Worktown and Muslims

In the 1930s, Bolton was the site of Mass Observation’s first major research project, and subsequent restudies allow us to track in detail the decline of Christianity in the town. It was also the site of the first major Muslim demonstration against Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. The reaction of Boltonians to Islam is discussed as an introduction to wider consideration of the impact of the growth of Islam in Britain. Detailed discussion of media coverage of Muslims and of attitude survey data makes the case that, while some British people dislike Islam, a more powerful trend is growing hostility to any religion that is taken seriously enough to intrude on the public sphere.

Ties that Bind

This chapter examines the relationship between local social structures and the popularity of religion through structured comparisons of three Scottish islands (Lewis, Orkney, and Shetland) and four Welsh villages. It also considers whether the apparent resistance of fishing and mining communities to secularization is best explained by the unpredictably dangerous nature of fishing and mining or by the relative isolation of those communities. It argues that, contra the view of some US sociologists, competition between churches, sects, and denominations weakens rather than strengthens religion. The enduringly religious parts of Britain remained so because they shared a common religion, and that consensus was possible because such communities were unusually socially homogenous and were relatively isolated (by geography and by language barriers) from the cultural mainstream.

Religion and Politics

In Catholic Europe, progressive and working-class politics have often been anti-religious. In Britain, class conflict was often expressed within, rather than against, Christianity, with the Labour Party having deep roots in dissenting movements such as the Methodists. This chapter details such class connections and associated regional movements (such as the anti-English appeal of the Welsh chapels). It considers Muslim involvement in the Labour Party and the roots of anti-Semitism. The rapid rise and fall of the Christian Party and the Christian People’s Alliance are used to test the electoral popularity of conservative socio-moral positions. An apparent connection between identifying as Church of England and BREXIT-era xenophobia is demonstrated to be largely a matter of nostalgia: regular churchgoers are more likely than nominal identifiers to be pro-European Union and sympathetic to immigrants.

Gods of the Common People

It is sometimes argued that, despite abandoning formal organizations, the British remain religious. Beyond churches, sects, and denominations, there is supposedly a deep reservoir of folk religion (which constructs magic rituals from Christian themes and places) and superstition. This chapter examines that case in detail and argues that folk religion has declined as fast as the formal organizations on which it is parasitic. Furthermore, superstition has changed in precisely the same way as has formal religion: what were shared beliefs have become highly personalized rituals, justified not by claims of supernatural power, but by the psychology of reassurance.

Old Rivals Merge; New Divisions Emerge

Although there have been few denominational mergers at the national level, there has been a great deal of facility-sharing and even merger of local congregations. Such rationalization has been driven by the need to replace or renovate crumbling churches and chapels coinciding with declining numbers of members to fund such work. While secularization has created a need for rationalization, it has also made it possible by reducing knowledge of, and interest in, the classic theological divisions that produced Britain’s current churches, sects, and denominations. As old arguments about baptism, church organization, liturgy, the nature of communion, and what is required for salvation have faded, new divisions have emerged. Apparently trivial disputes about church seating and music styles point to the bigger issue of whether churches should accommodate or resist social and cultural change. Gay rights and the roles of women have been particularly contentious.

Social Roles of the Clergy

Changes in two communities studied in the 1950s and 1960s by W. M. Williams (Northlew in Devon and Gosforth in Cumbria) form the springboard for reflections on the social roles of the clergy in a largely secular society. That the clergy are often called on to act as community spokespersons and honest brokers is not, as is sometimes argued, a reflection of the enduring popularity of religion. It is precisely because most people are not religious that the clergy can be seen as disinterested and valued for their organizational skills and their experience as public speakers.

The Big House

For centuries, Britain’s religious life benefited from the patronage of local grandees: in rural areas major landowners were obliged by custom and by law to support the churches, and in the growing towns and cities of the nineteenth century industrialists performed a similar role. Those social obligations collapsed abruptly in the early twentieth century with the decline of the Big House, the amalgamation of local firms into national and then international companies, the growth of democracy, and the rise of the welfare state. The personally religious wealthy continued to fund religion, but the breaking of local ties released those of little faith from any obligation to promote Christianity. That change seriously weakened the churches.

Can the Decline be Reversed?

The final chapter considers whether the decline of religion in Britain is likely to be reversed. It demonstrates the absence of a shared stock of religious knowledge and the current poor public reputation of religion. It considers what we know about the dynamics of religious conversion and makes the point that personal influence often relies on pre-existing social bonds and on social similarity between believers and potential converts. The key problem for British religion is that ‘being religious’ is no longer a common and widespread characteristic but is confined to a few relatively introverted minority populations. The odds on the religiously indifferent associating with committed believers are very small. Hence the chances of any religious revival occurring now, when it failed to occur in the previous century (when religion was far more popular), seem equally slight.

Spiritualism, Spirituality, and Social Class

Although Victorian spiritualism and contemporary spirituality share some common themes, they differ in important respects that reflect their very different social class bases: the former was strongest in the working-class towns of the industrial English Midlands and the North, while the latter is almost exclusively a middle-class (and female) movement. The popularity of both movements is assessed, and data on the geographical distribution of the charismatic movement is added to make an important point about the effects of individualism and consumerism on religion. The general point is made that the contrasting balance of fatalism and personal autonomy in these variations of the dominant religion resonates with the underlying realities of different social class position.

Migrant Christians and Pentecostalism in London

Religion remains relevant in secular societies when ethnic minority churches provide an accepting community for immigrants. This chapter discusses the socially adaptive roles of the Catholic Church for Irish immigrants in the first half of the twentieth century, the West Indian churches in the 1960s, and the West African Pentecostal churches that have grown in London and the south-east since the 1980s. Although similar in their social conservatism, West Indian and West African Pentecostalists differ in their attitudes to wealth. The West Indians used their Puritan ethics to encourage the self-discipline and frugality characteristic of the respectable working class. The West African churches are much more influenced by the ‘health and wealth’ gospel that argues that donating to the church will magically produce material benefits.