EVOLVING POLLUTION-RELATED REQUIREMENTS INTERNATIONALLY AND IN THE UNITED STATES

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 865-868
Author(s):  
Jonathan K. Waldron

ABSTRACT This paper will analyze the domestic and international pollution-related requirements for vessels that have recently come into force, or will likely soon affect, vessel owners and operators. In particular, the international requirements reviewed include: MARPOL Annex I, Annex IV, Annex VI, the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ship's Ballast Water, the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems, and the London Convention and its 1996 Protocol. The analysis of changing domestic law reviews the pollution related amendments to the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (CGMTA), Pub. L. No. 108-293, which was signed into law on August 9, 2004, which made numerous amendments relating to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), Pub. L. No. 101-380. Vessel owners and operators should continue to monitor evolving pollution related regulations in order to comply with new requirements.

1994 ◽  
Vol 31 (03) ◽  
pp. 175-182
Author(s):  
Hans Hofmann ◽  
George Kapsilis ◽  
Eric Smith ◽  
Robert Wasalaski

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has mandated that by the year 2015 all oil tankers operating in waters subject to jurisdiction of the United States must have double hulls. This paper examines the Act and the status of regulatory initiatives it has generated. Guidance for new hull construction and retrofit of existing vessels is outlined, and both IMO (International Maritime Organization) and U.S. Coast Guard requirements are discussed. Finally, the structural changes necessary to convert the U.S. Navy's T-AO Class oil tankers to meet the requirements of the Act are specified and illustrated.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 353-355
Author(s):  
Cadets John P. Nolan ◽  
Susan J. Blood

ABSTRACT The International Oil Pollution Prevention and Response (OPPR) Convention represents current international efforts to improve capabilities to prepare for and respond to catastrophic oil spills. Initiated by the United States, it is being negotiated by the Marine Environment Protection Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Major components of the proposal include the establishment of an International Marine Pollution Information Center located at IMO headquarters, National Response Centers in each coastal state, and oil spill response contingency plans for ships. Other proposed articles include prepositioning of oil response equipment in high-risk areas, a research and development program for response techniques, and international cooperation during responses to catastrophic oil spills. Several problems have complicated negotiations of the OPPR Convention. First, severe time constraints have been placed on the negotiators, with the final conference1 to consider the OPPR scheduled for November 1990. Second, the United States suffers from a lack of credibility in the IMO, since the Senate has not yet ratified previous initiatives, the 1984 protocols to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, and the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. Finally, the IMO's financial troubles have placed the concept of the International Information Center in jeopardy. In spite of these obstacles, a clear majority of countries are willing to support the document, realizing that it fills a gap in marine oil pollution prevention and response. The OPPR Convention will likely be carried through to adoption by the November conference. This paper traces the development of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Response and Prevention. It summarizes the background and initial proposals of the Convention, and then discusses the problems that arose during negotiations. Finally, it describes the present status of the Convention and offers a projection of its future direction.


Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.


Author(s):  
Julie A. Aquino

Every day more than 10,000 marine species are swept up in the ballast water of ships and make their way across the globe. 1 When discharged into non-native waters, these species are able to damage infrastructure, disrupt commerce, out compete native species, reduce biodiversity, and threaten human health.2 The ecological losses are difficult to quantify; however, the direct and indirect economic costs have been measured at billions of dollars per year in the United States alone.3 Recognizing the severity of the problem, Congress directed the Coast Guard in 1996 to administer a ballast water program and issue guidelines.4 According to various interest groups, the aquatic invasive species problem persists today despite Coast Guard involvement because of inherent and technological limitations surrounding ballast water management (BWM).5 However, other groups believe that the crux of the problem is that the Coast Guard has simply not acted aggressively enough to address the problem. In March 2005, an environmental advocacy group, joined by six states, convinced a federal district court for the Northern District of California that the EPA had exceeded its statutory authority by exempting the discharge of ballast water from the control of the Clean Water Act (CWA)6 in the case of Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA.


