Trials from Classical Athens
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and solemn oath. [2] Now, if any other judges were going to decide my case, I should find the risk very frightening; for I observe that sometimes the effect of fabrications and accidents is such that the result often surprises those on trial. But coming before you I hope to receive just treatment. [3] What I most resent, Council, is that I shall be compelled to speak to you about matters which so embarrassed me that I tolerated mistreatment to avoid having them widely known. But since Simon has placed me in this difficult situation, I shall tell you the whole story without concealment. [4] And I ask, Council, that if I am guilty you show me no mercy; but if on this issue I prove that I am not guilty of the acts to which Simon swore, and in general if it becomes clear that my feelings for the lad display a folly inappropriate to my age, I ask you to think no worse of me; for you know that desire is common to all mankind, but the best and most decent man is the one who is capable of bearing his misfortunes with the most decorum. All my efforts to achieve this have been blocked by this man Simon, as I shall prove to you. [5] We both fell in love with Theodotos, a Plataian youth, Council. And I tried to win his affection by treating him well, while Simon thought that with violent and lawless behaviour he would force the boy to do whatever he wanted. It would take too long to tell all the mistreatment Thoeodotos has received from him. But what I think you should hear is his offences against me personally. [6] Discovering that the boy was with me, he came to my house at night, drunk, broke down the doors and went into the women’s quarters, when my sister and my nieces were there; and they have lived such a decent life that they are embarrassed to be seen even by their relatives. [7] Such was his violence that he refused to go until the passers-by and the people who came with him, shocked at his conduct in entering the presence of orphaned young girls, made him leave by force. And so far from regretting his outrageous conduct, he found out where we were dining and did the strangest thing, something quite incredible, unless one happened to know the man’s madness. [8] He called me from indoors, and when I came out he immediately tried to strike me; when I resisted, he stood at a distance and pelted me with stones. He actually missed me, but hit Aristokritos, who had come with him to see me, with a stone and split his forehead open. [9] Personally, Council, though I thought myself appallingly treated, I tolerated it through embarrassment at my unfortunate situation, as I have
sacrifice. [17] Philoneos’ concubine went along for the sacrifice. When they were in Peiraieus, Philoneos sacrificed, of course. And when he had completed the sacrifice, the female wondered how to administer the drug to them, before or after dinner. And as she considered the matter she concluded that after dinner was better; she was also acting on the instructions of this Klytaimestra, my brother’s mother. [18] The full account of the dinner would be too longwinded for me to tell and you to hear. I shall try to give as brief an account as I can of the rest, of how the poison was administered. After dinner, naturally, since one was sacrificing to Zeus of Possessions and entertaining the other, and one was about to go on a voyage and was dining with a close friend, they made a libation and offered incense for their future. [19] And while Philoneos’ concubine was pouring the libation for them – as they offered prayers which would never be fulfilled, gentlemen – she poured in the poison. Thinking she was being clever, she gave more to Philoneos in the belief perhaps that if she gave him more she would win more affection from him – she had no idea that she was my stepmother’s dupe until disaster struck – while she poured less in our father’s drink. [20] They for their part after pouring their libations took their final drink, holding in their hands their own killer. Philoneos died at once on the spot; our father was afflicted with a sickness from which he died after twenty days. For this the assistant who carried out the act has the reward she deserved, though she was not to blame – she was put on the wheel and then handed over to the public executioner; the guilty party, the one who planned it, will soon have hers, if you and the gods will it. [21] Note how much more just my plea is than my brother’s. I urge you to avenge the dead man, who is the victim of an irreparable wrong. For the dead man my brother will offer no request, though he deserves your pity and support and vengeance for having his life taken in a godless and inglorious manner before his time by the last people who should have done this. [22] His plea will be for the murderess, a plea which is unprincipled, unholy, which deserves neither fulfilment nor attention either from the gods or from you; he will seek with his plea (to induce you not to convict her for her crimes) though she could not induce herself not to devise them.* But you must give your support not to those who kill but to the victims of deliberate
