Oil Spill Response Under the NCP and the NRF/Stafford Act - Incompatible Regimes?

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1050-1058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring
Keyword(s):  
Hurricane Katrina ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Homeland Security ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Federal Funds ◽  
National Response

ABSTRACT This paper examines oil pollution response during disaster situations when the Stafford Act is invoked by the President and the National Response Framework provides funding under ESF-10. The interrelationship between the National Contingency Plan (NCP), created by various pollution statues (Clean Water Act/CWA, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability/CERCLA, Oil Pollution Act/OPA) and the National Response Framework (NRF), created to deal with declared disasters under the Stafford Act, is becoming more fractious as time passes and the financial scope of disasters grows. The paradigm that existed when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005 was not in evidence when Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy made landfall in the fall of 2012. The NCP envisions oil and chemical spill response in the context of a single spill, ideally with a known responsible party (RP), who takes action to respond to the spill. That RP is liable for costs and damages resulting from the spill. Action commences when the spill occurs and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) determines that federal action is required. If the federal funds (Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund/OSLTF, CERCLA/SUPERFUND) are used, the federal government seeks cost recovery afterwards. The NRF envisions the federal government acting like a “no-fault insurance” regime, providing federal resources/funds to states when their capabilities are overwhelmed and their citizens require immediate succor. FEMA action commences when the State requests and the President approves aid. The states agree to a cost share – not to exceed 25% of Federal funding. There is no private party liability when actions are complete. The Homeland Security Act established the NRF, and operationally subsumes the NCP under it. However, the Homeland Security Act does not address what fund (Stafford or the pollution funds) will be used when a declared disaster occurs. Furthermore, the Stafford Act structure (State requests, Presidential approvals, Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Coordinating Officer (FEMA FCO) appointment, area surveys, mission assignments) becomes sclerotic in a large incident when compared to the much more nimble NCP process (spill, FOSC decision, immediate funding). The effect for Coast Guard (CG) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) field responders is to lean forward with NCP processes to protect the public. FEMA, faced with dwindling resources, observes this tendency and declines to provide disaster funding when the other federal funds “can be used”. The paper proposes a new paradigm for the “Makris-Suiter” Agreement of 1998 between EPA and FEMA. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.

Integrated Vessel Response Plan Format

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Response Planning ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.

ESA Section 7: Time for a Refresh in the Pre-Spill Planning Consultation Process

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Stacey L. Crecy ◽  
Melissa E. Perera ◽  
Elizabeth J. Petras ◽  
John A. Tarpley
Keyword(s):  
Endangered Species ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Service Agency ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT #2017-373 Federal agencies involved in oil spill response in the U.S. are required to comply with several environmental compliance laws. Where a Federal agency is operating in a way that may affect endangered species in the area, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to “consult” with the two Federal agencies responsible for protecting those species and habitats – the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, nonprofit organizations filed several lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (the “Action Agencies”) for failure to comply with the ESA during oil spill contingency planning. In one case, a settlement required the Action Agencies to consult with the NMFS and USFWS (together, called the “Services”) on the plan to use oil spill dispersants in California waters. Perhaps responding to these developments, several Regional Response Teams across the country initiated or made plans to review the status of their ESA Section 7 consultations. These efforts have varied in cost, scope, composition of agency representatives involved, and success in completing a consultation for a variety of reasons. There have been numerous challenges for USCG and EPA in meeting the ESA Section 7 consultation requirements for oil spill planning. First, the most recent framework for cooperation between the Action Agencies and the Services regarding consulting on oil spill planning and response activities is contained in an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2001. Although the agreement is still valid, some parts have been identified as outdated or in need of clarification. Secondly, there are no direct funding mechanisms or dedicated personnel assigned to the Action Agencies to work on pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations. Third, recommendations and consultation outcomes can vary between Service agencies as well as internally within each Service agency due to a high level of regional autonomy. In 2015, the National Response Team (NRT) formed a new, interagency subcommittee to improve the Federal Action Agencies’ ability to comply with environmental laws such as the ESA with respect to oil spill response and pre-spill planning. A workgroup of the NRT Subcommittee was formed to specifically address pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultation processes. The workgroup includes regional and national representatives from the Action Agencies and the Services. In addition to strengthening relationships and understanding among the participating agencies, the workgroup has identified gaps in the 2001 MOA and is in the process of developing tools and templates on how to conduct pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations to help fill some of the existing gaps. The workgroup ultimately hopes to facilitate the development of updated, complete, efficient, and consistent ESA Section 7 consultations across the nation.

