Soothing Wounded Vanity

Author(s):  
Joslyn Barnhart

This chapter focuses on national humiliation and the triggering in the 1880s of the Scramble for Africa, an unprecedented land grab by European great powers. It demonstrates that individual-level support for aggressive policies, both vengeful in nature and directed at third-party states, increased within states that are confronted with potentially humiliating international events. The chapter reviews two international events that played an essential role in generating the competitive dynamics of the Scramble for Africa during the 1880s. The first event involved an instance of unexpected national failure, while the second event involved the denial of great power privileges by a higher status state. It also describes the acts of territorial conquest in Africa by France and Germany that generated status and security concerns within Italy and Britain, which led both states to adopt expansionary policies they likely would not have pursued otherwise.

Author(s):  
Dale C. Copeland

This chapter explores the forty-five-year period after the Crimean War when great powers of all stripes fell into an intense competition for formal political control over third-party territories. The competition greatly increased the level of tension in the system, even if most of the struggles stopped short of a direct great power war. Most significantly, of course, France, Britain, and Germany dove into a scramble for colonial territory after 1880 that drew most of Africa and large parts of Asia into the European orbit. On two particular occasions—the Austro-Prussian “Seven Weeks' War” of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870—large-scale war between two great powers did break out. The purpose of the chapter is to uncover to what extent and in what manner economic interdependence shaped the struggles and wars of this almost-half-century period.


Curationis ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frieda Paton

The nurse, as a key person in health services, has an essential role in health education regarding human and medical genetics. This education is given at both community and individual level. Genetics is however not a simple subject and health education in this regard must be approached with care. The nurse must always be sure of her own knowledge and always be alert to the moral en ethical implications of the information she is providing. Health education in human and medical genetics is however essential to make the public aware of the benefits provided by this relatively new and developing science.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tudor Onea

AbstractThe article examines when and how often great powers are likely to follow a grand strategy of restraint and whether there is any evidence that they have ever done so. The question has considerable implications for the ongoing US grand strategy debate. Restraint refers to the practice of self-discipline in the use of force for self-defence or for addressing massive power imbalances; and in extending security commitments to foreign political actors. The first part of the article examines statistics in the last two hundred years on great power involvement in wars and disputes as well as on their commitments to alliances and dependencies. The second part considers whether two seeming cases of the dominant power scaling down its international involvement – Ming China withdrawal from naval mastery in the fifteenth century and Victorian Britain splendid isolation – represent instances of genuine restraint.


Author(s):  
Andreas Motzfeldt Kravik

Abstract The article explores the current stagnation in multilateral law-making based on an analysis of recent treaty attempts across various subfields of international law. It further examines why the law of the sea has continued to evolve despite this trend. The article demonstrates that states still regularly seek multilateral treaties to address new challenges. While there is some evidence of general treaty saturation, it is the current inability of traditional great powers to negotiate new binding norms which is the most constraining factor on multilateral law-making. This in turn is related to deeper geopolitical shifts by which traditional great powers, notably the United States and its allies, have seen their relative influence decline. Until the current great power competition ends or settles into a new mode of international co-operation, new multilateral treaties with actual regulatory effect will rarely emerge. The law of the sea has avoided the current trend of stagnation for primarily three reasons (i) a global commitment to the basic tenets of the law of the sea; (ii) a legal framework that affords rights and obligations somewhat evenly disbursed, allowing less powerful states to use their collective leverage to advance multilateral negotiations, despite intermittent great power opposition; and (iii) the avoidance of entrenched multilateral forums where decisions are reached by consensus only.


Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

Chapters 2 and 3 helped confirm that rising states support declining great powers when decliners can help rising states against other great power threats. In contrast, Chapters 4 and 5 assess the logic of rising state predation by examining the United States’ response to the Soviet Union’s decline in the 1980s and early 1990s. Chapter 4 first provides an overview of the Soviet Union’s waning relative position and discusses U.S. efforts to monitor the trend. Next, it reviews existing research on the course of U.S. strategy and relates this work to alternative accounts of rising state policy. The bulk of the chapter then uses extensive archival research to evaluate the factors central to predation theory and predict U.S. strategy given the argument. These predictions are analyzed in Chapter 5.


