4. Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwau

Author(s):  
Chalmers Johnson
2008 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
William R. Summerhill

Abstract In “Bargaining for Absolutism,” Alejandra Irigoin and Regina Grafe argue three points of considerable interest to historians: political absolutism in Castile did not extend to fiscal matters; fiscal relations within Spain and its empire were characterized by bargaining, not directives from the crown; and the differences between Spanish and British imperial fiscal systems have been overstated. Their first and second points are a welcome corrective to oversimplified treatments of early modern Spanish fiscal politics, and echo findings on absolutism in France. In practice, absolutist sovereigns were not autocrats. They needed money to wage war and defend against predatory rivals, and had to exchange rent-generating privileges and monopolies in order to levy taxes and borrow. Irigoin and Grafe understate, however, the differences between fiscal relations in the British and Spanish empires. The institutions governing economic policy making at home were quite distinct in the two cases. After 1688 Britain relied heavily on Parliament for the formulation and approval of economic policies. The formal mechanisms by which the economic interests of different groups were articulated and brokered between Parliament and the government led to more efficient outcomes. In Spain, where the crown could selectively assign and abrogate property rights in a manner unchecked by formal political institutions, fiscal weakness and economic stagnation resulted. This institutional gap was reflected as well in the implementation of economic policy in their respective colonies. In this difference one can trace one important source of differing economic trajectories in the late colonial and early national periods.


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 372-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minseok An ◽  
George H. Sage

In the past decade, to help maintain political stability and promote economic growth, South Korea has committed substantial resources to commercialized sports, including golf. A major source of support for building golf courses has come from government leaders and economic and social incentives as well. In the past 4 years the government has given permission to build 135 new golf courses. The official government discourse about the new golf courses is that they are being built in the interest of “sport for all.” But the golf courses overwhelmingly require membership, which is extremely expensive. Despite the enormous power and resources of the dominant groups in Korea, there are elements of opposition. The golf boom has been severely criticized because it removes large amounts of land from agricultural and industrial productivity, contaminates farm land, and pollutes water. It also represents the worst aspects of the social imbalance of wealth.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 127-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier> Cha

This article outlines the background to the divide between ‘the digital’ and ‘the humanities’ in contemporary South Korea. Since the late 1990s, the government of South Korea has made concerted efforts to digitize information, resulting in increased access to an unusually high quantity of heritage sources. However, the massive investments in the building of online resources have not inspired a ‘digital turn’ in the mainstream of South Korea’s departments in the humanities. This indifference to ‘the digital’, or what might be called a ‘digital/humanities divide’ has a history going back to the 1980s, when the Korean government and business leaders prepared for a post-industrial transition without drawing the interest of humanists and without expecting the nation’s remarkable success inict.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joon-heon Song

Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore the essential cause for the policy failure of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in South Korea. Design/methodology/approach To substantiate the claims made for the failure of the policy, this paper focuses on the differences in policy preferences among the government ministries and agencies involved in TAA. Findings The failure in the TAA policy, according to this study, was attributed to the conflicts and miscoordination arising from the differences in policy preferences among government ministries and agencies. To rectify this failure, the South Korean government had to revise its laws and regulations several times over a short period. Originality/value Drawing on the analytical framework of the literature on policy failure, this paper examines the causal relationships between outcomes of TAA policy and the conflicts or miscoordination among government bodies at each stage: initiatives and planning, implementation and operation of the policy.


Author(s):  
Yuhua Wang ◽  
Bruce J. Dickson

Abstract Authoritarian leaders around the world often fight against corruption in an effort to win public support. Conventional wisdom holds that this strategy works because leaders can signal their benevolent intentions by removing corrupt officials. We argue that fighting against corruption can undermine regime support. By revealing scandals of corrupt officials, corruption investigations can alter citizens' beliefs about public officials and lead to disenchantment about political institutions. We test this argument by examining how China's current anti-corruption campaign has changed citizens' public support for the government and the Communist Party. We analyze the results of two original surveys conducted before and during the campaign, and employ a difference-in-differences strategy to show that corruption investigations, at the margin, suppress respondents' support for the central government and party. We also examine our respondents' prior and posterior beliefs, and the results support our updating mechanism.


1988 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-48
Author(s):  
Pauline H. Baker

An underlying assumption that ocurs in both conventional wisdom and in many academic analyses of political behavior is the notion that a critical linkage exists between political change and economic performance. The assumption is that economic growth is either a precondition or a correlate of democracy and political stability. Little empirical research has been done to test the validity of this widely held assumption as it applies to multicultural societies. Moreover, in the African environment, the assumption seems to operate only in selected cases or in ways that defy categorization. Jerry Rawlings, for example, said he led his first coup d’etat in Ghana because the government was going to devalue the currency; he led his second coup, in part, because the next government was going to devalue; and, during his own tenure in office, he has presided over a 1000 percent devaluation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-54
Author(s):  
Nargiza Ortikova ◽  

The article deals with the problems like capability and experience of development of political elite theory, the notion of political elite specialized in ruling a country and other problems in this sphere. The author of the article throws light on the activity of political elite members, groups of people who are occupied at ruling the government, state, political parties and other political institutions. Main factors which indicate tendencies and mechanisms of state development are also discussed in the article. The author of the article suggests that political elite is a ruling layer of a society and functions in the sphere of state administration. The author of the article approaches theoretically to the notions of political elite, which in most cases, consists of professional politicians, who had professional training on working out program and strategies of state administration.Key words: state administration, strategy, program, politician, political institution, analysis of problems, activity of groups


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-366
Author(s):  
Rajeev Ranjan Kumar ◽  
Muhammad Rizwan

Abstract Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a controversial figure and has polarised public debate for over a decade. He is criticised for the decline in growth rate and increase in unemployment rate. It has been five years since the Modi-led Bhartiya Janata Party (bjp) came to power, so analysing the economic performance and extremist religious behaviour of the Modi-led bjp/rss (Rastriya Sevak Sangh) is interesting. This article discusses the non-conventional views on the economic performance of the government in India, and the ideology of Hindutva and hatred towards religious minorities. This deep-rooted hatred of religious minorities and the lower caste is the core philosophy of Hindutva and is followed by the bjp and rss. Under the shadow of the rss, the Modi government has focused on Hindutva rather than the economy and the people, which has been the most important factor in the economic decline of India.


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