The Subjectivity of Nature

Author(s):  
James Miller

Daoism proposes a radical reversal of the way that modern human beings think about the natural world. Rather than understanding human beings as “subject” who observe the “objective” world of nature, Daoism proposes that subjectivity is grounded in the Dao or Way, understood as the wellspring of cosmic creativity for a world of constant transformation. As a result the Daoist goal of “obtaining the Dao” offers insights into the ecological quest to transcend the modern, Cartesian bifurcation of subject and object, self and world. From this follows an ideal of human action not as the projection of agency onto an neutral, objective backdrop but as a transaction or mediation between self and world.

Religions ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. 266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoe Gareiou ◽  
Efthimios Zervas

Christian ecotheology uses theology to examine the consequences of human action on ecology. It comes from the notion that the natural world is the creation and the good of God. The study of the Sacred Texts and the analysis of their references to the environment provides information on the relation of human beings to the environment and reveals the approach of each author. In this study, a detailed descriptive statistical analysis of the environmental references of the four Gospels of the New Testament was carried out. The different aspects of the environment (natural, anthropogenic, and spiritual) were explored and a quantitative analysis of the environmental references was performed for the texts of the four Gospels using descriptive statistics measures. The results show that the anthropogenic environment is the most commonly cited, with the spiritual environment coming next and the natural environment in the third position.


2018 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-80
Author(s):  
Taylor Schey

AbstractLiterary history commonly holds that the Enlightenment inaugurated an epistemological crisis to which the British Romantic poets sought to respond. The skeptical separation of subject and object is considered a central problem for Romanticism, which is thought to rest on a desire to regain access to things in themselves—or, in a more recent idiom, to what Quentin Meillassoux calls “the great outdoors” and Jane Bennett calls “the out-side.” This story does not stand up to scrutiny. A reexamination of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poetry and philosophy reveals that he was positively invested in a poetic praxis of skeptical ignorance derived from David Hume and that this praxis allowed him to vacate the question of the way things really are. Eschewing the masculinist quest to penetrate the secrets of the natural world, this skeptical praxis offers a quiet solution to the mind-nature problem by dissolving its existence as a problem. It also overhauls our understanding of “Mont Blanc” and illuminates a Romantic tradition founded on a poetics of epistemic sufficiency.


Author(s):  
Marcus Düwell

This chapter investigates how human dignity might be understood as a normative concept for the regulation of technologies. First, various distinctions that are relevant for the way human dignity can be understood are discussed. It is argued that it is particularly important that we should see human dignity as a concept that ascribes a specific status that forms the basis of the human rights regimes. Second, the author’s own approach, inspired by Kant and Gewirth, is presented, it being proposed that we should see the concrete content of human dignity as the protection of the authority of human beings to govern their own lives. Third, various consequences for the evaluation of technologies are discussed. In a context of major global and ecological challenges, together with the replacement of human action by automation, the role of human dignity becomes one of guiding the development of a technology-responsive human rights regime.


Author(s):  
Karin Nisenbaum

This chapter explains why Schelling and Rosenzweig hold that the representation of God by finite human beings is a topic of practical philosophy. Like Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and his Ages of the World fragments, Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption is motivated by an attempt to provide an explanation for the existence of the finite world, for the condition that brings about the relation between subject and object that characterizes all states of human consciousness. The system that Rosenzweig develops in the Star invites us to consider our commitments, the values that we ascribe to ourselves when we form maxims for action, as the means through which abstract concepts of the good are cognized. On Rosenzweig’s view, our commitments are the site of reason’s revelation; for this reason, God is both cognized and realized through human action in the world.


Author(s):  
Karin Nisenbaum

This chapter shows that both Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and his Ages of the World fragments are motivated by an attempt to explain the relation between subject and object that characterizes all states of human consciousness. Fichte’s notion of the self-positing subject issues in the view that there is a single fundamental entity (the “absolute I”), which is constituted by two forms of activity, real and ideal activity; and, on Fichte’s view, the relation between real and ideal activity is the relation between subject and object that characterizes all states of human consciousness. Yet, in the Jena period, Fichte does not provide an adequate explanation for the basic relational structure of human consciousness. Schelling hopes to explain the structure of human consciousness by developing the view that human experience is grounded in three irreducible elements—God, the natural world, and human beings—which relate to one another in three temporal dimensions: creation, revelation, and redemption.


