Just a Glance, or More? Pathways from Counter-Attitudinal Incidental Exposure to Attitude (De)Polarization Through Response Behaviors and Cognitive Elaboration

Using two-wave U.S. panel survey data, this study proposes a moderated serial mediation model to examine through what paths and under what conditions incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal information on social media would enhance or mitigate polarization. The findings suggest that such exposure can indirectly polarize attitude by eliciting passive scanning behaviors, but it can also indirectly attenuate attitude polarization first through active engagement with the counter-attitudinal information, then through cognitively elaborating on the information. However, the indirect depolarizing effect of incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal information on citizens’ attitude depends on the extent to which they are instrumentally motivated. The indirect effect occurs when an individual’s perceived utility of counter-attitudinal information is at a high and a middle level, but not at a low level. Implications of the findings are discussed.

Wise reasoning, intergroup positivity, and attitude polarization across contexts

We hypothesized that a wisdom-based reasoning process comprised of epistemic humility, accounting for context, and integrating different perspectives and interests, would be helpful in overcoming intergroup bias and attitude polarization in societal conflicts. Here we test the hypothesis using both the Situated Wise Reasoning Scale and experimental induction. In each study, we recruited participants who self-identified as members of a group implicated in an ongoing intergroup situation. In five correlational studies (Studies 1-5) we examined the relations between measured wise reasoning and intergroup positivity and attitude polarization. In two experiments, we tested the effects of a brief online wise-reasoning thought exercise on intergroup positivity and polarization (Studies 6-7), and charitable behaviors to an outgroup (Study 6). We found that wise reasoning relates to more positivity toward outgroups and less attitude polarization across different groups and conflicts. The results have implications for theory and may also have implications for future research on interventions to improve intergroup relations.

Wise reasoning, intergroup positivity, and attitude polarization across contexts

We hypothesized that a wisdom-based reasoning process comprised of epistemic humility, accounting for context, and integrating different perspectives and interests, would be helpful in overcoming intergroup bias and attitude polarization in societal conflicts. Here we test the hypothesis using both the Situated Wise Reasoning Scale and experimental induction. In each study, we recruited participants who self-identified as members of a group implicated in an ongoing intergroup situation. In five correlational studies (Studies 1-5) we examined the relations between measured wise reasoning and intergroup positivity and attitude polarization. In two experiments, we tested the effects of a brief online wise-reasoning thought exercise on intergroup positivity and polarization (Studies 6-7), and charitable behaviors to an outgroup (Study 6). We found that wise reasoning relates to more positivity toward outgroups and less attitude polarization across different groups and conflicts. The results have implications for theory and may also have implications for future research on interventions to improve intergroup relations.

What Information Drives Political Polarization? Comparing the Effects of In-group Praise, Out-group Derogation, and Evidence-based Communications on Polarization

This project differentiates between communication that praises one's political in-group ( in-group praise), attacks the opposition ( out-group derogation), or focuses on policy details ( evidence based), testing their effects on network and attitude polarization. We begin with an agent-based model, which shows that congenial evidence-based exchanges polarize the network and the inclusion of identity-driven communications leads to greater polarization. Once out-group derogation reaches a certain threshold, the network of agents splits into two groups, yet the polarizing effects of in-group praise are yet stronger and emerge more rapidly (i.e., a lower threshold of in-group praise is needed to polarize the network). Using an experimental design on a sample of American partisans, we offer a partial validation of the model. In-group praise and out-group derogation polarize attitudes more than balanced evidence-based news, but not more than congenial evidence-based news. Identity-driven news also has no effects on affective polarization. This multidisciplinary evidence shows that the nature of political content matters.