1996 ◽  
Vol 33 (02) ◽  
pp. 92-100
Author(s):  
Katherine Weathers ◽  
Eric Reeves

The Great Lakes is the first place where the United States has established a defense against the introduction of nonindigenous species carried in ballast water. U.S. regulations controlling the discharge of ballast from all vessels entering from outside the Exclusive Economic Zone into the Great Lakes went into effect in early 1993 and are enforced by the United States Coast Guard, with active assistance from the Canadians and the Seaway authorities. The Great Lakes are a unique, valuable, and sensitive resource which have already suffered significant damage from nonindigenous species and are under continuing threat from new invasions. The Great Lakes also have some unique defensive advantages because vessel traffic can be controlled at the Saint Lawrence Seaway and open ocean exchange with salt water can be used as a verifiable, reasonably cheap, and safe method for impeding the invasion of new freshwater species. However, more effective defenses are needed in order to prevent new invasions over the long term. Development of these new defenses will probably require engineering changes in ballast systems in all vessels engaged in transoceanic trade, whether going to fresh or saltwater ports.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-231
Author(s):  
Frank J. Gonynor ◽  
Erika Lindholm

ABSTRACT 2017-392 The term ‘substantial threat’ appears in the statutory text of the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), and has played a key role as an important triggering mechanism for the operation of the Act in many prospective spill events. Yet this important term is not defined at all in the Act itself. This paper examines the meaning of this term, looking at other sources of possible definition, including plain language/dictionary meaning, court cases, the decisions of the US National Pollution Funds Center, and other materials. One way to define ‘substantial threat’ of pollution would be a situation where the risk of a spill is greater than the normal risk posed by a particular vessel in a particular place – but this paper will examine if that possible definition fits with the actual practice and experience of the term. In order to attempt to address that question, we will examine how the US Coast Guard has used this concept in cases in recent years. The statutory concept of ‘threat’ is also used outside of the US, and the second full section of this paper continues with a discussion of how this concept exists in other countries as to their approach to possible spill events, and how that may differ from the US approach. The conclusion from the examination of US and non-US terms is that the current ‘ad hoc’ use of the term, without a rigid meaning, is the best approach.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1051-1054 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Adams

ABSTRACT The United States has several international oil pollution response agreements for which the U.S. Coast Guard serves as lead agency for implementation. However, the United States does not have an integrated plan for implementing these agreements, the criteria to use in determining what level of cooperation is needed, or a strategy for prioritizing which countries with which to engage to forge new agreements. This paper outlines a strategy for international engagement that allows the United States to participate in response-related expertise exchange to ensure appropriate capabilities are available for spills that threaten U.S. interests. Obstacles to developing and implementing the strategy and ways to overcome them also are identified.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 913-917
Author(s):  
Michael Adams

ABSTRACT As called for under the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC), “Parties to the OPRC convention are required to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in co-operation with other countries.” As a signatory to OPRC the U.S. Government (USG) has pledged to assist other countries in the development of their own oil spill response capabilities and while USG has many agreements that meet the guidelines of assisting other countries, there is no formal engagement strategy for developing further agreements, no agency championing this effort, and there are many still requiring assistance. However, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is uniquely positioned to perform the role of drafting an engagement strategy and working with the global community to assist those countries that have yet to develop an adequate oil spill response system of their own due to the lack of resources, expertise or both. There are many hurdles to enabling USCG to assume the OPRC assistance banner that have been previously addressed (Adams, IOSC 2001), which this paper will not seek to readdress. However, if USG does decide to move forward with an integrated policy there remains the need to develop an adequate engagement strategy. This strategy is necessary to ensure the limited resources available for foreign assistance are expended in the most cost effective, ethical and responsible manner possible. There are three alternative strategies I will analyze in an effort to determine the best suited for implementation of this policy. These three strategies are based primarily on 1) environmental need, 2) geographical proximity, and 3) political/economic interests. The goal of this strategy is to effectively implement the oil spill assistance policy alluded to previously in support of the U.S.'s pledge under OPRC. This paper will analyze the success of each strategy making a recommendation on which one USG should pursue.


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