scholarly journals If you've earned it, you deserve it: ultimatums, with Lego

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Adam Oliver
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Policy Design ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Individual Decision Making ◽  
Design And Implementation ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Common Observation

Abstract The ultimatum and dictator games were developed to help identify the fundamental motivators of human behavior, typically by asking participants to share windfall endowments with other persons. In the ultimatum game, a common observation is that proposers offer, and responders refuse to accept, a much larger share of the endowment than is predicted by rational choice theory. However, in the real world, windfalls are rare: money is usually earned. I report here a small study aimed at testing how participants react to an ultimatum game after they have earned their endowments by either building a Lego model or spending some time sorting out screws by their length. I find that the shares that proposers offer and responders accept are significantly lower than that typically observed with windfall money, an observation that is intensified when the task undertaken to earn the endowment is generally less enjoyable and thus perhaps more effortful (i.e., screw sorting compared to Lego building). I suggest, therefore, that considerations of effort-based desert are often important drivers behind individual decision-making, and that laboratory experiments, if intended to inform public policy design and implementation, ought to mirror the broad characteristics of the realities that people face.

scholarly journals Reflecting on reflection: prospect theory, our behaviors, and our environment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Adam Oliver
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Policy Design ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Ecological Perspective ◽  
Individual Risk ◽  
Reflection Effect ◽  
Life Years

Abstract In a previously published article, I reported some tests of prospect theory's reflection effect over outcomes defined by money and life years gained from treatment. Those results suggested qualified support for the reflection effect over money outcomes and strong support over longevity outcomes. This article reruns those tests while accounting for the intensity of individual risk attitudes, and, overall, show consistency with the reflection effect. However, I argue that these results do not necessarily offer support for the explanatory power of prospect theory. Rather, the results may be driven by evolved responses to circumstances that provoke perceptions of scarcity and abundance. Therefore, from an ecological perspective, behavioral patterns such as those that are consistent with the reflection effect, which, by extension, tend to be considered as erroneous or biased by most behavioral economists because they conflict with the postulates of rational choice theory, may not be unreasonable. Recognizing as such is important when considering how behavioral insights ought to inform public policy design and implementation.

scholarly journals Social Preferences and Environmental Behavior: A Comparison of Self-Reported and Observed Behaviors

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (15) ◽  
pp. 6023
Author(s):  
Zachary Oliphant ◽  
Chae M. Jaynes ◽  
Richard K. Moule Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Environmental Behavior ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Environmental Behaviors ◽  
Environmentally Conscious ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Recycling Behavior

Faced with the depletion of natural resources and climate change, individuals making the choice to behave in a more environmentally conscious way is increasingly necessary. Rational choice theory suggests that individuals will only behave in pro-environmental ways if they perceive those actions to align with their own self-interests. Others, however, have highlighted instances where individuals act pro-socially or altruistically, deviating from their own self-interests for the benefit of others. The present study examines whether individuals’ social preferences are associated with engagement in pro-environmental behaviors. Specifically, drawing on a methodology from behavioral economics, we use dictator and ultimatum game behavior to measure social preferences, and we then evaluate whether heterogeneity in social preferences is associated with self-reported pro-environmental behaviors and observed recycling behavior. The results indicate that individual differences in social preferences have a modest association with self-reported pro-environmental behaviors but no association with observed recycling behavior. Self-reported pro-environmental behavior was not associated with observed recycling behavior. We also find that recycling bin proximity to classroom doors increased participation in recycling. This finding demonstrates that individuals are receptive to the proximate opportunity to recycle. This suggests increasing the ease with which people can engage in pro-environmental behaviors, such as recycling, will promote participation in these practices. Overall, our research indicates that social preferences do not seem to drive individuals to act in environmentally friendly ways. This work also provides new opportunities for future research to integrate economic games into the study of pro-environmental behaviors.

Toward a theory of behavioral public administration

2018 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Oliver Kasdan
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Public Administration ◽  
Public Service ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Policy Design ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Herbert Simon ◽  
Policy Compliance ◽  
Design And Implementation ◽  
Alternative Approaches

The connection between public administration and behavioral economics goes back to Herbert Simon, who recognized the tension between the institutional demands of rational efficiency and the reality of individuals’ alternate objectives. There is now a concentrated research push at the intersection of behavioral economics and governance, following recently publicized evidence of favorable synergies. Public administration can use behavioral economics in a variety of implementations, from boosting public service motivation to improving policy compliance. This article reviews the current discourse on the development of behavioral public administration, describes some dominant concepts currently being applied, and then offers a framework with propositions for a theory of behavioral public administration in order to enable further experimental inquiry and inform better governance. Points for practitioners Behavioral public administration is a developing theory that may enable practitioners to employ alternative approaches to policy design and implementation. Using concepts of behavioral economics that describe individual decision-making with alternative objectives to traditional utility maximization, behavioral public administration shifts the reliance on traditional causal models away from rational ideals and toward actual behaviors that inhabit empirically evident biases.

