‘The Russians are Coming’

By the beginning of the 2010s, the concept of hybrid warfare had gained as much popularity as criticism. As an outcome of both, there were different attempts to interpret Hoffman’s ideas, the most methodological of which was published by NATO in 2012. NATO’s initial enthusiasm for the idea of hybridity was not shared by its member states, yet this changed with the Ukrainian crisis, which brought the idea back to the center of academic, military and political discourse. This chapter seeks to analyze this discourse. Its first part focuses on the main criticism of the initial US concept of hybrid warfare and its later reconceptualization, which was intended to answer the disadvantages and weaknesses outlined in the critiques of the concept. The second part discusses the revival of hybrid warfare in the context of Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and the rise of the narrative of Russian hybrid warfare. The final part of the chapter analyses the politicization of this narrative in the West, focusing on the ways in which the conceptual debate on contemporary warfare has been reshaped to serve different political purposes.

The Rise of Gibridnaya Voyna

This chapter explores the rise of the concept of Gibridnaya Voyna, the Russian counterpart of Hybrid Warfare. By analyzing the works of Russian scholars, strategists and military thinkers, this chapter shows that the only common ground between Frank Hoffman’s theory of hybrid warfare and gibridnaya voyna is the name. The chapter traces how and why the focus of Russian scholars and strategists has not been based on a ‘blind’ adaptation of the Western theory, but an attempt to reconceptualize it within the context of the Russian political–military experience and the Russian theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of war. In other words, while Hoffman’s theory of hybrid warfare argues for the amalgamation of regular and irregular forces and incorporates mixed operational and tactical methods, the concept of gibridnaya voyna emphasizes a more abstract battlefield, on which actors fight to erode their adversaries’ socio-cultural cohesion and protect their own.

Net-Centric and Information Wars

This chapter analyzes two contemporary approaches towards confrontation: net-centric and information wars, developed during late 1990s early 2000s by two Russian scholars, Aleksandr Dugin and Igor Panarin. Although neither mentions Messner’s works, the essence of their concepts echo many of Messner’s ideas discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, the core of Dugin’s net-centric war and Panarin’s information war (as well as Messner’s subversion-war, as it was interpreted by many Russian contemporary military thinkers) is quite similar. As this chapter shows, all these theories claim that with the geopolitical and technological realities of the twenty-first century, it is easier to achieve political goals by undermining the political authority of the adversary through the manipulation of political elites and the generation of political dissent, separatism and social problems, rather than by waging classic wars and military operations.

Reading Evgeny Messner

This chapter explores the works of Evgeny Messner, an Imperial Russian émigré officer whose books were prohibited in the USSR due to his strong anti-Communist views. After the Cold War, however, his works have become increasingly popular, taking a more central place within the Russian school of military thinking. After a short introduction of the author and his career, the chapter explores the concept of “Subversion-War” (Myatezhevoyna), developed by Messner during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Due to his anti-Communist views and alliance with the White Movement, and later with Nazi Germany, Messner remained generally unknown in the Soviet Union. In the post-Soviet period, however, Messner’s works have become available to a broader range of military thinkers, and there has been a growing revival of Messner’s concept of subversion-war to analyze the contemporary geopolitical situation and political, military and economic confrontations.

‘Gibridnaya Voyna against Us Is Coming’

While Chapter 5 of the book focused on the conceptual development of the idea of the ‘Western gibridnaya voyna against Russia’, this chapter discusses how the different narratives represented by this idea influenced Russian military thought and were politicized by the Russian political establishment. The first part of the chapter examines the development of the theory of new-generation war, which many Western experts claim shares similar characteristics to the concepts of subversion, net-centric and information warfare (and, therefore, the concept of gibridnaya voyna). The second part of the chapter focuses on the politicization of these ideas, and on the ways in which the Russian military and the Russian political establishment have used the narrative of gibridnaya voyna to achieve their political aims.

P.S. A Lesson for Russia

The West will clearly have to make a number of difficult decisions if it wants to avoid a new Cold War. However, this book’s analysis of contemporary Russian political discourse also suggests that Russia will also need to make some difficult decisions if it wants to avoid the same scenario. The Russians, it seems, are talking themselves into a new round of unhelpful confrontations to the same extent and with the same speed as is the West....

Conclusions

As promised in the introduction, this book was not about the practicalities of the contemporary information struggle between the Kremlin and the West. It did not discuss the tactics of what Western experts commonly describe as Russian hybrid, cyber or information wars with their hacks, disinformation and propaganda operations conducted by pro-Russian forces, or forces backed by Russia....

The Birth of ‘Hybrid Warfare’

This chapter explores the characteristics of hybrid warfare as it was initially formulated by Frank Hoffman. It begins with an analysis of Hoffman’s works, as well as those of other US military thinkers, before examining the concept of hybrid warfare in the context of US strategic culture and how the concept differs from different theories that preceded Hoffman’s conceptualization. The chapter aims to provide a more complete overview of the original concept, its characteristics in US military discourse and the reasons behind its success.

The Conceptual Foundations of ‘Hybrid Warfare’

In the literature produced in the West, the concept of hybrid warfare is most often associated with US military theorist Frank Hoffman, who attempted to bridge the gap between the linear characterization of (regular or irregular) warfare in the context of the twenty-first century operational environment. This chapter explores the conceptual foundations of hybrid warfare and how it was originally conceptualized and understood in the West. Since the concept is the product of US military thought, it examines the context in which it was developed, in addition to the way it has been used by US scholars and members of the military. This chapter introduces four main sources that influenced the idea of hybrid warfare: namely the concepts of unrestricted warfare, fourth generation warfare (4GW), compound warfare and the ideas outlined in the 2005 US National Defense Strategy.

Introduction

I became interested in so-called hybrid warfare in late 2015, when two different books navigated their way on to my table. The first was entitled NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats, edited by two researchers from the NATO Defence College in Rome, Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey Larsen;...