Together Forward?

The Last Card ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 74-88

This chapter examines debates over US policy in the summer of 2006, focusing particularly on the unhappy results of military efforts to tamp down violence in Baghdad. Two major military operations—Operations Together Forward I and II—were launched, intended, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Peter Pace, recalled, to “begin the process of turning over the battlefield responsibilities to the Iraqi armed forces.” Both were clear disappointments, however, revealing how unprepared Iraqi forces were to assume responsibility for their country's security. Iraqi forces themselves were, in the words of the National Security Council's Meghan O'Sullivan, “perpetuating acts of sectarian violence” and were “as much part of the problem as they are a solution to the problem.” Throughout the summer, NSC staff thus sought to press the Iraq country team for a review of Iraq strategy, and pushed the president to ask General George Casey, commander of Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I), harder questions about where the current approach was leading. However, MNF-I and the US Embassy in Iraq continued to champion existing plans, believing that the existing strategy merely required more time.

The armed forces of Europe have undergone a dramatic transformation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces provides the first comprehensive analysis of national security and defence policies, strategies, doctrines, capabilities, and military operations, as well as the alliances and partnerships of European armed forces in response to the security challenges Europe has faced since the end of the cold war. A truly cross-European comparison of the evolution of national defence policies and armed forces remains a notable blind spot in the existing literature. This Handbook aims to fill this gap with fifty-one contributions on European defence and international security from around the world. The six parts focus on: country-based assessments of the evolution of the national defence policies of Europe’s major, medium, and lesser powers since the end of the cold war; the alliances and security partnerships developed by European states to cooperate in the provision of national security; the security challenges faced by European states and their armed forces, ranging from interstate through intra-state and transnational; the national security strategies and doctrines developed in response to these challenges; the military capabilities, and the underlying defence and technological industrial base, brought to bear to support national strategies and doctrines; and, finally, the national or multilateral military operations by European armed forces. The contributions to The Handbook collectively demonstrate the fruitfulness of giving analytical precedence back to the comparative study of national defence policies and armed forces across Europe.


1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 534-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sidney W. Souers

The National Security Council, created by the National Security Act of 1947, is the instrument through which the President obtains the collective advice of the appropriate officials of the executive branch concerning the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. An outline of the genesis of this new governmental agency will indicate in part its present rôle.Even before World War II, a few far-sighted men were seeking for a means of correlating our foreign policy with our military and economic capabilities. During the war, as military operations began to have an increasing political and economic effect, the pressure for such a correlation increased. It became apparent that the conduct of the war involved more than a purely military campaign to defeat the enemy's armed forces. Questions arose of war aims, of occupational policies, of relations with governments-in-exile and former enemy states, of the postwar international situation with its implications for our security, and of complicated international machinery.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-43
Author(s):  
Michael E. O’Hanlon

This chapter sketches out the characteristics of today's global security environment in a broad brush by describing the US Department of Defense. It focuses on the science of war, a subdiscipline of defense analysis that, beginning with a foundation of basic facts and figures about military organizations and operations, uses analytical methods to tackle key questions in the national security field. With this context, the chapter illustrates the analytical methods including simple computational algorithms for assessing military effectiveness and predicting combat outcomes. It also includes the study of defense budgets and economics, as well as efforts to understand the physics and technology of military weapons and operations today. The chapter then discusses many of the ABCs of the US armed forces. It explains the evolution of American grand strategy — the theory of the case for how the nation should ensure its safety, prosperity, and survival — that these forces are designed to undergird.


Author(s):  
Georg Löfflmann

This chapter explores how the US Department of Defense has acted as key producer of practical grand strategy discourse, regularly translating geopolitical imaginations, threat assessments and strategic narratives into concrete policy outcomes and security practices, from defense policy planning documents to the stationing of US troops and the conducting of military operations. High-level strategic documents published under the Obama presidency, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review reports or the Defense Strategic Guidance are examined in this chapter as key political outputs in providing the ‘big picture’ of national security. The chapter examines how several practical issues in defense policymaking and military planning were, at the same time, indicating are careful shift in the conceptualization and operation of American hegemony. The chapter details how budget sequestration had a lasting impact on the overall size of the US military while Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ shifted its geopolitical and operational focus. This limitation, recalibration and downsizing challenged a status quo of American primacy and global military supremacy that politicians, policy experts and military officials had largely taken for granted since the end of the Cold War.


Vojno delo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 18-33
Author(s):  
Hatidža Beriša

The period after the end of the Cold War and the reorganization of the world order brought new challenges to modern military organizations. Total technological progress and completely new threats and opponents in the form of nonlinearity have influenced modern warfare to change its shape and form to such an extent that most theorists believe that we are witnessing revolutionary changes in the character of war. The development of information technology particularly influences the development of new concepts of the use of the armed forces, with the most technologically advanced countries naturally leading the way. The development of information technology has a huge impact on the modernization and transformation of the armed forces, primarily in the West. In order to achieve a qualitatively new, higher level of precision and higher speed in conducting military operations, in the early 1990s, many segments of the US armed forces were specially equipped with modern technology, which is based on information networks. The revolution in military affairs and its implementation in the concept of network-centric warfare have become new military strategic models for the US armed forces, along with the process of redefining security policy, in line with the new situation. Network-centric warfare has set new standards in warfare, relying on information superiority. In this paper, the relation of military strategy and its principles to network-centric warfare is considered.


