Reproducing Populism

2021 ◽  
pp. 179-206
Author(s):  
Julio F. Carrión

This chapter discusses the third mechanism populist presidents use to reproduce their power: the tilting of the electoral playing field. The chapter shows the centrality of free and fair elections in defining democracy. It then identifies and discusses the main characteristics of democratic elections. The remainder of the chapter shows how unconstrained populist presidents violate four central conditions of free and fair elections: the free formation of alternatives, the free formation of preferences, the freedom to express these preferences, and the neutral management of elections. The chapter argues that the illegal enabling of reelection and the elimination of term limits violate the free formation of alternatives; the restriction of political and civil liberties and unfair access to media undermine the free formation of preferences; voter intimidations and vote buying violate the freedom to express those preferences; and electoral fraud and institutional biases negate the neutral management of elections.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Tofigh Maboudi ◽  
Ghazal P. Nadi ◽  
Todd A. Eisenstadt

Abstract Since the third wave of democracy, term limits have become a popular fixture of most constitutions intended to constrain the executive. Yet, recent constitutional reforms around the world show that presidents seeking re-election sometimes overturn the entire constitutional order to extend their power. What is the impact of these constitutional manipulations on the longevity of the executive in office? Using survival analysis of all political leaders and national constitutions from 1875 to 2015, this article demonstrates, for the first time, that when ‘authoritarian-aspiring’ presidents remove constitutional term limits, they increase their stay in office by more than 40%. Our findings contrast with a widely held position in the comparative authoritarian literature suggesting that dictators survive longer under institutional constraints. On the contrary, we argue that by removing constitutional barriers, rulers consolidate more power at the expense of their most ambitious allies and can stay in power longer.


Author(s):  
O. V. Varentsova

Contemporary political regimes in Venezuela and Bolivia led by late Hugo Châvez (now by his successor Nicolas Maduro) and Evo Morales are considered by foreign and Russian scholars as part of the third wave of populism. In the 20th century Latin America already witnessed two waves of populism which coincided with significant political transitions, namely a transition from oligarchy to mass politics accompanied by implementation of import substitution industrialization policies, and a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy during the third wave of democratization which triggered neoliberal reforms inspired by Washington Consensus. This article presents common characteristics of Latin American populist regimes that emerged in different historical periods which help identify the origins as well as distinctive features of Venezuelan and Bolivian political regimes. It is stated that the Châvez and Morales left populist regimes resemble classic populist regimes in that they rely on incendiary anti-establishment discourse. Therefore, left populist regimes are characterized by high levels of polarization as well as weak institutionalization and class or indigenous orientation. Election of left populist leaders may lead to institutional deadlock, uneven playing field and transition to competitive authoritarianism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-26
Author(s):  
William E. Pomeranz

Abstract Constitutional reform dominated Russia’s legal and political agenda in 2020. Starting with Putin’s January 15, 2020 state-of-the-nation address, the 1993 Yeltsin constitution was amended and substantially transformed to meet Putin’s immediate and more long-term political objectives. In the process a flawed but forward-looking document has been stripped of much of its liberal potential and instead been converted into a more traditional top-down system of governance. Putin did not just overturn the term limits on his presidency. He created a new power vertical (the unified system of public power), a stronger presidency, and a more subservient judiciary. Moreover, Putin’s amendments undermine the constitution’s internal consistency by introducing numerous contradictions into Russia’s founding law. In particular, while technically observing the constitution’s procedural requirements, he managed to downgrade Russia’s civil liberties—the highest value under the 1993 constitution—while elevating and expanding Russia’s social rights.


Author(s):  
Leiv Marsteintredet

Latin America holds a 200-year-long history of presidential constitutions. The region’s constitutional and democratic experimentation throughout history makes it an interesting laboratory to study the origins, development, and effects of presidential term limits. Based primarily on data from constitutions, this chapter provides an overview of presidential term limits in Latin America from independence until 1985. The chapter shows how term limits have varied across countries and time, and that the implementation of strict term limits often came as a reaction to prior dictatorial rules. Whereas both proponents and critics of consecutive reelection invoked arguments of democracy in their favour, the Latin American experience up until the Third Wave of Democracy shows that stable, republican, and democratic rule has only been possible under a ban on immediate presidential re-election.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 358-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Pevnick

