Varieties of Order in a New Market Context

Author(s):  
Regine A. Spector

This chapter asks how we can best study the economic dynamism of Kyrgyzstan’s bazaars, which are crucial pillars of the country’s economy. In contrast to perspectives that view them through the lens of neoliberal economic policies, state collapse and socioeconomic dispossession, or mafia rule, the chapter offers an alternative. It argues that within the context of new private property relations that distinguish traders, bazaar owners, and state officials, those who work at bazaars adapt pre-existing institutions and organizational forms to govern the bazaar, and in this way create islands of order that allow market interactions to flourish. The chapter discusses the book’s methodology and implications for literatures on ideas, institutions, and syncretism, and for studies of political economy and development.

2021 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-197
Author(s):  
Natalya Naumenko

The 1933 Ukrainian famine killed as many as 2.6 million people out of a population of 32 million. Historians offer three main explanations: weather, economic policies, genocide. This paper documents that (1) available data do not support weather as the main explanation: 1931 and 1932 weather predicts harvest roughly equal to the 1924–1929 average; weather explains up to 8.1 percent of excess deaths. (2) Policies (collectivization of agriculture and the lack of favored industries) significantly increased famine mortality; collectivization explains up to 52 percent of excess deaths. (3) There is some evidence that ethnic Ukrainians and Germans were discriminated against.


Author(s):  
Vugar Nazarov ◽  
◽  
Jamal Hajiyev ◽  
Vasif Ahadov ◽  
◽  
...  

Local and foreign scientists are now paying growing attention to various issues of property and the philosophical and ethical, political, economic, institutional, social, psychological, and other aspects of its formation, taking into account the requirements of large-scale transformation, which primarily concern post-industrial areas of social development. In consequence, as modern studies rightfully point out, considering property relations, two general restrictions should be taken into account: this is an attempt to explain the absoluteness of their roles, the presence and content of all aspects of socio-economic relations by property relations; and the denial of the role of property as one of the most important factors determining the direction of social development in the present and future.This situation forces a new look at the economic policy of the state in this area, because any financial and monetary measures taken by the government will be doomed to failure if their implementation will be without interaction with the mechanisms of the private property system. The article defines the entrepreneurial sector of the region, its interaction with the institutions of the market system operating in all sectors and spheres of the region's economy, and also shows the influence of the development of property relations on the institutions of entrepreneurship.


2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seven Ağir

Ottoman reformers' re-organization of the grain trade during the second half of the eighteenth century had two components—the creation of a centralized institution to supervise transactions and the replacement of the fixed price system with a more flexible one. These changes were not only a response to strains on the old system of provisioning, driven by new geopolitical conditions, but also a consequence of an increased willingness among the Ottoman elite to emulate the economic policies of successful rival states. Thus, the centralized bureaucracy and political economy of the Ottoman Empire at the time had remarkable parallels with those in such European states as France and Spain.


Author(s):  
Ekaterina Pravilova

This chapter traces the history of property relations in Russia. It examines how Russian rulers came to respect private property as a bulwark of autocracy and what this respect meant for property in the context of Russian monarchal rule. Topics covered include the reign of Catherine the Great and the invention of absolute private domain; the issue of expropriation; the scope and the legal status of state possessions; and initial attempts to introduce the notion of “public property,” which focused on Russia's natural treasures, such as the forests granted by Catherine the Great into the unlimited ownership of the nobles.


2021 ◽  
pp. 166-201
Author(s):  
Josh Wilburn

Chapter 7 examines the psychology of the virtue that moral education is designed to produce, as well as the psychology of civic unity that Socrates’ social, political, and economic policies for the Kallipolis are designed to foster. The main thesis is that at both the intrapsychic and the interpersonal levels, Plato’s proposals are designed to exploit the two primitive faces of spirited motivation: its aggression toward the allotrion, and its fondness, protectiveness, and friendship toward the oikeion. His educational program produces psychic harmony in large part by making correct reason “familiar” to spirit and vicious appetites “foreign” to it, and his policies on family and private property promote political harmony by instilling emotional bonds of familiarity and friendship among citizens.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-285
Author(s):  
Karen Y. Morrison

Abstract With the social reproduction of slavery in colonial Cuba as its center point, this essay draws on the recent historiographical acknowledgment of the way vassalage mediated the often starkly drawn social distinctions between whites and enslaved people within colonial Spanish America. Inside the region’s emergent, capitalist political economy, feudal vassalage continued to define each social sector’s rights and responsibilities vis-á-vis the Spanish Crown. The rights of enslaved vassals derived from their potential contributions to the Spanish monarchy’s imperial survival, in their capacity to populate the extensive empire with loyal Catholic subjects and potential military defenders. These concerns also justified the Spanish monarchial state’s ability to intervene between its slaveholding vassals and its enslaved vassals, by limiting private property rights over enslaved people and operating in ways that did not fully conform to capitalist profit motives. Awareness of such sovereign-vassal interdependencies challenges historians to broaden their understanding of the relationship between capitalism and slavery to include the remnants of feudal social-political forms, even into the nineteenth century.


