New Digest. The first nine books of the Code were treated together, while the Institutes, last three books of the Code and Authenticum, a version of the Novellae, with two books on feudal law, made up the Volume. The direction of study changed in the 14th century. The Commentators (Post-Glossators) created detailed expositions of the entire corpus. The Commentators predominated even after humanists criticized their Latin and their interpretative methods. Works on procedure or specific topics, records of disputations, and opinions (consilia) on cases were written. All of these genres originated in the manuscript milieu, but many texts were printed beginning in the 15th century. Lawyers trained at the universities taught, provided advice, served as judges, and worked as bureaucrats. In much of Italy, the learned law was fused with elements of feudal law in the ius commune (common law). Most consilia engaged both the common law and the ius proprium of localities to be relevant in specific contexts. The Roman law was received through much of Europe in the late medieval and Early Modern periods, but its influence in England was mostly indirect.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. McSweeney

Priests of the Law tells the story of the first people in the history of the common law to think of themselves as legal professionals: the group of justices who wrote the celebrated treatise known as Bracton. It offers a new interpretation of Bracton and its authors. Bracton was not so much an attempt to explain or reform the early common law as it was an attempt to establish the status and authority of the king’s justices. The justices who wrote it were some of the first people to work full-time in England’s royal courts, at a time when they had no obvious model for the legal professional. They found one in an unexpected place: the Roman-law tradition that was sweeping across Europe in the thirteenth century. They modeled themselves on the jurists of Roman law who were teaching in Italy and France. In Bracton and other texts they produced, the justices of the royal courts worked hard to establish that the nascent common-law tradition was just one constituent part of the Roman-law tradition. Through their writing, this small group of people, working in the courts of an island realm, imagined themselves to be part of a broader European legal culture. They made the case that they were not merely servants of the king. They were priests of the law.


1991 ◽  
Vol 4 (01) ◽  
pp. 67-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myron Gochnauer

In the common law world the oath has long provided one way of ensuring that trial witnesses tell the truth. The moral power of the oath supplements the judicial power of perjury laws. But unlike laws forbidding perjury, the oath cannot be used automatically. Through ignorance, belief or conscience a person may be incapable of meaningfully swearing an oath. Over the years there have been many legislative enactments and judicial pronouncements which sought to clarify conditions for the use of the oath and establish alternatives to it. With increasing secularization of society, the traditional ground rules have required modification. Because there has been little serious, theoretical discussion of the nature of the oath, these modifications have often exhibited inadequate understanding of the moral dimensions of the oath. As a result, judicial discussion has reached an impasse. In January, 1988 Bill C-15 became law. It contained yet another attempt to satisfactorily harness the power of the oath to the needs of the judicial system. The interpretation of this new legislation will offer excellent opportunities to eliminate some of the confusion surrounding the oath in Canadian law. This paper will analyze the nature of the oath with special attention to its obligation-generating capacity. The analysis developed here may help provide the understanding necessary for sensible judicial interpretation and reform.


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