MANAGING MULTIPLE OIL SPILLS FROM A NATURAL DISASTER: THE KATRINA OIL SPILL RESPONSES

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1219-1223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Cantin ◽  
Roger Laferriere ◽  
Larry Hewett ◽  
Charlie Henry
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Hurricane Katrina ◽  
Natural Disaster ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
The United States ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Response Options ◽  
National Response ◽  
Response Plan

ABSTRACT Every nation faces the possibility of a major natural disaster and few plans are in place to deal with the massive consequences that follow. When Hurricane Katrina reached landfall, the human toll and extent of damage made it the worst natural disaster in American history. The news headlines were filled with the images of desperation and the efforts of the thousands of heroes across the spectrum of government who worked tirelessly to help the citizens of the Gulf Coast of the United States recover. Less visible to the American public was the vast environmental impact caused by millions of gallons of oil released by hundreds of individual oil spills. The total oil volume lost to the environment is estimated at over 8.2 million gallons, making it the second largest oil spill in United States history. Moreover, this spill was the first major environmental disaster managed under the newly published National Response Plan, a plan developed following the tragic events of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This paper will describe how response managers overcame the incredible challenges of managing multiple oil spills in an enormous area devoid of the support infrastructure, human resources and the logistics network normally present in major spills within the United States. The authors will offer a first hand account of the strategies employed by the response management system assembled to combat the spills. They will describe key lessons learned in overcoming competition for critical resources; the importance of combining scientific, legal and other support in determining response options such as burning and debris removal; and the methodology employed in creating a Unified Area Command that included multiple responsible parties. Finally, this paper will provide insights to processes within the Joint Field Office, an element of the National Response Plan, and how well it performed in supporting response efforts.

scholarly journals United States and Canada Transboundary Oil Spill Liability and Compensation Regimes: An Overview

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Marine Habitat ◽  
Inland Waterways ◽  
Funding Sources ◽  
The Impact

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.

Makah IndianTribe – U.S. Coast Guard Memorandum of Agreement A Model for Meaningful Tribal-Federal Engagement

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 300663
Author(s):  
Chad Bowechop ◽  
Andrew Connor ◽  
Scott Knutson ◽  
Heather A. Parker ◽  
LCDR Lance Lindgren
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Homeland Security ◽  
Situational Awareness ◽  
Puget Sound ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Department Of Homeland Security ◽  
Indian Tribe ◽  
Work List

On 12 April 2013, the Makah Tribal Council Chairman and the District Commander of the 13th Coast Guard District (D13) signed into effect the “Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Coast Guard and the Makah Indian Tribe Regarding Interoperability and Coordination”. The purpose of this “Makah-USCG MOA” is to establish terms by which the two parties will coordinate and collaborate in the fulfillment of their mutual trust responsibility. The MOA's focus is to enhance consultation, improve leveraging of resources within each party's authorities, and improve collective all-hazards prevention and response posture in the Makah Treaty Area. Such an agreement between a federal agency and an Indian tribe is authorized by Executive Order 13175 - Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, signed in 2000 and is consistent with the 2011 Department of Homeland Security Tribal Consultation Policy. This groundbreaking document represents a 20 year relationship between key members of the Makah Tribe and the oil spill response members of CG D13 and Sector Puget Sound, and the trust developed over that period while working together to mutually support each party's oil spill prevention, preparedness and response readiness, as well as the desire to help and support each other by harmonizing efforts. With recent legislation such as the 2010 Coast Guard Authorization act, authorizing resources to engage tribes into training, exercises and other spill response preparedness activities particularly in the Northwest, it became clear there was a need to memorialize the strong supportive working relationship between the Makah and the CG, and provide some structure to our planning and development efforts. The MOA lays out a minimum of semi-annual meetings during which the two parties discuss overarching items of mutual interest and determine a work list of concrete, achievable goals to complete within the next 6 month period. An initial work list of common interest issues and responsibilities are outlined in the MOA, and fall into three general categories: Prevention; Preparedness and Response. The MOA also addresses the importance of Communication with the goal of enhancing mutual situational awareness via improved communication protocols between the Coast Guard and the Makah Tribe.

