Aproximaciones al derecho a la verdad en la justicia transicional, en Colombia

Resumen: La configuración de la verdad como el derecho a “saber qué ocurrió”, es uno de los pilares fundamentales del sistema de justicia transicional implementado tras la firma del Acuerdo Final de Paz entre el Gobierno colombiano y las FARC-EP. En la verdad se ha depositado parte im- portante de la esperanza por la construcción de una paz estable y duradera, y de la reconciliación en el país. En el presente artículo se sostiene que el derecho a la verdad en el funcionamiento del Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición (sIvJRnR) se experimenta como una construcción ética, jurídica, política y fáctica, que se desarrolla en el marco de un proceso relacional, multidireccional y polifónico, que va cambiando, modificándose y perfeccionándose en el tiempo, y puede pasar, según las necesidades y problemas a resolver, de tener un carácter puramente instrumental y racional, a uno ampliamente axiológico y moral. Para ello, se presenta una propuesta de operacionalización de esta verdad en respuesta a interrogantes sobre su com- prensión: ¿Qué? ¿Cómo? ¿Para qué? ¿Cuándo? y ¿Quién? Approaches to the Right to Truth in Transitional Justice in Colombia Abstract: The truth’s configuration as the right to “know what happened” has become one of the fundamental pillars of the transitional justice system implemented after signing the Final Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP. Thus, in truth, lays the hope for building a stable and lasting peace and reconciliation in the country. This article sustains that the right to the truth in the operation of the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition (sIvJRnR) is experienced as an ethical, legal, political and factual construction that is developed within the framework of a relational, multidirectional and polyphonic process. This construction is changing, modifying and improving through time and can go, depending on the needs and problems to be solved, from having a purely instrumental and rational character to a broadly axiological and moral one. To this end, a proposal for operationalisation of this truth is presented in response to questions about its understanding: What? How? Why? When? and Who? Keywords: Truth, Transitional Justice, Final Agreement, SIVJRNR

If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.

ARE YOU SERIOUS? ANALYSING EXAGGERATION IN RICHARD AYRES'S NO. 37B

ABSTRACTExaggeration as a deliberate aesthetic device has seen increased popularity with composers working in the western art music tradition in the last few decades. Their music promotes a feeling of excessiveness as an intentional compositional effect, worthy of being taken seriously. This would seem to encourage the development of analytical techniques for understanding how it works, but almost by definition exaggeration tends to be resistant to analysis, its transgressive, anti-rational character appearing incompatible with the systematic approaches associated with this discipline. This article analyses the forms of exaggeration employed in Richard Ayres's orchestral piece No. 37b (2006) and the techniques used to achieve them, developing a framework for how we might attempt to analyse exaggeration in a manner that is rigorous but sensitive to the nature of musical exaggeration. The article finishes by making the case for how exaggeration can be interpreted as sincere as well as ironic and why deliberate exaggeration has become an appropriate and attractive device for composers in the last few decades

Relevance of Max Weber’s Rational Bureaucratic Organizations in Modern Society

Despite evolution of management thought, Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy continues to be a classical theory whose prescriptive elements guide the nature of organizations and their structures and processes. In the wake of information, communication and technological revolution which is reshaping the structure and processes in modern day organizations, the paper re-examines the basic premises and constructs of Max Weber’s rational bureaucratic organizations and their relevance today. Weber’s contribution to social sciences in general and organization studies in particular, is both methodological as well as empirical. The paper discusses the context in which Max Weber originally propounded his theory. In so doing, the paper also draws similarities of his theory with that proposed by other management thinkers of his time. Few examples of modern-day organizations and also different cross-national contexts are examined to discuss the present-day relevance of Weber’s postulates. It is suggested that despite the ever-present portents of its demise, bureaucracy will continue to guide the dominant form of organizations in the near future because of its inherent rational character.

History, Idealism, and Schelling

This chapter places Schelling’s philosophy in the context of the general historical turn of German Idealism. It notes the many phases of Schelling’s career and his move from an early highly systematic approach that stresses the non-scientific character of history, toward a later more aesthetic and nuanced teleological approach that shows an appreciation for history, including religion and mythology, precisely because of its open and not entirely rational character. Following the interpretation of Odo Marquard and Dieter Jähnig, the chapter argues for the continuing relevance of Schelling’s philosophical notion of history, and also explains how its idealism in no way undermines its basically objective orientation.

Motive or Reason in Criminal Law

Guilt often encompasses volitional and intellectual mental processes and only in rare cases it will include affective processes. The motive and purpose are certain mental processes which the legislator sometimes introduces in the content of the offenses. The motive is the psychological causal support of human facts. The doctrine currently uses both the term of motive and that of reason, but the Criminal Code uses exclusively the term motive, which better communicates the conscious and rational character of these psychological processes. In the general section of the Criminal Code, mental processes of the motive are common among the general criteria of punishment individualization and also in listing the aggravating circumstances. In the special part of the Criminal Code mental processes of the motive can be found both for typical or special variants and aggravated or qualifying forms of certain crimes. Motive can be expressed explicitly by equivalent terms or by an implied manner, which entails the need for interpretation of the text.

