Leadership and Regimes

Author(s):  
Laurie M. Johnson

This chapter looks at the similarities and differences between Thucydides and Hobbes on the subject of regimes. Hobbes was convinced that Thucydides had proved the absurdity of democracy and the desirability of absolute monarchy. However, Hobbes misread Thucydides on this point. For Hobbes, monarchy was the only regime in which the selfish interests of the ruler and ruled rationally coincide. Revealingly, in order to deal with the leadership of Pericles, Hobbes had to characterize him superficially as a monarch, ignoring how Pericles won and maintained his power. But it is just the type of statesmanship exemplified by Pericles that Hobbes cannot accept because of his rigid assumptions about human nature. Thucydides' focus on the importance of studying the thought, character, and actions of statesmen is an important difference between the Thucydidean and the Hobbesian realist models. Hobbes's horror at civil violence led him to lose faith in ordinary human reason and thus in political deliberation. It is because he lost faith in the latter that scientific reason emerged as a powerful alternative. But if human beings are so unreasonable that one can no longer take seriously what they say, how can one expect them to be reasonable enough to accept Hobbes's prescriptions? The Hobbesian solution is that an absolute government must enforce the plan. The chapter then argues that this solution to political problems is even more dangerous than the Thucydidean solution, which relies on political rhetoric and judgment.

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-62
Author(s):  
Thomas Joseph White

The Chalcedonian confession of faith asserts that Christ is one person, the Son of God, subsisting in two natures, divine and human. The doctrine of the communication of idioms is essential to the life and practices of the Church insofar as we affirm there to be properties of deity and humanity present in the one subject, the Word made flesh. Such affirmations are made without a confusion of the two natures or their mutually distinct attributes. The affirmation that there is a divine and human nature in Christ is possible, however, only if it is also possible for human beings to think coherently about the divine nature, analogically, and human nature, univocally. Otherwise it is not feasible to receive understanding of the divine nature of Christ into the human intellect intrinsically and the revelation must remain wholly alien to natural human thought, even under the presumption that such understanding originates in grace. Likewise we can only think coherently of the eternal Son’s solidarity with us in human nature if we can conceive of a common human nature present in all human individuals. Consequently, it is only possible for the Church to confess some form of Chalcedonian doctrine if there is also a perennial metaphysical philosophy capable of thinking coherently about the divine and human natures from within the ambit of natural human reason. This also implies that the Church maintains a “metaphysical apostolate” in her public teaching, in her philosophical traditions, as well as in her scriptural and doctrinal enunciations.


Author(s):  
Mbosowo Bassey Udok

Human existence as a whole is attached to a culture. Every human is a member of a group that acts within the framework of patterns of behavior that is unique or peculiar to the group. Each group determines the component of her culture, and culture builds an identity for the group. This chapter is poised to examine definitions of culture across cultural backgrounds to show similarities and differences in articulating the subject matter. It explicates the components of culture which include the product and technical knowledge of human beings in a given environment. The work plunges into the characteristics of culture as socially based. Here, culture is seen as a creation of society and shared among members of the same society and learned through associations with others in the group. The work concludes that though there is no universally acceptable definition of culture, the impact of culture cannot be undermined as its influence is felt across disciplines and communities.


Author(s):  
Constance Y Lee

Abstract John Calvin (1509–64), a central figure in Reformed theology, is perhaps best known for his bleak doctrine of total human depravity. This dismal view of human reason has commonly overshadowed his statement that ‘some sparks still shine’. This article proposes that Calvin’s account of conscience, by conserving an illuminated space in human nature, makes possible a formal doctrine of natural law. Calvin enlists the interconnectedness between the knowledge of God and human reason to frame his anthropology. According to this, human reason was originally created to perfectly access knowledge of God but after the Fall, can only attain imperfect access. Within this broader framework, by adopting a dialectic of dual perspectives, Calvin maintains that, however fallen, human nature still partially reflects the Imago Dei as first intended. As through a glass darkly, this divine image is reflected in human conscience endowing it with sufficient knowledge for moral discernment. Calvin’s emphasis on ‘common grace’ in the preservation of this knowledge allows him to simultaneously maintain human ignorance and their universal accountability to objective norms. In this way, Calvin’s account of conscience enables him to hold both apparent extremes in tension: the immanent fallibility of human beings with the external normative standards they ought to pursue.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Geoffrey

A consequence of Protestantism‟s aversion to monopolistic religious control is the sprouting and growth of unorganized religious establishment by enterprising individuals in Protestantism. This aversion is justified within the context of a reformed understanding of anthropology in a twofold manner. Firstly, that the corruption in human nature makes power concentrations dangerous. Secondly to prevent human beings from slacking in their duty that arise due to human weaknesses, Adam Smith‟s idea of competitive religious markets perform better than ones where there is monopolistic control. While Protestant theology insulates us from the dangers of power concentration and slothful duty that stem from weakness in human nature, it opens us out to new problems such as consumerism, commercialization and commodification of Christianity. With the dawn of the COVID crisis and most churches and ministries being forced to move online for broadcast and connectivity, the issues of commercialization and consumerism in religion will find new avenues for manifestation. The subject of this article is to extract wisdom and strategies to deal with the same from the early church which was placed in a very similar context of commercialization and commodification of religion.