Can I Stick to My Guns? Motivated Reasoning and Biased Processing of Balanced Political Information

News media offer balanced political messages and many citizens also seek content that presents two sides of a political issue. Despite this supply and demand, most work on information processing tests exposure to one-sided content, i.e., either pro- or counter-attitudinal. We advance this work by studying (1) how balanced and one-sided messages affect information processing; (2) whether the processing of balanced information is moderated by individual motivations; and (3) the impact of balanced exposure on attitude polarization. Using an online experiment (N = 677), we primed either accuracy or defensive motivation and examined how participants processed information about two distinct issues (i.e., climate change and Syrian refugees). On both issues, participants were less biased in response to balanced content, compared to one-sided content. In addition, defensive and accuracy motivated people processed balanced content in a similar manner. Furthermore, pro-attitudinal content polarized individual attitudes, but not balanced content, and this effect was not moderated by motivation.

Maintenance or Change? Examining the Reinforcing Spiral Between Social Media News Use and Populist Attitudes

Citizens around the world increasingly express support for populism. Here, we apply the reinforcing spirals model to examine whether, and how, social media news use shapes populist attitudes over time. Specifically, we assess if using social media as a news source serves to maintain existing populist attitudes or facilitates a shift in attitudes to a more extreme position. A cross-sectional survey (N1 = 195) highlighted a positive correlation between social media news use and populist attitudes. A four-wave longitudinal survey (N2 = 386) further showed that this relationship reflects media and selection effects. Over a period of three months, more frequent social media news use predicted stronger populist attitudes at subsequent measuring points. In addition, higher levels of populist attitudes were related to more frequent social media news consumption in the following waves. However, the frequency of social media news use did not change over time and populist attitudes did not become stronger during the study period. Taken together, the findings indicate that social media news use contributed to the maintenance of populist attitudes at a stable level. There is no evidence to suggest social media news use predicted more extreme populist attitudes. We discuss these results with respect to the (potentially continued) rise of populism; we also critically reflect on the phenomenon of attitude polarization online.

Does Negatively Toned Language Use on Social Media Lead to Attitude Polarization?

Prior research has indicated that both attitudinal homogeneity of communication networks (“echo chambers”) and attitudinal heterogeneity of communication networks (“adversarial debates”) can lead to attitude polarization. The present paper argues that communication in both echo chambers and adversarial debates is dominated by network negativity, a negative valence in the tone of discussions which might be associated with attitude polarization. Combining methods from sentiment analysis and social network analysis, more than 4 million tweets on two controversial topics (Brexit, Trump) were analyzed to investigate the association between network negativity and two proxies of attitude polarization (extremity and ambivalence). Results indicate that negativity in users’ own tweets was most strongly related to polarization, whereas negativity among users’ friends, or consonance of sentiments between users and friends had less impact on polarization. The findings are related to literatures on negativity bias, optimal distinctiveness theory, and intergroup contact theory.

Ideological Asymmetries in Motivated Reasoning and the Mechanisms of Attitude Polarization: A Two-Wave Survey Experiment

Are there specific motives that lead individuals to become extreme in their political attitudes after exposure to information? Can these motives explain recent evidence that attitude polariza-tion occurs more on the conservative than the liberal side? We propose that two mechanisms, related to relational motives to engage in social conformity and epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty, might contribute to answering these questions. We used experimental manipula-tions to induce relational and epistemic motives in a two-wave survey experiment, in which we exposed participants to balanced information pertaining highly salient political issues in the U.S. Our results suggest that relational motives to maintain homogenous social networks are highly pertinent to how people, especially political conservatives, process information and make up their minds about important social and political issues. When exposed to social cues indicating where liberals and conservatives stand on specific issues, the two groups became fur-ther apart in their attitudes. Furthermore, we observed that, in the presence of social cues, con-servatives were more likely to develop extreme attitudes than liberals, triggering asymmetric polarization. Contrary to our predictions, however, we did not obtain consistent evidence of in-creased ideological polarization when epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty were present, although we found that conservatives (and not liberals) displayed a stronger confirmation bias in the evaluation of political arguments when uncertainty was high (compared to low).