GRADED UNIPOTENT GROUPS AND GROSSHANS THEORY

Let $U$ be a unipotent group which is graded in the sense that it has an extension $H$ by the multiplicative group of the complex numbers such that all the weights of the adjoint action on the Lie algebra of $U$ are strictly positive. We study embeddings of $H$ in a general linear group $G$ which possess Grosshans-like properties. More precisely, suppose $H$ acts on a projective variety $X$ and its action extends to an action of $G$ which is linear with respect to an ample line bundle on $X$. Then, provided that we are willing to twist the linearization of the action of $H$ by a suitable (rational) character of $H$, we find that the $H$-invariants form a finitely generated algebra and hence define a projective variety $X/\!/H$; moreover, the natural morphism from the semistable locus in $X$ to $X/\!/H$ is surjective, and semistable points in $X$ are identified in $X/\!/H$ if and only if the closures of their $H$-orbits meet in the semistable locus. A similar result applies when we replace $X$ by its product with the projective line; this gives us a projective completion of a geometric quotient of a $U$-invariant open subset of $X$ by the action of the unipotent group $U$.

The (Ir)rationality of Torah

This chapter continues to explore the rabbinic conception of Mosaic Law in an attempt to discern the extent to which and the manner in which that conception may have been informed by Greco-Roman discourses of natural law and positive law. Because the primary discourses of natural law in the Greco-Roman tradition underscore the rational character of the law, it takes up the question of the rationality of the Mosaic Law as represented by the rabbis. The chapter examines rabbinic sources that shed light on a constellation of questions that address the matter of the Law's essential rationality: Is the Law depicted as rational in the sense that it is not arbitrary and contains no contradiction or absurdity, no illogical or paradoxical claim, or does it defy logic and natural reason? Is it depicted as possessing intrinsic rationales or only an extrinsic utility of some kind? Is the Mosaic Law represented as rationally accessible or inaccessible? And does it derive its authority from its rational character or from a coercive sovereign will?

Autonomy of Schools and Quality of Education in Lithuania

This article discusses the relationship between autonomy of schools and quality of education. The results of the Lithuanian students who participated in the international PISA 2012 study were officially announced by the end of 2013. According to the presented report, they were rather mediocre. Lithuanian 15 year-old students were 30th in science, 37th in mathematics and 39th in reading among the 65 countries and territories which participated in the study. Countries and territories of South East Asia – Shanghai, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore – were on the top of the ratings. On the other hand, among the European nations the two Nordic countries – Finland and Estonia – seemed to show the best results. Some authors tend to explain the success of these countries by indicating the rational character of the Nordic people or the successful implementation of the welfare state model. However, other Nordic countries – Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland – showed results similar to those of Lithuania. A number of other authors, e. g., Pasi Sahlberg, claim that the outstanding results of Finland were achieved due to the high professionalism of teachers and wide autonomy of the Finnish schools. In many aspects Estonia follows the Finnish example, in particular, by ensuring the wider autonomy of schools. However,in Lithuania, according to our judgment, situation is rather different. The opinion surveys of school principals conducted in 1996, 2001 and 2009 show that majority of secondary heads consider Lithuanian education system as being too much centralized and think that school leaders should gain more decision-making powers. Analysis of key national educational documents, e. g. Education Acts and long-term educational strategies, show that there are no observable tendencies of striving towards greater autonomy of schools. If the assumption that greater school autonomy leads to a better quality of education is true, Lithuania has no reason to expect any major improvement in student achievements in the nearest future.

Forms of saturation: Discrete and continuous events in architectural design

This essay addresses the opportunities and limits of architectural design at the juncture of technology and disciplinary specific developments in architecture. The theoretical model that it develops encapsulates the essences of what it means to work with respectively digital and analogue modeling systems. It poses a release from the continuous crisis of architectural education in coping with the onslaught of the digital. Moreover, it addresses the uncritical obsession that architectural academia has with this technology without relapsing into the various forms of reactionary practices that are currently emerging in the profession as well as the schools. The discussion focuses on systems and regimes of representation within architectural design and production and problematizes the role of digital and computational design procedures with respect to analogue systems of representation, architecture's infinite construction of our physical environment and the inherent limitations of digital systems given their 'rational' character. The essay attempts to address the influence and status of the digital by focusing on an inclusive notion of space. This is both architectural space but also the productive design space in which architects work. In unfolding the argument, three artworks have been discussed and the initial premise for the argument is based on art theory.