The French connection: luxury, portraiture and the court of Charles II

Author(s):  
Laura L. Knoppers

The luxury of the court of Charles II is well-known and usually seen as reflecting the personal failings of the king or as a reaction to the Puritanism of the preceding regime. This chapter argues, rather, that Charles II adopted luxury as a mode of power modelled on his cousin, the powerful French king, Louis XIV. Portraiture of the French and English courts shows striking and largely unexplored links as, under the influence of Louise de Kéroualle, Duchess of Portsmouth and reigning mistress in the English court in the 1670s, French painter Henri Gascar executed portraits of Charles II, Portsmouth, and others closely drawn from compositions in the court of Louis XIV. Although court portraiture thus changed within England (showing links, rather, with continental models), a different kind of continuity can be seen when objections to luxury mark observers of the Restoration court, from former republicans to royalists.

1995 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven C. A. Pincus

ABSTRACTWhile Restoration historians have traditionally assumed that there was little public interest in foreign affairs, and that English attitudes towards Europe were determined either by religious or domestic concerns, this essay argues that there was a lively and sophisticated English debate about Europe which turned on the proper identification of the universal monarch rather than religion. In the later 1660s the English political nation was deeply divided in its understanding of European politics. Enthusiastic supporters of the restored monarchy thought that the republican United Provinces sought universal dominion, while the monarchy's radical critics identified absolutist France as an aspirant to universal monarchy. French success in the early phases of the third Anglo-Dutch war, the failure of the French navy to support the English fleet at sea, and the overthrow of the Dutch republican regime in favour of William III, Prince of Orange, convinced the vast majority of the English that France represented the greater threat. Ultimately popular pressure compelled Charles II to abandon the French alliance. In addition, the popular conviction that Louis XIV had succeeded in corrupting the English court resulted in a new-found desire for popular accountability in foreign affairs, and a consequent diminution of the royal prerogative in that sphere.


1924 ◽  
Vol XXXIX (CLIII) ◽  
pp. 86-89
Author(s):  
E. S. DE BEER
Keyword(s):  

1974 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Calvin Dickinson

Queen Anne's appointment of Sidney, Earl of Godolphin, as Lord Treasurer in 1702 was a fortunate choice for England. The country faced a war with France occasioned by the empty Spanish throne and the expansionist schemes of Louis XIV. England needed a man of ability in finance, experience in government, and credit with queen and country to handle home affairs and finance the armies of the allies on the continent. The Duke of Marlborough, head of England's armies, considered his friend Godolphin the only man for the task. He even threatened not to command English armies unless Godolphin took the Treasury post. Godolphin had opposed the war with France and had resigned from a Treasury post in 1701 for this reason, but in 1702 he accepted the white staff of Lord Treasurer at the insistence of his friend Marlborough.During the course of the War Of Spanish Succession Lord Godolphin used his exceptional talents to finance the military forces of England—land and sea—and to provide large amounts of money for the military expenses of England's allies in the conflict. He was successful while Louis XIV's efforts to accomplish the same ends by some of the same means failed.Godolphin possessed expertise and long experience in national finance, holding responsible Treasury positions in the reigns of Charles II, James II, and William III, before becoming Queen Anne's Lord Treasurer. Recognizing the advantages that the Bank of England could provide for national finance, he had helped push the proposal for its establishment through the House of Lords in the face of strong opposition in 1694. He had also favored a Land Bank that eventually came to naught. Seeing the value of exchequer bills in expanding the nation's money system during William III's reign, he made extensive use of this novel idea in financing Queen Anne's war.


2020 ◽  
pp. 7-30
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Borgognoni

In this article, I will analyse the political activity of marquise Marie Gigault de Bellefonds, ambassadress of France at the Madrid court between 1679 and 1681, by reflecting on the different diplomatic strategies implemented by her and her husband in order to gain the favour of the monarchs, particularly of the queen consort Marie-Louise of Orleans. The study of Louis XIV of France’s instructions to his ambassador and the perusal of the letters that the ambassadress sent to her friends in Paris evidence the importance of collaborative work in the marriages among diplomats in seventeenth-century court society. Moreover, our sources allow us to make visible the role of the wives of ambassadors in the pre-modern diplomatic system –a field of study in its beginning stages, but also highly promising. Who was Marie Gigault de Bellefonds? Why was she considered a dangerous individual or, as stated by Saint-Simon, «evil as a snake» at the court? Who were her main adversaries in Madrid? What was she accused of? Why did she and her husband have to leave the embassy in 1681? This research will attempt to answer these and other questions related to the presence of the French ambassadress at the court of Charles II and Marie-Louise of Orleans.


2004 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-144
Author(s):  
Deborah Payne Fisk

This superb monograph examines how radical politics found expression in performance in the decade prior to the Glorious Revolution. The years from 1678 to 1688 saw the English monarchy rocked by successive crises, ranging from allegations of secret Catholic plots to murder the king (largely fabricated) to murmurings of dark dealings between Louis XIV and Charles II (largely true). The inability of Charles II to produce a legitimate heir also worried a Protestant citizenry who feared that the line of succession would devolve to James, the Catholic brother of Charles II. Arbitrary rule, strict censorship, excessive taxation, and an atmosphere of Stalinesque surveillance further inflamed the populace. As Johnson wryly notes, the problem with the Restoration was that it restored too much, especially the oppressive political attitudes that caused the Civil War in the first place. Amid this tumult, Johnson situates the patent theatres and street performance. He is certainly not the first scholar to do so, but he is, happily, the first in a long time to combine keen intelligence with common sense. That he tells this compelling story stylishly and with verve gives one all the more reason to read this first-rate study.


1954 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 111-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. A. Thomson
Keyword(s):  

On 16 November 1700, Louis XIV publicly announced that his second grandson, Philip, duke of Anjou, was to succeed Charles II of Spain as the ruler of all the latter's dominions. On 15 May 1702, England, the Dutch re-public, and the emperor all declared war on France; England and the Dutch republic then also declared war on Spain, although they had recognized Philip as king; the emperor, however, who had not done so, declared war, not on Spain, but on the duke of Anjou and his adherents. If, then, Louis's action in November 1700 made war inevitable, it is curious that these declarations were so long in coming.


1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.F. Allen
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Rafael Valladares

La relación entre España y Francia a partir de 1661 revistió un interés particular a causa de la confluencia de dos fenómenos: el fin de la hegemonía hispánica y la extinción del valimiento en ambas coronas. Esto último dio paso al restablecimiento del gobierno personal, primero en Francia, en marzo de aquel año, y luego en España, en noviembre. En el caso español, menos conocido que el francés, Felipe IV llevó a cabo esta restauración no solo, ni principalmente, por la necesidad de emular a su sobrino Luis XIV, sino, recurriendo a la tradición de su propia historia y dinastía, con el objetivo de incluir este modo de gobierno en el legado del futuro Carlos II, consciente de que la persistencia del valimiento en España con un rey niño haría inviable la Monarquía.AbstractThe relationship between Spain and France from 1661 has a particular interest owing to the coincidence of two political phenomena: the end of the Hispanic hegemony and the abolition of the favouritism in both countries –and consequently the restauration of the personal rule, first in France, in March 1661, and then in Spain, in November. The Spanish case is less known but is very interesting. Philip IV decided to restore the absolute government not only to emulate his nephew Louis XIV, but above all to guide the future rule of his son, Crown Prince Charles, according to the historical tradition of the Habsburg dynasty. The ultimate goal of Philip IV was to avoid the weakening or even the disappearance of the Spanish Monarchy during the Royal minority of Charles II –a four-year-old child in 1665.


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