Author(s):  
Pascual F. Martínez-Freire

RESUMENEn primer lugar, se analiza la teoría clásica, tal como la formuló Aristóteles, de los seres humanos como animales racionales. En segundo lugar, se presenta la caracterización del hombre como no animal e irracional que ofrece Martinho da Vila. En tercer lugar, se consideran las tesis freudianas sobre la mezcla de racionalidad e irracionalidad en los humanos. En cuarto lugar, se señalan algunos puntos de vista recientes, debidos a Simon así como a la psicología y neurociencia actuales, sobre la limitación de la razón humana y su relación con las emociones. Finalmente se argumenta que ni Aristóteles ni Martinho da Vila describen bien la condición humana.PALABRAS CLAVERACIONALIDAD-CONDICIÓN HUMANA-ARISTÓTELES-FREUDABSTRACTFistly the classical theory, as put forward by Aristotle, about the human beings as rational animals is analysed. Secondly the description of man as no animal and irrational offered by Martnho da Vila is presented. Thirly the Freudian thseses on the mixture os rational and irrational aspects in humans are considered. Forurthly some recent points of view, by Simon and the current psychology and neurosciencie, about the limitation of human reason and irs relation with emotions are pointed out. Lastly it is argued that neithert Aristotle nor Martinho da Vila decribe well the human nature.KEYWORDSRATIONALITY-HUMAN NATURE-ARISTOTLE-FREUD 


Author(s):  
Turner Nevitt ◽  
Brian Davies
Keyword(s):  

This chapter presents Thomas Aquinas’s Quodlibet V, which dates from his second Parisian regency (the second time Aquinas functioned as a master in Paris). It contains Aquinas’s answers to questions about God, angels, and human beings. Specifically, the questions deal with: God’s knowledge; God’s power; God’s assumed nature; angels: Is Lucifer the subject of the aevum?; human nature; the sacrament of the Eucharist: Is the form of bread annihilated? Should a priest give an unconsecrated host to an unexposed sinner who asks him to do so?; the sacrament of penance; the sacrament of marriage; relating to the virtues; relating to the commandments; relating to prelates; relating to teachers; relating to religious; and relating to clerics.


Author(s):  
May Sim

Aristotle’s phronimos and Mencius’s sage are the paragons of virtue. They exemplify practical wisdom, enabling them to perform virtuous actions called for in different situations, and are the concrete models of virtue for all human beings, without whom others would not be able to cultivate their virtues. Aristotle and Mencius are also alike in holding that the virtues of character are based on human nature, and cultivation is key to achieving them. Despite these similarities, they differ in their accounts of human nature, details on the virtues, and how they are cultivated. Whether being the phronimos or the sage is the highest good for a human being, the degree of effectiveness he has on fellow citizens and the rest of the cosmos are issues about which they would disagree. Exploring similarities and differences between the phronimos and the sage will shed light on nature and nurture in their virtue-oriented ethics.


Philosophy ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 56 (217) ◽  
pp. 303-312
Author(s):  
Christine Battersby

To discover David Hume's views on women it is necessary to bring together remarks scattered somewhat sparsely throughout his philosophical and historical writings. Although the titles of Hume's major works might suggest that he was describing the understanding and nature of all human beings, both male and female, in none of the works do we find a specific section devoted to an analysis of sexual differences in these two respects. There is a tidy chapter on female morality in A Treatise of Human Nature, but nothing comparable for female nature as such (T, 570–573). This omission does not, however, imply that Hume thought that biological differences had no concomitants in character and understanding. Neither, despite Hume's bantering remark that an essay on a ‘Subject so little to be understood as Women’ would be ‘unintelligible’, does this neglect imply that Hume was uncertain about these attendant differences (L, i, 45). Hume's exclusion of such a section seems to stem only from his desire to stress human uniformity, not from any lack of recognition of human variety. Because of the absence of any systematic treatment of the subject by Hume, it is necessary to proceed cautiously in interpreting his remarks on women. There is a further reason for caution in that Hume offers ‘jests and pleasantries’ as well as more serious comments on this subject; Hume, on occasions, gallantly woos his so-called ‘favourites’, his female readers, and when he does so sincerity is gallantly put aside.


Author(s):  
Nicholas Buccola

This chapter reconstructs what Frederick Douglass thought about human nature to deepen peoples understanding of the foundations of his political morality and to counter criticisms of liberal views of human nature. It lays out the base critiques of the liberal view of human nature in modern Western political thought and shows how Douglass viewed the competing tendencies of human beings in order to form a nuanced idea of human nature. Going into the debates in the liberal community, it cites the differing opinions of Thomas Jefferson, Reinhold Niebuhr, and John Locke. With a focus on the dualities that make up Douglass’s view on the subject, this chapter shows how his view shaped his experiences and the way he interacted with the world. The dynamism that makes up Douglass’s idea of human nature makes it a viewpoint to be taken seriously and reflects the tensions inherent within the subject.


2020 ◽  
pp. 105-122
Author(s):  
David Baumeister

This chapter provides an overview of Kant’s conception of the animality (or Tierheit) of human beings. Though human animality is treated in a wide range of Kant’s writings, it has received relatively little attention from scholars, perhaps because Kant wrote no text principally devoted to the subject. With the aim of establishing its systematic unity, I track the status and role of animality across three distinct but interrelated domains of Kant’s theory of human nature—his account of animality as one of three basically good original human predispositions in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, his account of animality as the target of discipline in the pedagogy lectures, and his account of animality as simultaneously a driver of and hindrance to the progress of history in ‘Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Aim’. I argue that these accounts, taken together and in light of the teleological vision of human development that connects them, manifest a distinctively Kantian vision of the human as an actively rational, but at the same time ineliminably animal, being. Far from denying that humans are animals or seeking to repress human animality wholesale, Kant in fact offers a nuanced and robust, though still problematic, defence of the necessity, innocence, and originality of the human’s animal side.


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