Quantifying Turing: A Systems Approach to Quantitatively Assessing the Degree of Autonomy of Any System

This paper describes a method by which the degree of autonomy of a system can be quantified in a manner that allows comparison between systems. The methodology re-visits, refines and extends the Contextual Autonomous Capability (CAC) model proposed by the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) by defining three orthogonal system metrics against which the performance of a system may be assessed. During the development of this model, it was recognized that there existed two different but coupled domains of autonomy- the Executive Autonomy describing the degree of independence of a system during the execution of the mission; and the Developmental Autonomy describing the degree of independence of the system during preparation for the mission. The resulting methodology is explicitly developed to be system agnostic such that it could be applied to humans as well as computerized systems. As such, it provides a means of quantifiably comparing the performance of any two systems- including human and computer- that are performing comparable sets of missions. The proposed model is called the System-agnostic Quantification of Autonomy Levels (SQuAL) model.

7. The Executive Branch

This chapter offers a clear introduction to the history, constitutional structure, and powers of the modern executive in European countries. It provides an overview of the constitutional position of the political executive in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies, then charts variations in the powers of key actors (including prime ministers, cabinets, and presidents) and their political implications for conflict within government, cabinet stability, and policy processes. The text complements its coverage of the political executive with an analysis of the civil service and the political challenges of controlling it, and concludes with a comprehensive assessment of the rise in executive autonomy and its political implications in the twenty-first century.

Transnational Practices Governing European Integration: Executive Autonomy and Neo-Corporatist Concertation in the Steel Sector

The European Coal and Steel Community was marked by institutional innovations. They have masked strong continuities in administrative and business communities and their governance practices, however, which persisted after 1945. Based on fresh research in national and international organisation archives, this article explores the origins before, during and after the First World War of two key elements of these practices, their evolution over time and their influence on post-war Western European governance of the steel sector: the struggle for executive autonomy and close transnational industry cooperation. Both practices clashed in the ECSC, became amalgamated and had lasting impact on the present-day European Union and its democratic deficit.

Rethinking social pacts in Europe: Prime ministerial power in Ireland and Italy

In Ireland and Southern European countries, social pacts were widely seen as a mechanism to mobilize broad support for weak governments to legitimate difficult reforms in the context of monetary integration. I retrace the politics of these pacts in Ireland and Italy to argue that it was less the condition of ‘weak government’ that enabled the negotiation of tripartite pacts, than the intervention of a ‘strong executive’: the prime minister’s office. Social pacts were pursued as a political strategy to enhance prime ministerial executive autonomy. In the aftermath of the euro crisis, this means of enhancing executive autonomy has been replaced by the negotiation of grand coalition governments, with the exclusion of unions; but this continues the trend towards the prime ministerialization of politics.

Steering or Networking: The Impact of Europe 2020 on Regional Governance Structures

This article probes into how regions organize themselves to deal effectively with the Europe 2020 reform program. More specifically, it maps governance structures of regional policy-making and implementation of Europe 2020 and explains variation in these structures between policy domains and policy stages. The empirical focus is Flanders as this Belgian region possesses substantial legislative and executive autonomy and is therefore highly affected by the Europe 2020 program. The article distinguishes between policy-making (upload) and implementation stages (download) in education, energy and poverty policies. It is hypothesized that the varying impact of Europe 2020 can be attributed to the varying adaptational pressure of EU programs and a set of domestic intervening factors. Findings indicate variation between policy domains and policy stages on a continuum from lead-organization governed networks to shared participant governance networks. Overall, the extent to which Flanders is competent seems to be crucial. In addition, a substantial administrative capacity is needed to firmly steer and coordinate the governance structures that manage Europe 2020 policies. The level of integration further increases the extent to which Flemish Europe 2020 policies are steered.

The Democratic Propensity for Adjudication

This chapter examines the democratic propensity for adjudication by conducting a statistical analysis of the use of adjudication by eighty-one states during the period 1975–2004. It uses the data to explore different dimensions of democratic politics and whether demand for adjudication reflects electoral preference for free trade, legal norms, or accountability mechanisms arising from legislative constraints on executive autonomy. The domestic constraints hypothesis receives support from evidence that states with high checks and balances at home are the most frequent users of adjudication. The chapter also shows that the same dynamic generates a positive correlation between democracy and the likelihood of a state to be targeted as a defendant in World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes. The pattern of trade disputes is shaped by domestic politics in terms of institutions of the complainant and defendant and by geopolitics in terms of alliance relations between trade partners.

What Happens When Institutions Do Not Work: Jueteng, Crises of Presidential Legitimacy, and Electoral Failures in the Philippines

In the Millennium Development Goals discussion, the question of how we eliminate bad institutions that perpetuate global poverty often arises. Democracy and participatory institutions are proposed as meta-institutions that are meant to create better ones. Democracies, however, also stumble. We study two episodes of crisis of presidential legitimacy in the Philippines: one arising from perceived electoral failure and the other from involvement in an illegal numbers game called Jueteng. A crisis of legitimacy can arise because the “declared winner” may not be the “true winner” because of the compromise of mechanisms of recall and accountability, or because the “true winner” reveals himself or herself ex post to be the “incorrect choice,” or both. The ensuing crisis of legitimacy, in turn, robs the executive of political mandate and momentum for reform. In the struggle to survive, executive autonomy is traded away as the power brokers of the status quo are enlisted for the defense. Thus, democracy's march to good institutions may be blocked or even reversed.