scholarly journals Comparing the Class Bases of Left-wing and Right-wing Populist Parties in West European Countries

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 2_109-2_142
Author(s):  
Takeshi Hieda
Public Choice ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Bergh ◽  
Anders Kärnä

AbstractRecent micro-level studies have suggested that globalization—in particular, economic globalization and trade with China—breeds political polarization and populism. This study examines whether or not those results generalize by examining the country-level association between vote shares for European populist parties and economic globalization. Using data on vote shares for 267 right-wing and left-wing populist parties in 33 European countries during 1980–2017, and globalization data from the KOF institute, we find no evidence of a positive association between (economic or other types of) globalization and populism. EU membership is associated with a 4–6-percentage-point larger vote share for right-wing populist parties.


2016 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-79
Author(s):  
Peter Kovačič Peršin

EDVARD KOCBEK'S 'REFLECTION' ON SPAINDue to the Spanish Civil War, the ideological conflicts in the Catholic circles became more distinct. The clerical part, particularly the Slovenecdaily, which published biased articles on the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and 1937 with a special emphasis on condemning the rise of the popular front, understood the publication of Edvard Kocbek's essay as an attack on its views. Kocbek's purpose behind the Ponderingwas, however, to present a more balanced picture of the Spanish tragedy that was based on the reports by West European writers who favoured the Spanish republic.The Ponderingwas the central crystallising point that led to the final split in the Catholic circles, while at the same time stirring the left-wing political groups to start fighting for a common goal. But the main reason that it became the central crystallising point was the militant response by the right-wing Catholic group; the essay in itself would have otherwise been only considered a balanced representation of the situation in Spain, which were presented one-sidedly by the clerical press. This shows that political tensions on the territory of today's Slovenia had already reached their climax as early as a few years before the war, thus rendering a dialogue and a democratic compromise that could unite the Slovenians in a national defensive attitude impossible.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 146-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Huber ◽  
Christian H. Schimpf

This study examines the differences and commonalities of how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy. The focus is narrowed to the relationship between these parties and two aspects of democratic quality, minority rights and mutual constraints. Our argument is twofold: first, we contend that populist parties can exert distinct influences on minority rights, depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing populist parties. Second, by contrast, we propose that the association between populist parties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the populist element and thus, we expect no differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties. We test our expectations against data from 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our empirical findings support the argument for the proposed differences regarding minority rights and, to a lesser extent, the proposed similarities regarding mutual constraints. Therefore we conclude that, when examining the relationship between populism and democracy, populism should not be considered in isolation from its host ideology.


2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Romain Lachat

The left–right scale is the concept most often used to describe citizens’ and parties’ political positions. Its prevalence suggests that political preferences are structured by a single ideological dimension. However, much research shows that citizens’ issue preferences in Western Europe are structured by two dimensions: economic; and social–cultural. How can a single dimension be sufficient to orient oneself in a two-dimensional political space? This article suggests a solution to this paradox: among citizens, the left–right scale and more concrete political issues are related in a non-linear way. Economic issue preferences should be more strongly related to ideological differences among left-wing citizens (e.g. between extreme-left and centre-left citizens) than among right-wing individuals. The reverse pattern should characterize the relation between sociocultural issues and ideological self-placement. The analysis of 28 elections in five West European countries offers strong support for the hypothesis of a non-linear relation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Erik R. Tillman

This chapter introduces the puzzle and motivation for the book. Rising support for populist radical right parties in Western Europe and increasing polarization over European integration represent a change from the politics of the 1990s. Radical right parties or candidates have achieved new levels of electoral support in many West European countries. At the same time, though, mainstream values have become increasingly liberal. Thus, recent years have not simply seen a resurgence of right-wing nationalism in Western Europe; they have seen greater polarization concerning issues of national identity and community. In short, West European electoral politics is evolving from conflict based around cleavages such as class to a new dimension of conflict centring on questions of identity, culture, and the demarcation of national boundaries. This chapter reviews existing accounts of this electoral evolution before providing an overview of this book’s arguments and findings.


Author(s):  
A. E. YASHLAVSKII

The article makes focus on the rise of Western Europe’s far-right  parties which act with anti-immigrant agenda amid 2010s European  migrant crisis. Massive influxes of refugees and migrants have  accumulated huge political significance and triggered off a wide  range of conflicts (both on international and national levels). The  migrant crisis has indicated many social-political challenges for  European countries. The crisis has been synchronous with a rise of popularity of right populist political movements (old ones as well  as new ones), which promote restrictions of immigration etc. At the  same time it cannot be ignored that West European right-wing  populist political movements achieved some success in previous  decades, well ahead of the current migrant crisis. Immigration issue  has been a centerpiece of political discourses of West European right-wing parties (National Front in France, for instance)  since late 1970s – early 1980s. But it is quite obvious that the 2010s migrant crisis became a trigger for revitalization of the far-right  movements which are outspoken critics of the European Union as “a  supra- national body” dictating its conditions to the member  countries. Besides, the crisis gave a boost to a rise of new populist  movements (for example, “Alternative for Germany”). In 2017 the  populist right-wing parties in Europe won the largest support over  the three past decades. Recently the right populist forces appeared  in elections in a number of European countries (Germany, Austria,  France etc.) as tough competitor of traditional mainstream political  parties and won parliamentary representation and/or representation in the government coalitions. Furthermore, these  movements demonstrate attempts to change their image to shift to  political mainstream. However, in the foreseeable future, any  cardinal breakthrough and far-right anti- immigrant parties’ coming  to the power in Western Europe’s coutrnies is hardly possible.