pride which makes a mortal forget his place in the order of things), the word is most often used of dealings between human beings. It generally describes behaviour which is uncontrolled and which presupposes a desire to humiliate or at least a contempt for the rights and prestige of others. It could be applied to anything from mockery through verbal insult to physical assault, including rape. However, in law the term was narrower. The law on hybris quoted at Dem. 21.47 appears to cover action, not words. It is likely, moreover, that in legal contexts at least, though the law was imprecise (it appears to have begun: ‘if anyone commits outrage [hybris] against someone . . .’), the offence was generally understood to cover physical violence. It is not clear what converted aikeia into hybris, but it may be suggested that where the speaker could argue that the assault was committed either with the intention of humiliating or with wilful disregard for the status of the victim then the action for outrage might succeed. In the present case the action of Konon in imitating a victorious fighting cock after beating Ariston could be held to prove either. In explaining his reasons for choosing the private action, Ariston naturally places the emphasis on modesty (a public action would require more boldness and greater legal experience than a young man should in this culture possess) and restraint. In the process he suppresses other motives. As was explained in the general introduction, the prosecutor in a public action faced serious penalties if lie either dropped the case or failed to obtain 20 per cent of the judges’ votes. In addition, since on most reconstructions hybris involved the state of mind or intention of the perpetrator it would be more difficult to prove than aikeia, for which the fact of striking first sufficed. Finally, if Konon were convicted in a public action for hybris any fine would go to the state, while the victor in a private action for aikeia stood to gain compensation. The case against Konon is presented with remarkable force, and one’s first impression is that Ariston’s case is overwhelming. As to the assault itself, Ariston has good evidence from a doctor that he was severely beaten. That Konon was actually the perpetrator is suggested by Konon’s behaviour at arbitration (for which Ariston has witness testimony); evidently Konon had difficulty assembling a case, and it appears that it was only when his situation was looking desperate that his associates gave evidence on his behalf. However, it is far from clear that the witnesses who carried Ariston home actually saw the attack; they may merely have found him lying beaten. It may be that the only witness on Ariston’s side was his friend Phanostratos. From §§30–3 one
evacuation of blood occurred at a time when I was in great pain and already despaired of, I might even have died from suppuration. As it was, it was this that saved me, the evacuation of blood. To prove that in this too I am telling the truth, and that I was subjected to illness such as to reduce me to a desperate condition, as a result of the blows I received from these men, read the doctor’s deposition and that of the people who visited me. Depositions [13] So the fact that the blows I received were not slight or insignificant but that I found myself in extreme danger because of the outrageous behaviour and the violence of these people, and so the action I have brought is far less serious than they deserve, this has I think been made clear to you on many counts. And I imagine that some of you are wondering what on earth Konon will dare to say in reply to this. Now I want to warn you about the argument I am informed he has contrived; he will attempt to divert the issue away from the outrage of what was done and reduce it to laughter and ridicule. [14] And he will say that there are many individuals in the city, the sons of decent men, who in the playful manner of young people have given themselves titles, and they call some ‘Ithyphallics’, others ‘Down-and-outs’; that some of them love courtesans and have often suffered and inflicted blows over a courtesan, and that this is the way of young people. As for my brothers and myself, he will misrepresent all of us as drunken and violent but also as unreasonable and vindictive. [15] Personally, judges, though I have been angered by the treatment I have received, my indignation and feeling of having been outraged would be no less, if I may say so, if these statements about us by Konon here are regarded as the truth and your ignorance is such that each man is taken for whatever he claims or his neighbour alleges him to be, and decent men get no benefit at all from their normal life and habits. [16] We have not been seen either drunk or behaving violently by anyone in the world, nor do we think we are behaving unreasonably if we demand to receive satisfaction under the laws for the wrongs done to us. We agree that his sons are ‘Ithyphallics’ and ‘Down-and-outs’, and I for my part pray to the gods that this and all else of the sort may recoil upon Konon and his sons. [17] For these are the men who initiate each other into the rites of Ithyphallos and commit the sort of acts which decent people find it deeply shameful even to speak of, let alone do.
