Alternative To Development of Tourist Attraction with Public Private Partnership Scheme in Magelang Regency

This study aims to see how the condition of the object/Tourist Attraction (TA) in Magelang Regency in Indonesia and its alternative development. This research uses a descriptive qualitative approach with case studies of 31 tourism objects which will then be investigated regarding their conditions and possible future developments. Research data were obtained by direct observation of the location of tourist objects and through semi-structured interviews. The results of this study illustrate that tourism objects in Magelang Regency are currently quite developed. However, this has not been able to attract general tourists to linger in the regency and provided an optimal contribution to regional income. This is because tourism objects in the regency other than Borobudur Temple have not been maximized for their existence and utilization. The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme model can be an alternative to be applied in developing tourism objects accompanied by an appropriate Value for Money (VfM) analysis. Tourism objects in the form of cultural heritage can be developed through concession contracts, natural beauty can be developed through management contracts, and artificial objects can be developed through service contracts while taking into account the development needs of each tourism object. Local governments need to establish cooperation with the private sector with a Public-Private Partnership scheme accompanied by the preparation of strict regulations so that the implementation of cooperation in the context of developing tourism objects in the Magelang Regency can bring optimal benefits to all parties.

The Case of the Chelsea Grand: Card-Check Neutrality, Management Contracts, and The Duties of Owners and Operators

This article examines the dispute between a hotel owner, operator, and union, and the subsequent litigation. The dispute centered on whether the hotel owner was bound by agreements made between its operator and the union, and whether the operator had a fiduciary duty to the owner. Courts found that the operator was a joint employer of the owner’s employees, and as a result, the owner was bound to agreements that the operator had made with the union. The owner, who did not want to be bound to the union agreement, subsequently sued its operator for alleged breach of fiduciary responsibility. The courts ruled that the hotel management agreement between the owner and operator created no agency relationship and thus no fiduciary duty on the part of the operator. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for union-management relations as well as owner-operator relations, with a specific focus on the implications for hotel owners in the labor context.

Public financing versus private billing in a public hospital under management of a Social Health Organization

ABSTRACT Introduction: to assess the efficiency of management by a Social Health Organization (Organização Social de Saúde - OSS) compared with the private sector; to verify if there are savings for the State Health Secretariat (SES) in management contracts for financing the production of a public hospital versus its production values billed by private methods; and to establish if the amounts billed by the Unified Health System (SUS) table would finance the same procedures. Methods: we compiled and tabulated all procedures performed and the materials and drugs dispensed in the Euryclides Jesus Zerbini Transplant Hospital (HTEJZ), managed by the OSS Associação Paulista Para o Desenvolvimento da Medicina (SPDM), in September, October, and November 2018, according to the Brasíndice® table for drugs, the Simpro® table for materials, the CBHPM® table for medical fees, and tables SIGTAP SUS and SIA SUS. We then compared the average values obtained in the private billing with the costing amount reimbursed by the State Health Secretariat and the billing calculated in the SIA-SUS. Results: the average SUS revenue was R$ 2,774,086.91; the monthly reimbursement by the SES was R$ 13,055,700.00; and the average private revenue was R$ 25,084,440.31. Conclusions: the management by the OSS SPDM in the Euryclides de Jesus Zerbini Transplant Hospital was more efficient in the financing / production ratio than it would be to a private hospital. The economy of public funds was significant. The current SUS table reimbursement values would not meet the need for funding for an overly complex hospital.

Optimal Asset Management Contracts With Hidden Savings

We characterize optimal asset management contracts in a classic portfolio‐investment setting. When the agent has access to hidden savings, his incentives to misbehave depend on his precautionary saving motive. The contract dynamically distorts the agent's access to capital to manipulate his precautionary saving motive and reduce incentives for misbehavior. We provide a sufficient condition for the validity of the first‐order approach, which holds in the optimal contract: global incentive compatibility is ensured if the agent's precautionary saving motive weakens after bad outcomes. We extend our results to incorporate market risk, hidden investment, and renegotiation.