Utilitas ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Riley

John Stuart Mill argued, in his Principles of Political Economy (1848, 7th edn., 1871), that existing laws and customs of private property ought to be reformed to promote a far more egalitarian form of capitalism than hitherto observed anywhere. He went on to suggest that such an ideal capitalism might evolve spontaneously into a decentralized socialism involving a market system of competing worker co-operatives. That possibility of market socialism emerged only as the working classes gradually developed the intellectual and moral qualities required for worker co-operatives to succeed against private firms. Workers would tend to reject the hierarchical wage relation as they developed the requisite personal qualities, he believed, and capitalists, facing escalating wages for skilled labour as a result of the diminishing supply of high-quality workers for hire, would tend to lend their capital to the worker co-operatives ‘at a diminishing rate of interest, and at last, perhaps, even to exchange their capital for terminable annuities. In this or some such mode’, he speculated, ‘the existing accumulations of capital might honestly, and by a kind of spontaneous process, become in the end the joint property of all who participate in their productive employment: a transformation which, thus effected, (and assuming of course that both sexes participate equally in the rights and in the government of the association) would be the nearest approach to social justice, and the most beneficial ordering of industrial affairs for the universal good, which it is possible at present to foresee.’


Author(s):  
Christopher W. Calvo

The conspicuous timing of the publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations and America’s Declaration of Independence, separated by only a few months in 1776, has attracted a great deal of historical attention. America’s revolution was in large part motivated by the desire to break free from British mercantilism and engage the principles, both material and ideological, found in Smith’s work. From 1776 to the present day, the preponderance of capitalism in American economic history and the influence of The Wealth of Nations in American intellectual culture have contributed to the conventional wisdom that America and Smith enjoy a special relationship. After all, no nation has consistently pursued the tenets of Smithian-inspired capitalism, mainly free and competitive markets, a commitment to private property, and the pursuit of self-interests and profits, more than the United States. The shadow of Smith’s The Wealth of Nations looms large over America. But a closer look at American economic thought and practice demonstrates that Smith’s authority was not as dominant as the popular history assumes. Although most Americans accepted Smith’s work as the foundational text in political economy and extracted from it the cardinal principles of intellectual capitalism, its core values were twisted, turned, and fused together in contorted, sometimes contradictory fashions. American economic thought also reflects the widespread belief that the nation would trace an exceptional course, distinct from the Old World, and therefore necessitating a political economy suited to American traditions and expectations. Hybrid capitalist ideologies, although rooted in Smithian-inspired liberalism, developed within a dynamic domestic discourse that embraced ideological diversity and competing paradigms, exactly the kind expected from a new nation trying to understand its economic past, establish its present, and project its future. Likewise, American policymakers crafted legislation that brought the national economy both closer to and further from the Smithian ideal. Hybrid intellectual capitalism—a compounded ideological approach that antebellum American economic thinkers deployed to help rationalize the nation’s economic development—imitated the nation’s emergent hybrid material capitalism. Labor, commodity, and capital markets assumed amalgamated forms, combining, for instance, slave and free labor, private and public enterprises, and open and protected markets. Americans constructed different types of capitalism, reflecting a preference for mixtures of practical thought and policy that rarely conformed to strict ideological models. Historians of American economic thought and practice study capitalism as an evolutionary, dynamic institution with manifestations in traditional, expected corners, but historians also find capitalism demonstrated in unorthodox ways and practiced in obscure corners of market society that blended capitalist with non-capitalist experiences. In the 21st century, the benefits of incorporating conventional economic analysis with political, social, and cultural narratives are widely recognized. This has helped broaden scholars’ understanding of what exactly constitutes capitalism. And in doing so, the malleability of American economic thought and practice is put on full display, improving scholars’ appreciation for what remains the most significant material development in world history.


1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald F. Gaus

Liberal political theory is all too familiar with the divide between classical and welfare-state liberals. Classical liberals, as we all know, insist on the importance of small government, negative liberty, and private property. Welfare-state liberals, on the other hand, although they too stress civil rights, tend to be sympathetic to “positive liberty,” are for a much more expansive government, and are often ambivalent about private property. Although I do not go so far as to entirely deny the usefulness of this familiar distinction, I think in many ways it is misleading. In an important sense, most free-market liberals are also “welfare-state” liberals. I say this because the overwhelming number of liberals, of both the pro-market and the pro-government variety, entertain a welfarist conception of political economy. On this dominant welfarist view, the ultimate justification of the politico-economic order is that it promotes human welfare. Traditional “welfare-state liberals” such as Robert E. Goodin manifestly adopt this welfarist conception. But it is certainly not only interventionists such as Goodin who insist that advancing welfare is the overriding goal of normative political economy. J. R. McCulloch, one of the great nineteenth-century laissez-faire political economists, was adamant that “freedom is not, as some appear to think, the end of government: the advancement of public prosperity and happiness is its end.” To be sure, McCulloch would have disagreed with Goodin about the optimal welfare-maximizing economic policy: the welfarist ideal, he and his fellow classical political economists believed, would best be advanced by provision of a legal and institutional framework — most importantly, the laws of property, contract, and the criminal code — that allows individuals to pursue their own interests in the market and, by so doing, promote public welfare. In general, what might be called the “classical-liberal welfare state” claims to advance welfare by providing the framework for individuals to seek wealth for themselves, while welfarists such as Goodin insist that a market order is seriously flawed as a mechanism for advancing human welfare and, in addition, that government has the competency to “correct market failures” in the provision of welfare.


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