homosexuality are however complex, and the reader interested in pursuing the issue further will find an admirable discussion in K.J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (London 1978). CASE VI: DEMOSTHENES 54 – AGAINST KONON FOR BATTERY We have here a private action for battery (aikeias dike). A young man named Ariston claims to have been the victim of an unprovoked attack by a middle-aged man named Konon. Although he has brought a private case, Ariston notes that he could have brought a public action for outrage (graphe hybreos). The nature of these actions is discussed in the brief essay at the end of the speech. Both plaintiff and defendant appear to be people of substance, to judge by both the reference to public services (leitourgiai) at the close and the fact that Konon’s associates (§7) include Spintharos, whose father Euboulos was one of the most successful politicians in fourth-century Athens. The date of the action can be fixed by the reference in §3 to garrison duty at Panakton two years before the trial. Demosthenes speaks at 19.326 of an expedition to Panakton in 343, and tells us that during the Sacred War (355–346) no such expedition had been necessary. It is far from clear that the expedition mentioned in Dem. 19 and the guard duty mentioned here are the same kind of operation; nor can we exclude the possibility that Demosthenes is exaggerating. But the evidence such as it is would suggest a date of 357 or 343 for the incidents narrated and 355 or 341 for the hearing. It is difficult to choose with confidence. The association of Konon with the son of Euboulos, whose faction Demosthenes was attacking by the late 350s on the ground of its failure to check the rising power of Macedon, suggests that Demosthenes may have accepted the case from political motives. Unfortunately, even if true, this conjecture does not help for dating, since Demosthenes was still struggling (though more successfully) with this faction in the late 340s. However, since by 341 Demosthenes was one of the leading political figures, he is less likely to have needed, or to have been free, to take on a speechwriting brief. So a date in the 350s seems marginally more likely. [1] I was outrageously assaulted by this Konon, judges, and placed in such a serious condition that for a long time neither my family nor any of the doctors
the ruin which has befallen them. Then if they are able, if they have time before they die, they summon their friends and relatives and call them to witness; they tell them the identity of the killers and solemnly instruct them to take vengeance for the crime against them – [30] as my father instructed me, his son, during his last pitiable illness. If they cannot reach them, they write down a statement and call their servants to witness and reveal the identity of the killers. This is what my father did; he revealed all this and gave his instructions to me, young as I still was, not to his slaves. [31] For my part, I have told my tale and given my support to the dead man and the law. It is for you to consider the rest for yourselves and to vote in accordance with justice. I think that the gods below also take an interest in the victims of wrongdoing. The central facts are straightforward enough. The speaker’s father died not long after a friend, Philoneos, with whom he had dined. According to the speaker, he believed himself to have been poisoned. Philoneos’ mistress, who was probably a slave, confessed under torture to administering poison, apparently in the belief that she was giving Philoneos a drug which would restore his desire for her. The speaker claims that his father imposed a solemn injunction (Greek episkepsis) on him, stating that he was the victim of murder and instructing him to pursue the killer. §30 seems to suggest that the speaker was very young at the time, and it may be that a substantial interval has intervened since the father’s death, perhaps the interval needed for the speaker to reach the age of majority and so be able to prosecute (there was no time limit, prothesmia, in homicide cases). There is no real reason to doubt the broad outline of ascertainable events provided by the speaker, and one can readily see why the son of the first marriage might welcome the chance to prosecute his stepmother. The problem resides in the imputation of guilt to the stepmother; there is in fact a striking lack of evidence to incriminate her. Even if we accept that Philoneos and the speaker’s father were poisoned (and not merely the victims of food-poisoning or some other natural cause) and that Philoneos’ mistress had administered a fatal drug (and did not simply confess to a non-existent crime to be rid of the torture), the speaker’s father could do nothing more than express his suspicions. Whether he even suspected his second wife is not made explicit by the speaker; this may be a deliberate evasion of a weak point. The woman who was tortured evidently did not incriminate the stepmother, or we should have expected to
