OIL SPILLS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY (1985-1994)

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 944-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradley N. Balch

ABSTRACT U.S. Coast Guard data show a clear upward trend in oil spills in Chesapeake Bay. From 1985 through 1994, there were approximately 1,313,218 gallons of oil spilled. Pipelines accounted for 37% of the total spill volume. 71% of the total amount of oil spilled during the 10-year period was diesel or no. 2 fuel. The average size of a spill in the 1- to 99-gallon range decreased annually from 1989.

1977 ◽  
Vol 1977 (1) ◽  
pp. 523-527
Author(s):  
John V. Roland ◽  
Glenn E. Moore ◽  
Michael A. Bellanca

ABSTRACT On February 2, 1976, one of the worst oil spills in recent history occurred in the lower Chesapeake Bay. Approximately 250,000 gallons of No. 6 oil were discharged into the bay after a barge, the STC-101, sank in a storm near the mouth of the Potomac River. The oil contaminated extensive beach and marsh areas on both sides of the bay. Cleanup operations lasted almost a month and the cost approached $400,000. The U.S. Coast Guard estimated that 167,000 gallons of oil were recovered by cleanup crews. The remaining oil is believed to be widely dispersed over large areas of the bay—possibly tied up in fringe marsh grass, buried under sand on the beaches or carried out into the Atlantic Ocean. The heavily-contaminated fringe marsh grasses were cut, leaving the root systems intact, in order to protect the fragile marsh areas. An overall assessment of the environmental damages caused by the spill is almost complete. Estimates of the number of waterfowl killed range from 20,000 to 50,000 birds. Damage to shellfish and other aquatic resources is still under study. Preliminary reports indicate that damages to the environment may not be as severe as initially expected.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 273-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lt. Alvin M. Crickard ◽  
Donald S. Jensen

ABSTRACT The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) has resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the national strike force. The OPA 90 legislation amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA), which first gave the Coast Guard a role in marine environmental protection. The FWPCA led to the establishment of the national response system (NRS) and the establishment of “special forces” which would be available for pollution response. These special forces included the Coast Guard manned strike teams (collectively, the national strike force, or NSF) and the public information assist team (PIAT). OPA 90 legislation affected the NSF by requiring the Coast Guard to establish a national response unit (NRU) located at Elizabeth City, North Carolina. The NRU, now renamed the National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC), would provide overall management of the strike teams and PIAT and in addition, perform several new functions in consulting, exercise management, coordination of spill response, and logistics and maintenance of worldwide resource inventories. This paper examines all OPA 90 initiatives affecting the national strike force. It concludes that the overall impact on the national response system is quite positive and should result in significant improvement in response to both major and catastrophic oil spills.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-133
Author(s):  
Mac W. McCarthy ◽  
John McGrath

ABSTRACT On July 22, 1991, the Tuo Hai, a 46,500 ton Chinese grain carrier, collided with the Tenyo Maru, a 4,800 ton Japanese fish processing ship, off the coast of Washington State. The Tenyo Maru sank, creating an oil spill that cost upwards of $4 million (U.S.) to clean up. The incident initiated a joint response from the U.S. and Canadian governments. As part of this response, the Canadian Coast Guard mobilized an SRN-6 hovercraft. This air cushioned vehicle (ACV) provided logistical support to responders on both sides of the international boundary. The response operation along the Pacific Coast was extensive. Dense fog and the remote location of the impacted area provided formidable challenges to the cleanup effort. It was the mission scenario of the Canadian SRN-6 hovercraft to provide logistical support—as an experiment in ACV utility—to the organizations responding to this incident. Based on this experience, it can be argued that the hovercraft offers great potential value in responding to marine oil spills. Appropriate application of ACV technology can enhance oil spill response work, spill waste management, and incident surveillance. This paper discusses the contribution of the SRN-6 hovercraft to the Tenyo Maru response, briefly examines the use of another, very different hovercraft, during a response in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and reviews a new hovercraft design and discusses its potential contributions.