scholarly journals Altruism, Noise, and the Paradox of Voter Turnout: An Experimental Study

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Sarah A. Tulman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Experimental Study ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Participation Rates ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Voting Participation

This paper addresses the paradox of voter turnout, wherein observed voting participation rates are far greater than what rational choice theory would predict. Voters face multiple voting choices, stochastic voting costs, and candidates offering different economic platforms. A combination of two approaches attempts to resolve this paradox: quantal response equilibrium (QRE) analysis, which introduces noise into the decision-making process, and the possibility of ethical (altruism-motivated) voting. A series of laboratory experiments empirically tests the predictions of the resulting model. Participants in the experiments are also given opportunities for communicating online with their immediate neighbors, in order to enhance the chances that subjects would realize the possibility of ethical voting. The results show that ethical voting occurs but gains momentum only in the presence of a vocal advocate and even then it mostly dissipated by the second half of the session. The QRE-based model was able to explain some but not all of the overvoting that was observed, relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction. There is evidence to suggest that communication via the chat feature generated some of the voting and also some of the ethical voting.

Rational Choice Theory and the 1990 Party Merger in South Korea

OUGHTOPIA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-282
Author(s):  
In-Kyun Kim ◽  
Myeong-Geon Koh
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory

Minimizing Missed Opportunities: Modeling Relationships between the State and Business in Russia

2009 ◽  
pp. 42-61
Author(s):  
A. Oleynik
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Common Good ◽  
The State ◽  
Power Relationships ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Missed Opportunities ◽  
Power Domination ◽  
Individual Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Outcomes

Power involves a number of models of choice: maximizing, satisficing, coercion, and minimizing missed opportunities. The latter is explored in detail and linked to a particular type of power, domination by virtue of a constellation of interests. It is shown that domination by virtue of a constellation of interests calls for justification through references to a common good, i.e. a rent to be shared between Principal and Agent. Two sources of sub-optimal outcomes are compared: individual decision-making and interactions. Interactions organized in the form of power relationships lead to sub-optimal outcomes for at least one side, Agent. Some empirical evidence from Russia is provided for illustrative purposes.

POLITICS-LAW CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE? 'SMALL' POLITICAL PARTIES, REALPOLITIKAND SOUTH AFRICA'S 20 YEARS OF DEMOCRACY

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kealeboga J Maphunye
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Democratic Consolidation ◽  
Secondary Research ◽  
Extant Literature ◽  
African Charter

This article examines South Africa's 20-year democracy by contextualising the roles of the 'small' political parties that contested South Africa's 2014 elections. Through the  prism  of South  Africa's  Constitution,  electoral legislation  and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it examines these parties' roles in South Africa's democratisation; their influence,  if any, in parliament, and whether they play any role in South Africa's continental or international engagements. Based on a review of the extant literature, official documents,  legislation, media, secondary research, reports and the results of South Africa's elections, the article relies on game theory, rational choice theory and theories of democracy and democratic consolidation to examine 'small' political parties' roles in the country's political and legal systems. It concludes that the roles of 'small' parties in governance and democracy deserve greater recognition than is currently the case, but acknowledges the extreme difficulty experienced by the 'small'  parties in playing a significant role in democratic consolidation, given their formidable opponent in a one-party dominant system.

Nuclear Weapons, South Asia and Morality

Think India ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 535-546
Author(s):  
ABHISHEK CHOUDHARY
Keyword(s):  
South Asia ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Moral Perspective ◽  
The Us ◽  
Positive Duties ◽  
Nuclear Development ◽  
Asian Context

The paper analyses the concerns arising from a moral perspective in the context of a renewed arms race in South Asia. It challenges the idea that possession of nuclear power could in any way contribute to any sort of balance. The emulation of so-called great powers and expecting that balance would arrive as it did in the case of the US and the erstwhile-USSR during cold war is detrimental to the temporal and spatial uniqueness of South Asia. Deterrence, based on rational choice theory, does not apply to the South Asian context due to ambiguity owing to mutual mistrust especially in the case of India and Pakistan. Also, it no longer only sates that are sole actors in the international arena. One cannot expect the non-state actors to behave in a rational manner. Furthermore, the idea of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ itself is questionable as it is a flexible posture adjusted to relative prowess and ambiguity in policy further aggravates the situation. The paper argues from a consequentialist notion of ethics and argues that the principles of harm and equity ought be part of nuclear decision-making. Another aspect that the paper uncovers relates to the ‘reification’ of nuclear power. Using a neo-Marxist framework and concept of Lukács, the paper argues that it is no longer the state as a repository of power that decides the trajectory of nuclear development. Rather the nuclear technology has started to dictate the way states are looking at regional and international relations. This inverted relationship has been created due to neglect of any ethical toolkit. The paper thus proposes an ethical toolkit that focuses on the negative duties of not to harm and also the positive duties to create conditions that would avoid harm being done to people.

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