scholarly journals SOVIET LEADER: RECONSTRUCTION OF THE IMAGE ACCORDING TO THE JOURNAL "CROCODILE" (1953–1964)

2020 ◽  
pp. 131-137
Author(s):  
M. A. Klinova ◽  
◽  
A. V. Trofimov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Leader

Operation “Denver”

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 4-80
Author(s):  
Douglas Selvage
Keyword(s):  
Immune Deficiency Syndrome ◽  
Deficiency Syndrome ◽  
West Germany ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
State Security ◽  
Intelligence Services ◽  
Immunodeficiency Virus ◽  
East German ◽  
Acquired Immune Deficiency

Abstract This second part of a two-part article moves ahead in showing how the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) came to play a key role in the disinformation campaign launched by the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) in 1983 regarding the origins of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The KGB launched the campaign itself, but in the mid-1980s it sought to widen the effort by enlisting the cooperation of intelligence services in other Warsaw Pact countries, especially the Stasi. From the autumn of 1986 until November 1989, the Stasi played a central role in the disinformation campaign. Despite pressure from the U.S. government and a general inclination of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to curtail the campaign by the end of 1987, both the KGB and the USSR's official Novosti press agency continued until 1989 to spread false allegations that HIV was a U.S. biological weapon. Even after the KGB curtailed its disinformation in 1989, the Stasi continued to disseminate falsehoods, not least because it had successfully maintained plausible deniability regarding its role in the campaign. The Stasi worked behind the scenes to support the work of Soviet–East German scientists Jakob Segal and Lilli Segal and to facilitate dissemination of the Segals’ views in West Germany and Great Britain, especially through the leftwing media, and to purvey broader disinformation about HIV/AIDS by attacking U.S. biological and chemical weapons in general.

Ezra Taft Benson Meets Nikita Khrushchev, 1959

2019 ◽  
pp. 53-67
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Leader ◽  
Brigham Young University ◽  
High Ranking ◽  
Nikita Khrushchev ◽  
Small Doses ◽  
Lds Church ◽  
High Ranking Official

In 1966 Ezra Taft Benson, high-ranking official of the LDS church and former U.S. secretary of agriculture, delivered a speech on the campus of LDS-owned Brigham Young University in which he summarized his encounter with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in September 1959. Benson told BYU students that Khrushchev had bragged to him, in part, “[W]e’ll keep feeding you small doses of socialism until you'll finally wake up and find you already have Communism. We'll so weaken your economy until you'll fall like overripe fruit into our hands.” This essay examines the accuracy of Benson's recital of Khrushchev’s alleged comments and concludes that Benson misstated the incident and attributed statements to Khrushchev he did not make. It also speculates why Benson misrepresented, or misremembered, the facts of the encounter.

scholarly journals Increasing Relevance of Treaties: The Case of the Arctic

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 52-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Koivurova
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Polar Bear ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
Multilateral Cooperation ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

The Arctic was one of the main theatres for strategic military confrontation during the Cold War between the blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. There was no place for multilateral cooperation, other than for very limited issue areas, such as the 1973 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears between the five states with polar bear populations. Yet, the warming of relations by the end of the Cold War changed all this. Inspired by Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in 1987, in which the Soviet leader pro-posed various possible areas for Arctic cooperation, differing ideas for international cooperation were advanced. Canadians, in particular, were trying to advance international treaty-based general cooperation for the Arctic, but this never came to pass and it was eventually Finland who was able to broker soft-law collaboration between the Cold War rivals.

At the edge of Soviet state control

AJS Review ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-188
Author(s):  
Gennady Estraikh
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
State Control ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
Totalitarian Regime ◽  
Nikita Khrushchev ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Crimea ◽  
State Of Israel ◽  
Jewish Intellectuals

In August 1956, Nikita Khrushchev took part in a meeting with a delegation of Canadian communists. Discussing the wave of repression against Jewish intellectuals during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Soviet leader mentioned that he had supported Stalin's decision not to give the Crimea to Jews because it would have created a springboard for attacks on the Soviet Union. Apart from being paranoid about the Soviet Jews' loyalty to the young state of Israel and its imperialist backers, Khrushchev had, as his remark revealed, another paranoia that was characteristic of the Kremlin decision-makers: distrust of the peripheries. Khrushchev and his advisors knew that their totalitarian regime was not such a monolith as it might appear in the eyes of foreign observers, especially because visitors were seldom allowed to travel to the outskirts of the Soviet empire and did not know that some areas had features of fiefdoms. The post-Soviet disintegration of the communist empire confirmed the Kremlin denizens' misgivings.

scholarly journals Clash of Emotions: White House—State Department Relations during the Kennedy Administration

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-40
Author(s):  
Kasper Grotle Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Common Ground ◽  
State Department ◽  
The State ◽  
First Year ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
White House ◽  
Berlin Crisis ◽  
Nikita Khrushchev ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Relationship

This article examines the rather poor emotional relationship between the White House and the State Department during 1961, the first year of the presidency of John F. Kennedy. The article argues that both sides had expectations of the relationship that turned into disappointments and that both sides felt that their approach and work was superior to the other. During the Berlin Crisis, this clash of emotions gained political significance concerning the case of the American response to a Soviet formal diplomatic note (an aide-mémoire) following the June 1961 Vienna Summit between Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. The White House and the State Department had different priorities and because of the poor emotional relationship they failed to find common ground. The end result was that the State Department won the battle by having its preferred version of the response sent to the Soviets. But the Department lost the war, because the White House used the opportunity to take control of Berlin policy at the expense of the State Department.