1981 ◽  
Vol 1981 (1) ◽  
pp. 557-562
Author(s):  
Edward Wirkowski

ABSTRACT Clean Harbors Cooperative is a nonprofit organization initiated by eight major oil companies whose purpose is to contain and clean up major oil spills effectively and efficiently throughout the Greater New York Harbor area. Initial efforts included defining the area of interest; determining the maximum size spill that is likely to occur; deciding the time to clean up the free oil on the water; determining the type and quantity of equipment required to contain and clean up the spill, where major spills are likely to occur, where the equipment should be located, and the means to finance the purchase of the equipment and the operation of the cooperative; and deciding who will store, operate, test, and maintain the equipment, and who will direct and handle the actual cleanup activities. These decisions were reached by discussions with company marine experts, by analyses of past major spills, by consultations with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) regarding its experiences and recommendations, by visits with other major cooperatives throughout the country, and by studies that simulated oil spills at various locations throughout New York Harbor (by means of Shell Oil Company's spill computer program and the USCG vector analysis program). Secondary efforts consisted of establishing a response organization team that will be available to direct and supervise the entire containment and cleanup effort, and developing a major contingency plan manual that includes cleanup plans and techniques, and data on sensitive areas, training, disposal, communications, wildlife, etc., in addition to call-out procedures and emergency phone numbers. Parameters covering both technical and practical aspects were developed and used in preparing equipment specifications. Purchase decisions were based primarily on visual observations, recommendations of knowledgeable users, and impartial test results. Cost was a secondary consideration. The capital equipment purchase program was divided into three 1-year periods and totalled 3.9 million dollars. In conclusion, Clean Harbors Cooperative believes that by using the best technical and practical knowledge and experiences available, the time and money will have been spent wisely, and they will be prepared to contain and clean up major oil spills efficiently and effectively anywhere in the Greater New York Harbor area.


1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 313-316
Author(s):  
William F. Croswell ◽  
John C. Fedors

ABSTRACT The U.S. Congress has directed NASA to conduct an assessment of the potential use of space technology in the monitoring of oil spills and ocean pollution. As a result, laboratory studies, aircraft missions, and spacecraft studies are underway to perform this assessment with the cooperation of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Geological Survey, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Canada Centre for Remote Sensing. Primary emphasis in the space system will be directed toward all-weather remote sensing and surveillance in which the space system would provide information to regulatory agencies for closer investigation with aircraft or ships. Laboratory and aircraft missions will be directed toward understanding and obtaining simultaneous microwave and optical imagery of oil spills on the sea with instruments of potential usefulness in the modeling of the movement of spills, along with detection and surveillance image definition. This paper summarizes the status of these efforts as of late 1978. Initial results of the required assessment should be available by the end of 1979.


1977 ◽  
Vol 1977 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-191
Author(s):  
James C. Clow

ABSTRACT The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), as amended in 1972, tasks the Coast Guard with development of “procedures and techniques to be employed in identifying…. oil and hazardous substances….” In carrying out this portion of the service's environmental mandate, the Coast Guard Research and Development Center has developed first generation laboratory and field systems for the forensic identification and classification of oil spills. The laboratory system utilizes four independent analytical techniques (infrared and fluorescence spectroscopy, gas and thin-layer chromatography) to match spill samples with suspected sources, while the field system utilizes two analytical techniques (fluorescence spectroscopy and thin-layer chromatography). The field system is designed to give each Captain of the Port or Marine Safety Office the capability to rapidly identify the source of the majority of oil spills, or in more difficult cases to provide sufficient information to justify the collection of additional samples for more detailed analysis by the laboratory system.


1981 ◽  
Vol 1981 (1) ◽  
pp. 319-324
Author(s):  
James T. Paskewich ◽  
Edmond P. Thompson ◽  
Timothy W. Kana

ABSTRACT The need for rapid, detailed oceanographic surveys of tidal inlets for contingency planning became apparent during the Ixtoc I and Burmah Agate oil spills in 1979. Tidal inlets, which exist along virtually all coastal plain shorelines, provide the major conduits for open-ocean spills to enter environmentally sensitive coastal habitats. During Ixtoc I and Burmah Agate, a significant effort was made to combine scientific expertise with the practical expertise of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Strike Teams to design more efficient and appropriate boom configurations for Texas passes. Information on tidal inlets, needed by the Strike Teams, included distribution of surface currents, duration and time of flood currents, updated bathymetry, and location of low-velocity zones or natural oil traps. Based on the Texas experience, techniques were developed to survey major tidal inlets rapidly, prepare detailed boom and skimmer deployment, and coordinate implementation of each plan with private cleanup contractors. The surveys were designed to improve the performance and efficiency of containment equipment. Site-specific plans for inlet protection were prepared for Brazos-Santiago Pass, Mansfield Pass, Aransas Pass, and Pass Cavallo during Ixtoc I. During the Burmah Agate incident, designs for protecting San Luis Pass and Galveston Entrance, two of the largest inlets in Texas, were prepared within 10 days after the spill, using aerial reconnaissance and hydrography studies. The schemes took advantage of natural circulation patterns and identified most likely oil trajectories and impact zones within each pass. Contingency plans for Texas inlets were site-specific and attempted to balance the need to protect sensitive lagoon environments with the need to maintain commercial navigation within the practical limitations of equipment and manpower available.