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-346
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Borkowska-Nowak

Today in Europe we are witnessing a populist turn, we could even speak of a “populist moment” that signals the crisis of neoliberal democracy. According to Chantal Mouffe, “the populist moment” is the expression of a set of heterogeneous demands, which cannot be formulated in traditional right/left frontier. The battles of our time will be between right-wing and left-wing populism. Although the current state of liberal societies appears to favor the development of a Right project, Mouffe proves that just a left-wing one can uphold any kind of radicalisation of democracy. The aim of this paper is to examine the reasons for the increasing success of populist parties in European countries and to consider whether the way the present crisis is manifesting is conducive to the growth of a populist narrative, especially in its right-wing variant.


2016 ◽  
pp. 37-55
Author(s):  
Michał Rauszer

Nation against “the leftist.”  Political categorizations of the reality in internet folkloreIn his well known essay “Left-wing” communism: an infantile disorder Lenin used the Russian term “levizna” to name a naïve strategy of West European communist parties. This term is usually translated as “Left-Wing” but it does not show its disregarding to West communist politics in Lenin’s eyes. In Polish there is anther tradition, used by communist nomenclature, to ridicule left wing movement (e.g. in 1968), and it is translated as “lewactwo” (translations such as”lefty”, “leftie” do not fit due to historical context and the Russian grammar). Nowadays the term is used by right-wing movements and politicians to humiliate each left-wing idea as childish (opposed to “adult” right-wing). In my article, I intend to show how this “lewactwo” notion works as a barrier of national identity, as well as a screen of phantasy. The empirical part of my work was based on Internet folklore, such as mems, commentaries, short YouTube films and also on offers of shops with patriotic clothes and gadgets (because their offer is rooted in this folklore, and they first make some “patriotic context,” e.g. something interesting in history, and then offer clothes etc. in relation to this. So their merchandise is strictly based on Internet folklore and work as “barometer” for it). My analysis shows how the notion “lewactwo” works as an ideological and phantasmatic barrier for national identity. This barrier shows how all these right-wing movements construct positive set of the “nation.” This set contains positive as well as negative (put together with “lewactwo”) elements, like notions, ideas and signs with which they must be contiguous to be part of the nation (e.g., in an anthropological notion of magic based on contagion and similarity). The term “lewactwo” is also used as a screen of phantasy, where you are projecting all features which exclude you from the community and your positive “national identity.” Naród kontra lewactwo. Polityczne kategoryzacje rzeczywistości w folklorze internetowymW znanym eseju Dziecięca choroba lewicowości w komunizmie Lenin, na określenie naiwnej jego zdaniem polityki zachodnich partii komunistycznych, używa pojęcia „lievizna”. Zwykle tłumaczy się je jako „lewicowość”, termin ten jednak nie oddaje pogardy dla zachodnich partii komunistycznych, z jaką Lenin się o nich wypowiadał. W języku polskim wyraz ten był także niekiedy przekładany jako „lewactwo”, po to by służył ośmieszaniu działań niezgodnych z nomenklaturą Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej (przykładem może być ruch ‘68 na Zachodzie). Współcześnie określenie „lewactwo” najczęściej jest używane w dyskursie ruchów prawicowych, aby pokazać każdy niezgodny z nimi projekt jako „dziecinny”. Wyrazem tym określa się nie tylko ruchy lewicowe, ale także wszystkie inne, które nie wpisują się w dyskurs prawicy narodowej. W swoim artykule staram się pokazać, w jaki sposób wyraz ten służy jako fantazmatyczna bariera, granica definiująca tożsamość narodową. Za materiał badawczy posłużył mi folklor internetowy taki, jak: memy, komentarze pod artykułami i zdjęciami, krótkie filmiki na portalu YouTube, a także oferta internetowych sklepów z odzieżą i gadżetami patriotycznymi (oferta tych sklepów jest ściśle oparta na takiej folklorystycznej interpretacji wydarzeń ujmowanych jako ważne). Pojęcie „lewactwa” funkcjonuje jako bariera wyznaczająca tożsamość narodową oraz jako przestrzeń fantazji. Ideologiczna praca tego pojęcia pokazuje, w jaki sposób w opozycji do tej bariery definiuje się i wyznacza pozytywny zbiór tego, co jest postrzegane jako „narodowe”, oraz tego, co „narodem” nie jest. Ponadto „lewactwo” jest także używane jako ekran fantazji, na której projektuje się cechy, których posiadanie wyklucza z narodowego zbioru, stanowi niejako jego negację.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003329411989990
Author(s):  
Burcu Tekeş ◽  
E. Olcay Imamoğlu ◽  
Fatih Özdemir ◽  
Bengi Öner-Özkan

The aims of this study were to test: (a) the association of political orientations with morality orientations, specified by moral foundations theory, on a sample of young adults from Turkey, representing a collectivistic culture; and (b) the statistically mediating roles of needs for cognition and recognition in the links between political orientation and morality endorsements. According to the results (a) right-wing orientation and need for recognition were associated with all the three binding foundations (i.e., in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity); (b) right-wing orientation was associated with binding foundations also indirectly via the role of need for recognition; (c) regarding individualizing foundations, left-wing orientation and need for cognition were associated with fairness/reciprocity, whereas only gender was associated with harm/care; and (d) left-wing orientation was associated with fairness dimension also indirectly via the role of need for cognition. The cultural relevance of moral foundations theory as well as the roles of needs for cognition and recognition are discussed.


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