scholarly journals Joseph Stalin and the development of Tank Forces of the Red Army in the 1930’s - early 1940’s

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 962-984
Author(s):  
Aleksei A. Kilichenkov
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
Soviet Leadership ◽  
Military Vehicles ◽  
Red Army ◽  
Technical Innovations ◽  
Winter War ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
The Military

The author attempts to analyze the totality of ideas and opinions of I.V. Stalin on the development of tank weapons in the 1930s. Documents of RGASPI and RGVA archives were used as the sources. Influenced by a series of ‘military alarms,’ Stalin began to closely engage with issues of tank construction in the late 1920s, and initiated a large-scale program for equipping the Red Army with tanks. The program was to ensure the military-technical superiority of the USSR over its likely opponents, with the goal to compensate for the overall backlog. As the USSR was unable to create its own modern tanks, in 1930 the Soviet leadership purchased several dozen military vehicles abroad. Stalin personally controlled the procurement process, often intervening in the process; he also attended demonstrations of tests vehicles and decided on the number of tanks that were to be produced. At the same time he closely followed the technical innovations in foreign armies. The study of Stalin’s interest in tanks reveals that in the early 1930s, the Soviet leader thought of the tank weapon as an ‘asymmetrical alternative’ to overcome the broader gap in preparation for war. The present article analyses how Stalin read the documents that were sent to him; this analysis demonstrates that Stalin was more likely to seek confirmation for his existing views than to actually use the documents for coming to new conclusions. In general, Stalin’s ideas and opinions on tank issues were based on political, economic and logical considerations rather than on military expertise. One case in point is his support for M.N. Tukhachevskii when the latter called for the massive production of surrogate tanks based on tractors. In the mid-1930s, when the army had already received thousands of new tanks, Stalin shifted his emphasis from issues of equipment to the quality of the personnel, while at the same time demanding a simplification of machinery down to the level of a ‘crewman with skills that are just medium or even lower.’ But on the eve of the war, the Soviet leader again returned to the need for a qualitative and numerical growth of armored forces. Finally, Stalin analysed how tank forces were used during the Winter War against Finland and in the first years of war in Europe, but he remained unable to assess the strike potential of this weapon and its role in the future war with Nazi Germany.

Los Cuatro Generales

2021 ◽  
pp. 209-212
Author(s):  
William Klinger ◽  
Denis Kuljiš
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Military Training ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
To Receive

This chapter looks at Marshal Tito's power in the secret sphere that was based on the revolutionary cadres from the Spanish Civil War. It describes Tito's own four Spanish generals, namely Enrique Líster Forján, Juan Modesto, Antonio Cordon, and José Manuel Tagüeña Lacorte. It also talks about General Líster, who was born in Cuba but went to the Soviet Union to receive military training in 1932. The chapter discusses Moscow's accusation that Tito was repatriating important cadres after the defeat of the Republican army and about 440,000 people crossed the Pyrenees. It explains that the 1944 Churchill–Stalin Agreement sealed the fate of revolution in Europe as the Soviet leader ordered all the guerrillas to demobilize.

“We Will be Two Ismails”

2017 ◽  
pp. 315-326
Author(s):  
Isabella Ginor ◽  
Gideon Remez
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Anwar Sadat

The failure of US President Richard Nixon to make good on his post-reelection vow to press Israel was evident when Prime Minister Golda Meir, visiting Washington in the spring of 1973, offered no concessions in return for continued arms supply. Reports from “Mossad spy” Ashraf Marwan and others of imminent Egyptian attack led Israel to call a costly alert in April; US statesman Henry Kissinger took credit for getting the Soviets to make Egyptian President Anwar Sadat delay the offensive until after a summit with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in California in June. But evidence shows that the ultimate timing of a joint offensive with Syria in October had already been determined. While Sadat’s envoy Hafez Ismail impressed Kissinger with peace proposals in Washington, War Minister Ahmed Ismail shuttled between Moscow and Damascus to coordinate war plans and weapons supplies. At the summit in August, Brezhnev took a belligerent stance. The USSR’s support for the impending attack was exemplified by delivery of Scud missiles with Soviet operators, and participation in the final councils of war.

Self-Government in Late 1980s Czechoslovakia: The Slovak Philosopher Miroslav Kusý against the Communist Party1

2021 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-452
Author(s):  
Dirk Mathias Dalberg
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
State Enterprise ◽  
State Socialism ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Economic Changes ◽  
The Public

Self-government is one of the most popular terms in left-wing political thought. In the second half of the twentieth century, it was used and discussed both in Western liberal democracies and in the communist bloc. The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev used this notion from the mid-1980s onwards, forming part of his wider policy of perestroika. Although the Czechoslovak leaders were not interested in political reforms and were largely sceptical about economic changes, the Soviet example resonated with the public and impacted on official discussion in Czechoslovakia. In this context, the Czechoslovak parliament adopted the Act on State Enterprise in July 1988, which was preceded by the discussion of the Proposal on the Act on State Enterprise (1987). This article draws attention to Czechoslovak dissident milieus and the response to the parliament’s proposal. It focuses on the Slovak philosopher Miroslav Kusý (1931-2019), who articulated the most substantial critique of the official plans. While accepting the principle of self-government, he argued that the proposal was subject to fundamental misinterpretations. In assessing his arguments, the article traces a particular intervention within the wider debates on state socialism in the 1980s.

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