1975 ◽  
Vol 1975 (1) ◽  
pp. 301-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. S. Paulson ◽  
A. D. Schumaker ◽  
W. A. Wallace

ABSTRACT The frequency of large-volume oil spills is considerably greater than is consistent with prediction based upon traditional methods. The reason for this phenomenon is that standard probability distributions of magnitude of spills do not have the flexibility to admit of very large coefficients of variation, especially for distributions which are highly skewed to the right. Hence, distributions which have large means relative to the median and which have long thick tails are prerequisites for an appropriate treatment of the problem. The class of stable laws provides a convenient method for investigating the empirical oil spill experience: several large spills dominate the total volume of spillage in virtually all accounting periods; e.g., quarterly. Our methodology involves a statistical assessment of “accident-proneness component;” if one exists, the data is further examined to identify insofar as is possible the genesis of the component (s); if none exists, we assess the frequency and severity of discharge for various geographic areas. A new approach has been utilized to fit these long, thick-tailed probability distribution to a U.S. Coast Guard data file on oil spills, the pollution incident reporting system (PIRS), with considerable success. We pay particular attention to the fitted upper tail vis-a-vis the actual upper tail. The agreement, where our methodology is deemed applicable, is very good We also indicate improvements to methodology and applications.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1772-1783
Author(s):  
Drew Casey ◽  
John Caplis

ABSTRACT As observed during several recent major oil spills, most notably the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, the current regulatory planning standard for mechanical recovery equipment has been often scrutinized as an inadequate means for vessel and facility plan holders to calculate their oil spill equipment needs. Effective Daily Recovery Capacity, or EDRC, was developed during a negotiated rulemaking process following the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. During an IOSC 2011 Workshop sponsored by the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the U.S. Coast Guard, there was general agreement among workshop participants that EDRC is not an accurate planning tool for determining oil spill response equipment needs. In addition, many attendees agreed that EDRC should account for the skimmer system as a whole, not individual skimmer components such as pump nameplate capacity. In 2012, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the U.S. Coast Guard initiated and completed a third-party, independent research contract to review the existing EDRC regulations and make recommendations for improving planning standards for mechanical recovery. The contractor's final report methodology is based on oil spill thickness as a fundamental component in calculating mechanical recovery potential, and it emphasizes the importance of response time on-scene and storage for recovered oil. This research provides a more realistic and scientific approach to evaluating skimmer system performance, and more accurately accounts for a wide range of operating conditions and external influences. The federal government, with input from the oil industry, OSRO community, and other interested stakeholders, now has a sound methodology to serve as a starting point for redesigning the current planning standard that more accurately reflects skimmer system performance.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 1453-1470
Author(s):  
LT Christopher M. Kimrey

ABSTRACT 2017-205 Catastrophic events like Deepwater Horizon, Exxon Valdez, major hurricanes, and other such anomalies have a tendency to overwhelm the initial crisis management leadership due to the chaotic nature of the event. The inability to quickly and accurately make critical assessments about the magnitude and complexity of the emerging catastrophe can spell disaster for crisis managers long before the response ever truly takes shape. This paper argues for the application of metacognitive models for sense and decision-making. Rather than providing tools and checklists as a recipe for success, this paper endeavors to provide awareness of the cognitive processes and heuristics that tend to emerge in crises including major oil spills, making emergency managers aware of their existence and potential impacts. Awareness, we argue, leads to recognition and self-awareness of key behavioral patterns and biases. The skill of metacognition—thinking about thinking—is what we endeavor to build through this work. Using a literature review and cogent application to oil spill response, this paper reviews contemporary theories on metacognition and sense-making, as well as concepts of behavioral bias and risk perception in catastrophic environments. When catastrophe occurs—and history has proven they will—the incident itself and the external pressures of its perceived management arguably emerge simultaneously, but not necessarily in tandem with one another. Previous spills have demonstrated how a mismanaged incident can result in an unwieldy and caustic confluence of external forces. This paper provides an awareness of biases that lead to mismanagement and apply for the first time a summary of concepts of sense-making and metacognition to major oil spill response. The views and ideas expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Coast Guard or Department of Homeland Security.


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