Author(s):  
Joseph Kirby

In works like What Is Ancient Philosophy and Philosophy as a Way of Life, French classicist Pierre Hadot argues that, in the ancient world, the word philosopher was used primarily to refer to people who transformed their way of living through spiritual practices—and not, as in the modern world, to someone devoted to the reading and writing of specifically philosophical texts. Along similar lines, in You Must Change Your Life, German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk argues that the concept of religion should be replaced by a concept of spiritual practice, or anthropotechnics, the regimens of spiritual training whereby human beings strive to shape themselves through repetitive actions. Importantly, both of these thinkers are attempting to revive spiritual practice not only as scholarly concept but also as a living exhortation, for human beings to once again take up the crucible of disciplined self-transformation. That being said, the ancient understanding of spiritual practice remains radically different from the way spiritual practice manifests for a contemporary thinker like Sloterdijk. This difference, in turn, stems from a profound disagreement concerning the nature of reality itself. Generally speaking, ancient philosophers understood reality to be fundamentally harmonious, peaceful, and good—and within this vision, spiritual practice was understood in terms of reconnecting to this fundamental goodness. In modern thought, by contrast, reality is generally understood to be fundamentally violent, chaotic, and ultimately indifferent to human flourishing—and within this alternative view, spiritual practice is then understood in terms of the cultivation of self-control, as part of a larger cultural project to transform the indifferent natural world into a comfortable human home. As for ancient spiritual practice and its concomitant cosmology, these are criticized from the modern perspective as being nothing more than a flight into illusion, motivated by terror at the as-yet-uncontrolled world of nature. If the modern critique of ancient spiritual practice begins with a critique of cosmology, the ancient critique of modern cosmology would begin from the opposite side of the spectrum, with a critique of modern spiritual practice. More precisely, the ancient practitioner would argue that modern cosmology is actually the result of a flawed approach to spiritual training. This critique turns on the location of what Hadot calls practical physics within the ancient curriculum of spiritual development. In short, the widespread historical narrative, whereby the infinite depths of space and time only became thinkable after Copernicus and Galileo, is actually not true; people have been contemplating the way human life appears from the perspective of the infinite abyss for thousands of years, and the moral upshot of this practical physics was the same in the ancient world as it is now: to inculcate a sense of humility, shared vulnerability, and universal human solidarity. In the ancient world, however, this perspective was not seen as the single, scientific truth of the human condition, but rather was understood as an imaginative spiritual exercise. Moreover, this exercise was itself set within a larger curriculum of training that began with the practice of selfless moral discipline. This is because the ego-dissolution that arises from this “view from infinity” can be spiritually dangerous, leading to a sense of fatalism or even nihilism—the idea that the only good is the power to ensure our own pleasure and survival within a fundamentally meaningless universe. According to the ancient philosophers, however, this conclusion, and the abyss of terror, as well as the sense of ontological despair often experienced by modern people, would be the logical results of an incorrect approach to spiritual training: namely, the precocious dissolution of the ego in the infinite, but without the preliminary cultivation of a relatively selfless ego that can peacefully endure its own dissolution. By the terms of this ancient curriculum, meanwhile, the proper pursuit of these two sides of spiritual life—moral selflessness and self-dissolution—would eventually give way to the experiences that Neoplatonists referred to with the word metaphysics, and which 3rd-century theologian Origen describes in terms of the experience of infinite love.


2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 698-699
Author(s):  
John Pickering

Recent developments in both evolutionary theory and in our ideas about development suggest that genetic assimilation of environmental regularities may occur on shorter timescales than those considered by Shepard. The nervous system is more plastic and for longer periods than previously thought. Hence, the internal basis of cognitive-perceptual skills is likely to blend ontogenetic and phylogenetic learning. This blend is made more rich and interactive by the special cultural scaffolding that surrounds human development. This being so, the regularities of the environment which have been genetically assimilated during the emergence of modern human beings may themselves be the products of human action. [Shepard]


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK TURNER

Research in our time offers a welcome flood tide of investigation into how cognitively modern human beings use their basic mental operations to think and act. With luck, it will not ebb. It could become standard, in the way that calculus, once it arose, abided. This tide offers special emphasis, crucial for this issue, on the cognitive origins and operations of language and literature, and in particular on the ways in which systems of multimodal forms can be deployed to prompt for mental operation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Christian Schröer

An act-theoretical view on the profile of responsibility discourse shows in what sense not only all kinds of technical, pragmatic and moral reason, but also all kinds of religious motivation cannot justify a human action sufficiently without acknowledgment to three basic principles of human autonomy as supreme limiting conditions that are human dignity, sense, and justifiability. According to Thomas Aquinas human beings ultimately owe their moral autonomy to a divine creator. So this autonomy can be considered as an expression of secondary-cause autonomy and as the voice of God in the enlightened conscience.


Author(s):  
Robert Chodat

The 1960s saw the triumph of cognitive science over behaviorism. This chapter examines three literary–philosophical objections to this shift: “West Coast” phenomenology, Richard Powers’s Galatea 2.2, and the writings of Walker Percy, the first of the postwar sages featured in this book. For “West Coast” philosophers, cognitive science ignores the way human action is structured by what we “give a damn” about—a sense of significance that orients our actions. Powers’s novel goes a step further: no more than machines do we know what to give a damn about. Percy’s essays and fiction challenge both these positions, asking us to see analogies between the significance we find in language and the significance we find in living a Christian life. Establishing such an analogy is the goal of Percy’s 1971 Love in the Ruins, which seeks to embody—with only partial success—what terms such as “faith” and “community” might mean.


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