The Last Card ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 153-181

This chapter traces a series of climactic meetings of the National Security Council in December of 2006. By December, Vice President Dick Cheney thought it was “pretty clear that we've got to do something different than what we've been doing. December was then devoted to sort of nailing down what that was going to be.” The president and his advisors discussed fundamental issues regarding American goals and responsibilities in Iraq and increasingly concluded that only a surge option, as part of a change in military strategy and an effort at bottom-up political reconciliation in Iraq, could salvage the American mission there. That same month, the president visited the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their meeting room to hear and address their concerns about whether an intensified military effort in Iraq might overtax the US military and even “break the force.” In December, too, public discussion about the American future in Iraq was fueled by reports from the congressionally mandated Iraq Study Group, which advocated for a regional diplomatic strategy to help quell violence in Iraq, as well as from the American Enterprise Institute, which advocated increasing US forces in Iraq and pursuing a proper counterinsurgency strategy. The impact of these external reviews on the eventual surge decision remains hotly debated; the chapter helps place these efforts within the context of the internal administration policy process and Bush's decision making.


2020 ◽  
pp. jramc-2019-001298
Author(s):  
Michael J Rabener ◽  
J Breeze

Physicians assistants (PAs) are being increasingly utilised by the US Armed Forces both in homeland medical treatment provision as well as while on deployment. In a deployed environment, the USA has the flexibility to interchange doctors with specialty-trained PAs in all roles of care due to their ability to practice autonomously, thereby filling shortfalls created by the lack of specialty physicians. PAs are increasingly being utilised within the UK National Health Service, in similar roles to their US counterparts. This paper postulates that PAs have an equivalent role to play in the future of medical care provision within the UK Defence Medical Services, including on military operations.


Author(s):  
Oksana Manchulenko

The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 was the most comprehensive and important defense reorganization legislation since its initial establishment in 1947. It has administrated the way the United States has organized, planned, and conducted military operations for the last thirty years. Despite this, a strong opposition movement organized primarily by Navy Secretary John F. Lehman, almost endangred the adoption of the mentioned above law. This opposition also included members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prominent Senators and Congressman, and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. A ten year retrospective of the Act’s passage at the National Defense University (NDU) in 1999 detailed its six most significant achievements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as an individual, was designated the principal military advisor to the President and other senior officials. The Chairman was assigned new responsibilities in the areas of strategic planning, logistics, net assessments, joint doctrine, and joint programs and budgets. A Vice Chairman position, outranking the other chiefs was created to assist the Chairman and act as the Chairman in his or her absence. The Joint Staff was expanded beyond 400 members and placed directly under the control of the Chairman. The power and influence of the deployed unified commanders was also increased by providing them authority over subordinate commands in their areas of responsibility, especially regarding joint training, force organization, and force employment. Finally, the Joint Specialty Officer program was mandated. This program was designed to ensure the services assigned some of their highest quality officers to joint duty.”1 Nearly all in attendance at the 1999 NDU event concluded that passage of the legislation was a universal good. The subject of the article is the influence of international US military campaigns on the adoption of Goldwater-Nichols Act. This article tends to examine the background which led to the adoption of Goldwater Nichols Act, the opposition of the Marines and Navy against the aforementioned Act. The goal is to analyze the main changes brought in by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and their impact on the development of the US military. The phenomena concern “Joint Forces” and the increase of effective cooperation between the departments. The key provisions, which strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense and outlined its role in the chain of command, will be evaluated. Keywords: Goldwater-Nichols Act, reorganization, conflict, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, unified commanders


2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDGAR JONES ◽  
ADAM THOMAS ◽  
STEPHEN IRONSIDE

Background. ‘Forward psychiatry’ was introduced by the French Army in 1915 to stem the loss of troops to base hospitals. Also known by the acronym PIE (proximity to the battle, immediacy of treatment and expectancy of recovery, including return to duty), it was subsequently used by the British and Americans in both World Wars. The US Army used PIE techniques in Korea and Vietnam. Although widely accepted as an effective intervention, forward psychiatry is not amenable to random-controlled trials and only one controlled outcome study has been conducted.Method. All 3580 soldiers with shell shock admitted to 4 Stationary Hospital between January and November 1917 were recorded. Unit details, military experience, length of stay and outcomes were analysed. Soldiers were categorized into combat, combat-support and non-combatant groups. Admissions were correlated with military operations to compare the impact of defensive and offensive phases of warfare.Results. Rates of admission for shell shock rose significantly during offensives when physical casualties escalated. Combat troops were disproportionately represented. Over 50% of admissions had less than 9 months service in France and 21% broke down within 3 months of going overseas. Less than 20% returned directly to combat units, most going to other hospitals, convalescent depots or base duties.Conclusions. Forward psychiatry was not effective in returning combat troops to fighting units but, by allocating soldiers to support roles, it prevented discharge from the armed forces. Uncertainties remain about relapses, including other routes that servicemen used to escape from a combat zone.


2014 ◽  
pp. 13-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Glazyev

This article examines fundamental questions of monetary policy in the context of challenges to the national security of Russia in connection with the imposition of economic sanctions by the US and the EU. It is proved that the policy of the Russian monetary authorities, particularly the Central Bank, artificially limiting the money supply in the domestic market and pandering to the export of capital, compounds the effects of economic sanctions and plunges the economy into depression. The article presents practical advice on the transition from external to domestic sources of long-term credit with the simultaneous adoption of measures to prevent capital flight.


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