Transcending the ethically silent space of New Zealand’s social studies curriculum

<p>This is a largely theoretical thesis about social studies education in New Zealand. Its aim is to consider how learners’ ‘ethical decision-making and action’ (to paraphrase the curriculum) could be better supported by proposing a broad theoretical orientation to this curriculum requirement. It argues that although ethics is central to learners’ lives and to the purposes of social studies education, this has hitherto been minimally communicated and elucidated through New Zealand curriculum documentation. It takes the view that while providing pedagogical guidance to teachers is urgent and vital, theoretical considerations should be a first priority. The thesis begins by offering a partly stipulative definition for ethics and foregrounds the complexities of ethical decision-making and action in our everyday lives and in academic ethics. It then considers the relationship between ethics and the purposes of social studies education, and uses a form of content analysis to describe the curricular meanings that have been implicitly ascribed to ethics over time. It explores how the present New Zealand social studies curriculum is framed theoretically and what could be possible within this framing to better support learners to navigate in their ethical worlds. Three adjustments to the curriculum’s framing are proposed: social studies as issues-based education, as counter-socialisation, and as engagement with the philosophy of ethics. These are defended as a matter of social justice, and on the basis of their contribution to a range of social studies outcomes. The thesis then considers the theoretical underpinnings of these proposed adjustments in greater depth. It explores whether an ethically reflexive orientation would better support social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action, through three analytic moves: charting reflexivity’s tropes in the social sciences and social theory literature, developing an understanding of ethical reflexivity, and questioning the work this concept could do in social studies education. The thesis argues that an ethically reflexive orientation is a theoretical space in the literature worthy of attention, not least because it maps onto the contemporary ethical space in which learners find themselves. The considerable challenges ahead for such an orientation are readily acknowledged, but the thesis finds within the literature, and from the perspectives of a small group of social studies teachers and learners, some optimism that a reflexive orientation could transcend the ethically silent space of New Zealand social studies education.</p>

Transcending the ethically silent space of New Zealand’s social studies curriculum

<p>This is a largely theoretical thesis about social studies education in New Zealand. Its aim is to consider how learners’ ‘ethical decision-making and action’ (to paraphrase the curriculum) could be better supported by proposing a broad theoretical orientation to this curriculum requirement. It argues that although ethics is central to learners’ lives and to the purposes of social studies education, this has hitherto been minimally communicated and elucidated through New Zealand curriculum documentation. It takes the view that while providing pedagogical guidance to teachers is urgent and vital, theoretical considerations should be a first priority. The thesis begins by offering a partly stipulative definition for ethics and foregrounds the complexities of ethical decision-making and action in our everyday lives and in academic ethics. It then considers the relationship between ethics and the purposes of social studies education, and uses a form of content analysis to describe the curricular meanings that have been implicitly ascribed to ethics over time. It explores how the present New Zealand social studies curriculum is framed theoretically and what could be possible within this framing to better support learners to navigate in their ethical worlds. Three adjustments to the curriculum’s framing are proposed: social studies as issues-based education, as counter-socialisation, and as engagement with the philosophy of ethics. These are defended as a matter of social justice, and on the basis of their contribution to a range of social studies outcomes. The thesis then considers the theoretical underpinnings of these proposed adjustments in greater depth. It explores whether an ethically reflexive orientation would better support social studies learners’ ethical decision-making and action, through three analytic moves: charting reflexivity’s tropes in the social sciences and social theory literature, developing an understanding of ethical reflexivity, and questioning the work this concept could do in social studies education. The thesis argues that an ethically reflexive orientation is a theoretical space in the literature worthy of attention, not least because it maps onto the contemporary ethical space in which learners find themselves. The considerable challenges ahead for such an orientation are readily acknowledged, but the thesis finds within the literature, and from the perspectives of a small group of social studies teachers and learners, some optimism that a reflexive orientation could transcend the ethically silent space of New Zealand social studies education.</p>

Toward a Volitional Definition of Religion

This article advocates for the production of stipulative definitions of religion, a type of nominal definition that articulates new ways of applying a word to a thing. I propose that scholars look to sites where phenomena historically have been labeled “religion” on lexical or real understandings of the term, this to query how religious agents there chose, implicitly or explicitly, to systematize thought, speech, emotion, and action. Such self-consciously ordered systems, I argue, may properly be labeled “religion.” Next, I apply this method to premodern South Asia, suggesting “religion” refers to the second-order structuring there that links normative social relations to normative states of subjectivity, any innovation in the one demanding innovation in the other. I conclude by inviting other efforts at stipulative definition, all with an eye toward an inductive approach, allowing that the myriad locations of religion present mutually distinguishable systems that may all properly be so labeled.

Essence and Definition by Abstraction

We may define words. We may also define the things for which words stand. Definitions of words may be explicit or implicit, and may seek to report pre-existing synonymies, but they may instead be wholly or partly stipulative. Definition by abstraction seeks to define a term-forming operator by fixing the truth-conditions of identity-statements featuring terms formed by means of that operator. Such definitions are a species of implicit definition. They are typically at least partly stipulative. Definitions of things (real definitions) are typically conceived as statements about the essence of their definienda, and so not stipulative. There thus appears to be a clash between taking Hume's principle as an implicit, at least partly stipulative definition of the number operator and as a real definition of cardinal numbers. This chapter argues that this apparent tension can be resolved, and that resolving it shows how some modal knowledge can be a priori.