Recent Research and Development Testing Conducted at Ohmsett – The National Oil Spill Response Research and Renewable Energy Test Facility

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 1345-1365
Author(s):  
Paul Meyer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Renewable Energy ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Test Facility ◽  
Oil Spill Response

Abstract 2017-321 The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) National Oil Spill Response Research and Renewable Energy Test Facility, Ohmsett, plays a critical role in advancing oil spill response capabilities through research, development, testing, and training. Ohmsett’s 10 million liter (l) saltwater wave tank provides an independent venue to conduct research and development with full-size response equipment using real oil, in realistic, repeatable conditions. This paper will discuss recent research and development conducted at Ohmsett, including: Remote sensing of surface oil by BSEE, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the United States Army, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA); using acoustics to measure oil slick thickness; creating large volumes of emulsions for Ohmsett tests; mechanical recovery of chemically treated, undispersed oil; skimmer testing in diminishing slick thickness; a USCG and BSEE test of a skimmer ice management system; and an autonomous skimmer development. This paper will summarize the setup and methodology used during recent testing, training, and research conducted at Ohmsett. Reports of BSEE funded oil spill response research can be found at https://www.bsee.gov/site-page/master-list-of-oil-spill-response-research.

scholarly journals UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY “THEN” AND “NOW”

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Emergency Response ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.

scholarly journals The Marine Salvage Industry: Proven in Preventing Oil Spills

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
New Policies ◽  
The U.S

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.

scholarly journals ENHANCEMENTS TO STOCK CCG TRANSFER PUMPS/SKIMMER UNITS

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 841-844
Author(s):  
D. Cooper ◽  
R. MacKay ◽  
C. Brown
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Background Information ◽  
Environment Canada ◽  
Performance Information ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
The Past

ABSTRACT A number of modifications and enhancements of the two primary transfer pump/skimmer units, specifically the GT-185 and GT-260 stocked by the Canadian Coast Guard have been proposed over the past few years. Much of the focus of the testing during this time has centered on dealing with very viscous oils, but the proposed changes will impact the performance of these devices when dealing with any oil. This paper details the development of a collaborative series of projects supported by Environment Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard over the past six years. It provides background information on the original problems or design limitations of the oil spill recovery equipment. Descriptions of the subsequent modifications are presented, along with performance information which quantifies any improvements to performance. The work has evolved to include partnerships with federal government organizations from Canada and the United States, along with contributions by manufacturers of similar spill response equipment during testing trials.

OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND CONTROL AT NAVAL SHORELINE ACTIVITIES1

1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-224
Author(s):  
Warren G. Hansen ◽  
Ernest Clements ◽  
Elizabeth A. Lundt
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Policy Development ◽  
Prevention And Control ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Subsequent Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Oil Storage ◽  
And Control

ABSTRACT In response to Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Coast Guard regulations, the United States Navy has undertaken a comprehensive program to minimize the potential for land-based oil spills originating from naval shoreline oil storage and handling facilities. Construction and maintenance projects have been begun to prevent land-based oil spills from occurring or from reaching adjacent navigable waters. These projects were preceded by careful policy development, surveys of existing conditions, and analyses of remedial alternatives. Specifically, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command divisions have assisted shoreline activities in the preparation of oil spill prevention, control, and countermeasures (SPCC), and oil spill contingency plans. Improved spill containment and cleanup technologies, as well as improved personnel training, have contributed greatly to the refinement and upgrading of these plans. SCS Engineers (SCS) has been involved in all phases of compliance with these plans. Plan and manual reviews were supplemented by detailed field surveys and subsequent development of remedial projects to be instituted at all deficient facilities. Based on the preliminary recommendations and design sketches prepared for tank farm sites at San Clemente Island, SCS is now providing design and related services for oil spill prevention and control facilities.

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