Public-Private Negotiation of the Increase in Land or Property Value by Urban Variant: An Analytical Approach Tested on a Case of Real Estate Development

The insufficiency of public resources in Europe, which increased due to the debt crisis of 2010, has raised the need for combined financing forms to activate urban settlement transformation processes. Among these is the partial recapture of surplus value generated by interventions that derogate from urban planning tools as a regulation form of the differential rent phenomenon. This form of financing recalls the concept of land value recapture; it consists of an extraordinary charge of urbanisation (ECU) paid to policymakers. In Italy, the national law (2014) assigns responsibility for ECU determination to local decision-makers. Their plurality of operational guidelines are generally inspired by the transformation value criterion, and are sometimes methodologically incoherent and dispersive in their modus operandi. To support policymakers in the programming of public works within the limits of their available financial resources, the aim of the present work is to test a coherent, rational and applicable procedure in the field of estimation in order to analytically determine the “surplus value” generated by the intervention ante and post urban variant. The proposed procedural model is based on the structural characterisation of multiple methodologies used in practice and in the literature. The procedure was tested on a case study in the Italian context of Rome City. The results deduced from its implementation clarify that the ECU evaluation must also appropriately weigh the mutual benefits according to the “timing” and “riskiness” of the investment.

Urban development and negative differential rent [Lo sviluppo urbano e la rendita differenziale negativa]

The growth of building land does not always produce a positive differential rent on the existing building stock. The essay aims to discuss the case where urban expansion has negative effects on the rent of existing building plots and constructions. In other words, the differential rent assumes negative values that increase over time, lowering the value of existing properties. This occurs when the expansion of the city does not correspond to a real need for new housing. Generally, it happens in the presence of urban centres already in an advanced phase of demographic contraction, when the existing building stock would be sufficient to satisfy the real estate demand. This expansion (sometimes achieved through urban plans or building programs, others in the total absence of plans) is a phenomenon that, since the 1960s, has affected (and still affects) many smaller towns in Italy. While in the cities that attract population, urban expansion led to the creation of a positive and growing rent (absolute and differential), in the centres suffering from depopulation the same type of expansion had adverse effects on the existing building stock.

A modern accumulation? The intricacies of enclosure, dispossession and cultural production in Venezuela’s Gran Sabana

In Gran Sabana (southern Venezuela), an ongoing process of enclosure is transforming property rights over lands previously treated as common pool resource by the indigenous Pemon. Members of the Pemon communities in which land is being enclosed participate actively in this process through the development of tourist projects. This process reflects a different configuration of forces than those Marx associated with ‘primitive accumulation’. It shows that dispossession can also be articulated by subjects who in principle do not appear as conventional power holders and who, furthermore, are themselves exposed to ongoing threats of dispossession. Additionally, enclosures take place amidst discursive manoeuvring that contributes to situating Gran Sabana as a centre of differential rent-capture for tourist operators and landowners. The term ‘modern accumulation’ will be used to conceptualise this form of accumulation and to discuss its applications.

On the role of the exchange rate as a tool for industrial competitiveness

ABSTRACT By means of a two-tradable-sector model for an open, price-taking economy inspired by the Classical-Sraffian tradition, which conceives the pattern of trade as a technical-choice problem, we examine some difficulties with the recourse to exchange-rate policy as a tool to promote sectorial competitiveness. To this aim, we distinguish among economies that only produce manufactures from those in which the most profitable sector exploits natural resources under conditions of differential rent. We show that, when both tradable sectors produce industrial goods, conventional devaluation does not generally allow one domestic sector to reach international competitiveness without damaging the other. While when the prevailing sector operates under conditions of differential rent, even though the development of a new sector - by setting the exchange rate at its “industrial-equilibrium” level - is possible, this requires that the policymaker determines the effect of changes in the exchange rate, both in direction and magnitude, on the other distributive variables.

Economic Estimation of Land Resources Potential of Ukraine

The article reflects the foundations of the formation of land resource potential. The methodology of land resource evaluation through the differential rent I and II is explored.

REGIONAL ASPECT OF DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL RENT OF RECREATIONAL TERRITORIES OF THE CRIMEA

The article describes a methodological approach to assessment of a natural rent of recreational territories that consists of eight consecutive stages. The assessment is made on the basis of differential rent 1 provisions and figures of gross national income that acts as economic criterion and allows to define the net natural rent applying benchmark method of its amount in the recreational territories with better and worse climatic conditions. The method justification is done by carrying out factorization of recreational territories and developing the detailed characteristic of categories of recreational territories of the Crimea; application of a differential rent 1 on the basis of expert estimates of quality characteristics of the worst recreational territories of the Crimean peninsula confirmed with concordance coefficient; development of the flowchart of methodological approach to assessment of a natural rent of recreational territories. Recreational territories of the Dzhankoy region of the Crimea are considered the worst in terms of natural and climatic conditions. Approbation of the author's methodological approach is executed on the example of thirteen resort regions of the Crimea with calculation of indicator of gross national income of recreational territories, rent component taking into account coefficient of price rise and net natural rent. The received calculated indicators have allowed to develop classification of recreational territories by the size of a clean natural rent and to carry out their positioning. It has been stated that the cost of rest isn't a limiting factor in adjustment of a number of tourists in the best natural and climatic conditions of recreational territories. Comparison of amount of the economic damage caused to resort recreational territories of the Crimea and a net natural rent has been carried out. It allows to prove the possibility of application of a natural rent as of the economic tool for ensuring process of reproduction of recreational territories.

Methodical Approach to the Rent Considering in the Mineral Resources Evaluation

Movement to the multisectoral economy strengthens the tendencies of development and improvement of rental relations and ways of accounting rent as the assessed value of natural resources. At the same time, objective ecological and economical assessment should provide an adequate share of profit to every participant of development and processing of minerals: to the state and to the region – the administrative unit of RF, as the proprietor of the subsoil and minerals (obviously, this is the absolute rent and differential rent I), to the shareholder or the leaseholder, to the production worker (differential rent II), to the financier (the state, the bank or other legal entity), which have pretensions of the interest.