Décomposer les humanités numériques

The definition of the digital humanities has been a matter of heated discussion ever since the introduction of the term, earning the field the dubious reputation of being undefinable. While some seem to take pride in this reputation, the absence of a coherent definition frequently sparks off acrimonious criticism and debates. More importantly, though, it increasingly becomes a liability in the context of the progressive institutionalization of the digital humanities. Rather than vainly trying to find a definition of digital humanities that is at the same time descriptive and rigorous, we propose a stipulative definition that separates them into theoretical and applied digital humanities: the theoretical digital humanities are the metascientific discipline whose goal is the conception of formal methods that the applied digital humanities use to create formal models in the various humanities disciplines.

On the use of definitions in sociology

Definitions may seem marginal to the sociological enterprise but can be very useful; however, they can also lead to serious errors. Examples of both are given in this article. Different types of definitions are presented, and their relevance for sociology is highlighted. A stipulative definition, for example, is very useful in sociology, as opposed to lexical and ostensive definitions. The definition of a concept that is used in a sociological analysis has to be sociological in nature, and the concept cannot have the same meaning as it has in everyday language. Additional items to bear in mind when a definition is put together are discussed, including some tips on how to proceed that come from political science (Sartori, Collier, Goertz). A definition can also be very helpful in the research process itself by indicating which are the important aspects of some phenomenon to focus on (Weber, Blumer). On the negative side, a term that is not properly defined may lead to misunderstandings as well as to a false sense of agreement with other uses of the term.

The Definition of a Legal Dilemma

The first part answers the book’s first question: ‘What is a Legal Dilemma?’ It frames the book’s analysis by offering a stipulative definition of the term legal dilemma and its constitutive components as a term of art. Once defined, the term will then be distinguished from numerous related concepts (Section A), such as legal gaps, disagreements, or paradoxes. The first part also considers various circumstances, including international law’s non-hierarchical nature and fragmentation, which increase the potential frequency with which dilemmas may arise (Section B). Finally, this part introduces a distinction between dilemmas responding to epistemic undecidability and to metaphysical undecidability (Section C).

The Possibility of a Legal Dilemma

The second part validates the stipulative definition of Part I by identifying those norm conflicts which contemporary international law cannot satisfactorily resolve. In doing so, this part answers the second research question—whether legal dilemmas could exist in international law—in the affirmative and demarcates the doctrinal space that legal dilemmas occupy. The argument develops in three sections. The first section identifies the inherent limitations of norm conflict resolution devices. Norm conflict resolution devices deal with a norm conflict by establishing a hierarchy or a compromise between norms. They thereby identify a course of action that avoids impairing either norm unduly. The second section considers the limitation of norm conflict accommodation devices. The third section explains why measures of last resort do not preclude the possibility of the existence of legal dilemmas.

What are Emotions? Structure and Function of Emotions

This paper attempts to coin a stipulative definition of “emotions” to determine their functions. In this sense, “emotion” is a complex phenomenon consisting of an accurate (reliable) determination of the state of affairs in relation to the state of the subject and specific “points of adaptation”. Apart from the cognitive aspect, this phenomenon also includes behavior, physiological changes and expressions (facial expression, voice, posture), feelings, and “execution” of emotions in the nervous system. Emotions fulfill informative, calibrating, identifying, existential, and motivating functions. Emotions capture the world as either positive or negative, important or unimportant, and are used to determine and assign weightings (to set up a kind of hierarchy). They emerge automatically (involuntarily), are difficult (or hardly possible) to control and are (to some extent) influenced by culture.

Political participation and commons

Purpose – The crisis of confidence in political institutions has become a phenomenon with uniform trends across Europe. Nevertheless, citizens still express interest in politics and are engaged in political and social activities. What are the issues that still motivate them to go to the polls and/or engage in non-institutional forms of political participation? The case study of the Italian referendum in favour of the “Water Common Good” (June 2011) is particularly appropriate to explore these issues and motivations. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – The paper proposes a multidisciplinary common good’s framework focusing on its social and political challenges. As the referendum succeeded also thanks to the rhetorical effectiveness of the “common good” epithet, a survey on 120 Roman citizens who voted in favour of the “Water Common Good” was conducted. The hypothesis was that the referendum success could be associated with social needs to defend strategic resources (“commons”) by actively participating in the deliberations on them. A quantitative non-probabilistic research was carried out face-to-face, through a standardized and semi-structured questionnaire. Findings – The main findings refer to the leading role that distrust in political institutions, civil society activism and common good rhetorical effectiveness played. Originality/value – The most original contribution of this paper is the explanatory and stipulative definition of common good, which reduces the semantic uncertainty of the concept including common sense meanings. This novel conceptualization has practical implications in policy terms, as it explicates the social need to change the way of conceiving the relationship with strategic resources and decision-making processes concerning them.