A Theory of European Military Intervention

Chapter one first defines military intervention. It can occur with or without the consent of the targeted government and/or the United Nations, be direct or indirect, and be characterized as liberal and humanitarian. This section also situates military intervention among other seven other types of intervention: economic, political, cultural, institutional, legal, medical, and environmental. The following section discusses the theory of European military intervention, based on insights from realism, constructivism and post-colonialism. The realist approach is essential for explaining European intervention in Africa, as it takes account of motives such as security, economics, prestige and also, if an intervening state faces limited threats on these three counts, humanitarianism. Constructivism is used to uncover the norms of legality and Eurocentrism. Post-colonialism highlights the importance of history for the understanding of policy decisions on intervention, introduces the concept of neo-colonialism, and helps to address and refine the issue of Eurocentrism, which to date remains under-researched in the literature on international relations.

The European Union

Chapter six shows that even the European Union, which gives a high priority to addressing development problems, and which is legally constrained to act in accordance with international law, often adopts a realist type of foreign policy in Africa. First, in terms of aid and trade (including arms trade), the European Union privileges relations with strong economies in the North of Africa, South Africa, and oil-resource states. The second section demonstrates that the European Union plays a limited diplomatic role in conflicts in Africa, it is securitizing its development policies, and has deployed civilian operations which face difficulties on the ground. Then, an analysis of EU military interventions in Africa shows that they are not consistent, and are either discussed but not carried out, or limited in time and space. The fourth section focuses on motives. The European Union has never intervened primarily for humanitarian motives. EU states do not have a consistent approach towards conflicts, and when they discuss intervention, they often fail to give any priority to European solidarity. As a result, and as expected by realism, member states are more likely not to intervene, or to intervene unilaterally or in ad hoc interventions, than to work through the EU framework.

The Persistence of the French Pré Carré

Chapter four shows that France has reduced its economic impact in Africa in comparison with other world powers; but as core realists would expect, France still maintains an important ad hoc and permanent diplomatic and military presence in Africa. Case studies of French intervention and non-intervention show that French leaders have always acted first and foremost to ensure security interests, that is, the support for ‘cooperative’ regimes and the removal of ‘uncooperative’ regimes in African states, the safety of France’s own military bases and citizens, and the fight against terrorism. They also want to gain personal prestige, prestige for French citizens, and prestige for France in the international community (the United States, the United Nations, and the Arab world). France promoted its economic interests through intervention in the 1990s, but after 2000 it merely made sure those were not harmed. France is still tied to its colonial past, even if it has declined to help only three former colonies in the past ten years. Humanitarianism is never the only motive for French intervention, but it has been one of the motives, especially in operations since 2004.

Actors in Military Intervention

Chapter three locates European military intervention alongside the military interventions and political and economic presence of other regional and international actors. African states have agency in their own foreign policies, but African security organizations are dependent on European funding for the deployment of troops, and they cooperate with the European Union. The United Nations is present in Africa, but it often has to act alone: European actors are not always there to support UN missions. However, Europeans are keen on reinforcing UN capacity to fight militias. China is increasingly an important economic partner of Africa, and now becoming a security actor there. European actors are trying to develop relations with China on African security affairs. The United States is an important security actor in Africa, with military bases there. Its role and motives are studied in detail, as it influences the decisions of European actors to intervene.

Historical Background

Chapter two places European intervention in its historical context, as current political decisions are taken by leaders situated within colonial history. It analyses the first two waves of intervention by European actors. Motivated by security and greed, European states colonized and enslaved African people and exploited resources. The second wave took place after decolonization, and the move of African states to independence. Britain and France, operating in the wider context of the Cold War, had different motives. The United Kingdom made sure its former colonies did not turn to communism, and then it withdrew from Africa. France remained active in African states for motives of security and economic benefit, and to gain or retain prestige with Africa, the United States and the international community.

European Intervention in Africa

The book has surveyed thirty years of interventions in Africa. Chapter seven is divided into three sections. It first gives an assessment of the most appropriate theoretical approaches for understanding motives of European military intervention in Africa. The second section highlights the importance of EU state control of military intervention, and argues that EU actors are likely to remain motivated by security interests and prestige, to the detriment of humanitarian motives. It looks at the implications of this for Africa in international relations: African states and organizations will continue to be needed to address security concerns of European actors, but their economic relations with European actors are likely to be reduced. As expected by the decolonizing school, African states are likely to become more prominent security and economic actors within the African Union in order to address conflicts and economic problems in Africa. The final section offers a more optimistic analysis of how humanitarian concerns could drive European intervention for both better and equal relations with African actors, and for improved security (with less economic violence) in Africa and Europe.

Introduction

Why do France, the United Kingdom and the European Union intervene militarily in some African conflicts? Is it because European leaders feel responsible for the people who face conflicts in Africa? Do they always have several interests and values at stake when they decide to intervene? The first sections on ‘theorizing European military intervention’ and ‘security, prestige and the weight of neo-colonialism’ give an overview of the major theoretical and empirical contributions of the book. The following section shows how the book offers a new light on intervention, and how it rejects Eurocentrism. There is then a discussion of the research design, methodology and case selection of the present study, and an explanation of the importance given to history. The last section discusses the larger African context in which European military intervention takes place.

The United Kingdom

Chapter five argues that the United Kingdom is less present militarily than France in Africa, and that its military interventions are primarily motivated by security and prestige. The chapter begins with a discussion of the United Kingdom’s active aid policy, and its limited trade interests in Africa. It then argues that there have been a limited number of British military interventions there, and they were never influenced by economic motives. Britain did however carefully consider making military interventions in its former colonies, and taking part in French and EU operations. The chapter shows that, as predicted by normative realism, the United Kingdom promoted its image at home, in the United States and in the United Nations, and it made sure its security interests were protected in, and now outside its former colonial zone. Humanitarianism was a component of its interventions in Somalia in 1992-1993, Sierra Leone in 2000, and Libya in 2011.