Outsourced Services, Supervision of Contracts and Labor Liabilities: Case Study UNIR From 2015 to 2019

This article aims to identify the monetary amounts spent by Fundação Universidade Federal de Rondônia (UNIR), with Labor Court due to administrative failures during the supervision of outsourced service contracts. It is a case study, with qualitative research, with documentary analysis of the decisions, sentences and judgments delivered in the processes. After the analysis of 68 (sixty-eight) cases in which UNIR appeared in the passive pole, categories were identified for the classification of the cases. It was found that there was a reduction in the number of lawsuits against UNIR after the Labor Reform and 21 (twenty-one) lawsuits were identified in which UNIR was ordered to pay labor indemnities or the contracted companies signed labor agreements, causing the public agency to be obliged to make payments through Small Value Requests (RPV), or Precatories, deriving from failures in internal controls and management contracts at Fundação Universidade Federal de Rondônia (UNIR).

Trends of commodification in the SUS of the state of São Paulo: territorial analysis of spending on agreements and management contracts with Social Organizations

RESUMO As literaturas nacional e internacional indicam o redimensionamento do setor privado dentro dos sistemas públicos de saúde, com sua ampliação e constituição de novos arranjos. O trabalho objetiva analisar a dinâmica territorial no processo de mercantilização explícita no território do estado de São Paulo, identificando a distribuição espacial de recursos para a gestão privada de instituições públicas e a contratação de instituições sem fins lucrativos para a oferta de serviços. Recorreu-se às informações orçamentárias da Secretaria de Estado da Saúde de São Paulo, no período de 2010 a 2017. A análise dos dados permitiu observar uma participação relevante de despesas com gestão privada de instituições públicas (25,8%) e com contratação de instituições sem fins lucrativos para oferta de serviços (12,0%) nos gastos em saúde do estado, e o aumento real dos gastos em ambas as despesas ao longo do período. A análise territorial demonstrou que a contratação de gestão privada é um fenômeno característico da principal metrópole paulista, enquanto nas demais regiões prevalecem as despesas com contratação de instituições sem fins lucrativos para a oferta de serviços. Observa-se, também, que o estado despende recursos financeiros principalmente para a contratação da gestão dos equipamentos hospitalares, seguido dos ambulatórios.

Unraveling the role of governance mechanisms in online ratings: The case of Spanish chain-affiliated hotels

This article studies how the choice of the mechanism of governance affects online ratings of hotels, empirically exploring the conditions under which various governance mechanisms improve (or damage) them. We emphasize that no governance mode is universally superior. However, when the mechanism of governance fits hotel characteristics, online ratings improve. We argue that such characteristics (i.e., hotel category, size, and age) determine the severity of agency problems (e.g., managerial shirking and free-riding) and the performance of governance choice. We test several organizational fit hypotheses on a data set of 2,328 hotels operating in Spain. Our results support the fit argument, because they show the superiority of franchise and management contracts (i.e., hybrids) for enhancing online ratings, as opposed to vertical integration, when category rises and size increases. Furthermore, we find evidence that maintenance does not appear to be a major problem in leasing. JEL CLASSIFICATION: D23; L25; L83

Case Studies

This chapter presents a series of short case studies of the best-known management contracts for water and electricity services in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The studies attempt to identify projects that successfully met the expectations of a wide variety of key stakeholders. But the review finds very few contracts that have achieved this standard of success. Why have governments, particularly in Africa, been so willing to sign these kinds of contracts, despite their consistently poor performance? Why has that performance not appreciably improved after almost three decades of experimentation? Why do donors, development finance institutions (DFIs), and multilateral development banks (MDBs) continue to promote these mechanisms? What lessons have been learned about the pre-conditions necessary for the conventional management contract model to meet expectations? The case studies in this chapter explore these questions and attempt to identify the factors that make such contracts successful.

Management Contracts

In this chapter the discussion turns to management concessions as they have been used in the water and power sectors of developing countries. Because these arrangements are typically short term and involve little or no private investment, they considerably reduce the normal PPP risks faced by private partners. But despite the seeming potential of such contracts for improving the operational efficiencies of infrastructure service systems, as well as the reduced risks of such projects for private partners, these kinds of private–public partnerships (PPPs) have rarely met the expectations of local stakeholders, especially in the poorest countries. Is this criticism fair, or are the objectives of these contracts misunderstood? Hybrid forms of these contracts seem to be emerging in response to disappointment with traditional models. Will these hybrids be successful in achieving the original aims of management contracts?