Author(s):  
David M. Edelstein

While Hitler’s Germany in the 1930’s has received abundant attention, this chapter begins earlier in the interwar period. Throughout the 1920’s, Europe’s great powers debated how to manage a defeated Germany that had the latent power potential to again become a great power. This chapter traces how Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union addressed this challenge. It argues that all three of these European powers preferred to cooperate with Germany in the short-term rather than paying the high cost of competing with Germany when it had uncertain long-term intentions. This explanation based on time horizons is superior to alternative explanations based on either buckpassing or engagement.


2021 ◽  
pp. 44-72
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rosato
Keyword(s):  

This chapter evaluates intentions optimism, the view that great powers can, under certain conditions, obtain the kind of information that would allow them to estimate the intentions of their peers with confidence. The first argument holds that there are some situations in which states can access firsthand information about each other’s intentions. The next three arguments contend that secondhand information about state’s intentions—evidence of their declarations, interests, and actions—can, on occasion, be a reliable guide to how they intend to behave. The fifth argument maintains that even if single clues are only marginally informative, multiple clues can, in combination, be a dependable indicator of a state’s intentions. The final argument deals with the future and contends that knowledge of how a great power intends to behave today can serve as reliable secondhand information about how it will intend to behave in the future. An evaluation of these arguments reveals that they are logically and empirically flawed. Intentions optimists have greatly exaggerated the odds that states can access firsthand information or acquire reliable secondhand information about each other’s current and future intentions. Hence, it is almost impossible for great powers to trust each other.


Author(s):  
Rosemary A. Kelanic

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the relationship between oil and great power politics. For over a hundred years, oil has been ubiquitous as both an object of political intrigue and a feature of everyday life, yet its effects on the behavior of major powers remain poorly understood. This book focuses on one particular aspect of oil: its coercive potential. Across time and space, great powers have feared that dependence on imported petroleum might make them vulnerable to coercion by hostile actors. They worry that an enemy could cut off oil to weaken them militarily or punish them economically, and then use this threat as a basis for political blackmail. Oil is so essential to great powers that taking a state's imports hostage could give an enemy significant leverage in a dispute. The book presents the first systematic framework to understand how fears of oil coercion shape international affairs. Great powers counter prospective threats with costly and risky policies that lessen vulnerability, ideally, before the country can be targeted. These measures, which can be called “anticipatory strategies,” vary enormously, from self-sufficiency efforts to actions as extreme as launching wars.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Charlie Laderman

This introductory chapter outlines why the American response to the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians offers such critical insights into the US rise to world power, its evolving relationship with Britain, and the development of ideas on humanitarian intervention and global order at the turn of the twentieth century. It introduces the Armenian question, setting it within the larger Eastern question, and explains why the Ottoman Empire became a target for outside intervention by the European great powers in the nineteenth century. It explains why the United States, which had traditionally avoided political entanglement in the Near East even while its missionaries established an exceptional role there, began to take a greater interest in the region as its emergence as a great power coincided with the first large-scale Armenian massacres.


Author(s):  
Moeed Yusuf

This chapter addresses the general applicability of brokered bargaining beyond South Asia, focusing on four prototypes of rivalries: between countries that are considered friends of the unipole (futuristic crisis scenarios involving Israel versus a nuclear Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Egypt); between a friend and foe of the unipole (Israel versus a nuclear Iran); between a foe of the unipole and an ally with formally extended deterrence guarantees (Korean peninsula); and between a friend and a presumptive great power rival of the unipole (India versus China). The discussion establishes the similarities and differences of these prototypes with the South Asian cases. While each presents a somewhat distinct set of challenges for third-party actors, the fundamental crisis dynamic whereby the third party works to secure de-escalation without seeking to alienate either conflicting party completely and the antagonists feel compelled not to defy it outright remains valid in each case.


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