Many argue that an important goal of campaign finance reform should be to ensure that competing candidates have roughly equal financial resources with which to contest campaigns. Although there are very important reasons to worry about the role that money has come to play in many democracies, this article argues in three main steps that this particular position lacks compelling justification. First, while advocates of such positions often rely on an analogy with much smaller deliberative settings to defend the view that advocates of competing perspectives should be given equal resources, there are differences between such settings and campaigns that undermine the analogy’s appeal. Second, independent arguments – connected to the importance of ensuring that the wealthy do not dominate public debate and preventing corruption – may speak strongly in favor of a generous system of public funding, but fail to provide reason to ensure that advocates of competing positions have access to equal resources. Third, it is impossible to meaningfully level the playing field without objectionably restricting civil liberties. An implication of these arguments is that common criticisms of voucher-based systems of public funding, which hinge on an implicit commitment to the importance of a level playing field, fail.


Author(s):  
І. В. Застава

Considered political indicators as a tool for measuring democracy. Special attention is paid to the methodological aspects of the formation of such indicators, in particular, checking whether indicators are an effective tool for measuring democracy. The main theoretical approaches to the definition of indicators of democracy are highlighted. Indicators of democracy make it possible to track which transformational-democratic processes are taking place in a particular state or in a region. It is determined that the basic indicators of democracy are competition and participation. The democracy index measures the level of democracy within the state and is based on the methodology of expert assessments and the results of public opinion polls from the respective countries, characterizing the state of 60 key indicators grouped into five main categories: electoral process and pluralism, government activity, political participation, political culture, civil liberties. Having systematized methodological approaches to indexing democracy, two things become apparent: firstly, the inherent connection is clearly traceable elections and democracy, because there is no scientific one project or approach to calculate democratic regime, which would not include Institute for Election to Level Measurement democracy; and secondly, a formalized approach to Democracy makes it possible to assume that it is itself The election institution is also subject to numerical measurement, so we can try to construct a methodology for calculating the index of democratic elections In this case, you can develop a model democratic elections as an important component of the democratic regime in general. The index of the institutional foundations of democracy determines the extent of the development of conditions conducive to the democratic attraction of citizens to the political sphere of society.


Author(s):  
James Christensen

Here our focus shifts from the burdens of trade to its benefits. The trade regime provides its members with opportunities to access the markets of others, and this chapter addresses the claim that the distribution of these opportunities should be regulated by a principle of ‘formal equality’, according to which all states are to receive and offer equal, or uniform, treatment (e.g., by matching the market liberalization efforts of others). The first section of the chapter explicates the idea of formal equality and its rationales, identifies a number of positive arguments for departing from formal equality, and rebuts several objections to granting ‘special and differential treatment’ to developing countries. The second section analyses one specific element of formal equality in the trade regime, namely, the principle of reciprocity. The third section considers the claim that without policy ‘harmonization’, market access will be impeded by a slanted playing field.


2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-126
Author(s):  
K. STEVEN VINCENT

The history of French liberalism is undergoing a renaissance. For much of the twentieth century, it was viewed with disdain, as insufficiently “engaged,” as too tentative in its demands for social reform, as overly optimistic concerning the progress of reason and science. Scholarship during the past three decades has challenged these views, though it is notable that there is still, to my knowledge, no general history of French liberalism that goes past the consolidation of the Third Republic in the late 1870s. Part of the ongoing reassessment has been the consequence of the decline of revolutionary illusions and of marxisant frameworks of analysis following 1968, reinforced by the more general decline of the left following the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. Another element contributing to this reassessment has been the emergence of more nuanced definitions of “liberalism,” ones that are not limited to legal (civil liberties), political (constitutionalism), and/or economic (free trade) dimensions. Equally important, scholars are insisting, are conceptions of science, of religion, of the role of the state, of solidarity, of sociability, of moeurs, of identity, of gender, of the self.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chan Wook Park

Although Korea has made significant strides to strengthen its democratic system since the successful transition in the late 1980s as part of the “third wave” of global democratization, a look into the process of making budgetary policy in the National Assembly would suggest that Korean democracy is far from consolidation. Korean politics has shed itself for the most part of its authoritarian past, when the military was the main conduit of action and oppression. The principle of free, regular, and fair competition has taken root as the procedural norm in both national and local elections. Korean citizens enjoy civil liberties to a degree unprecedented in the authoritarian era, and civil society transformed into an increasingly open, transparent, and pluralistic field of political action.


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