Sirte’s Tribes Under the Islamic State

This chapter focuses on the Libyan coastal city of Sirte, a former stronghold of Mu’ammar Qaddafi and his regime, and analyses the circumstances under which it fell under the control of the Islamic State (IS) between 2015 and 2017. It argues that the tribal character of the local society combined with the influence of the Salafist current within the tribes and their search for a channel to regain political influence and military power after the regime change are not sufficient to explain why IS could develop and take root in Sirte. Rather, it underlines the dramatic impact of the 2011 war on relations of power and authority within the local communities, as well as the incapacity of Libya’s transitional authorities to provide security in the city as key factors that contributed to Sirte becoming a Jihadist platform in Libya and North Africa.

Sufi Jihad and Salafi Jihadism in Egypt’s Sinai

Based on ethnographic observations, interviews and informal talks with members of the Sawarka tribe in Egypt’s Northern Sinai, this chapter analyses the sociological and socio-political dynamics that have shaped the Egyptian Jihadist scene, both ideologically and organizationally. In particular, it investigates conflicts between the patriotic Sufi Jihad and contemporary Salafi Jihadism and argues that the ideological debate between the two is in reality covering a hidden socio-economic, ethical and political generational conflict.

Kto Kovo? Tribes and jihad in Pushtun Lands

Based on interview data from Helmand Province, Afghanistan, this chapter explores the relationship between tribalism and jihadism from 1978-2015. The authors argue that local actors, predominantly tribal, have taken on the mantles of different jihadi organizations in order to gain funding as a way of increasing their leverage in local conflicts with other actors. This relationship holds true in Helmand through the ‘jihad’ against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the civil war, the Taliban era, and the post-2001 US-led nation-building period. The author concludes that jihadi organizations, or other external organizations, need to understand and work with tribal dynamics in order to achieve their aims in tribal territories.

Iraqi Tribes in the Land of Jihad

Since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the tribe has resurfaced as an important element in the literature focusing on security issues and the involvement of local actors in conflicts. It has addressed the tribe itself, its place in society, its allegiance to state authorities and even to foreign powers, and its role in providing security or provoking insecurity. Yet the behavior of tribes in lands of jihad had so far remained under-explored. This chapter discusses this phenomenon in Iraq, a country struggling with political implosion, an undermined state, the rise of radical jihad, sectarian war as well as regional and international interference. The analysis puts particular emphasis on certain tribes that have collaborated with ISIS in the provinces of Al-Anbar or Nineveh.

Between the ‘Kanuri’ and Others

One of the common explanations for the expansion of Boko Haram in Lake Chad Basin is to consider that it has been fostered by the links between the jihadist movement and Kanuris. Indeed, the area of this insurgency largely covers the historical settlement area of Kanuris between northeastern Nigeria, the far-north of Cameroon and southeastern of Niger. Many Boko Haram supporters are from Kanuri populations. Yet many victims of this insurgency also belong to this community. Based on observations made in the far-north of Cameroon, this chapter calls into question the primacy of community ties in the diffusion of Boko Haram. It highlights the ability of the jihadist movement to undermine the tribal system upon which the state has always based its local domination. In particular, it shows how Boko Haram, whose social base is in reality trans-communal, has been able to take advantage of inequalities and divisions within tribes to create links stronger than community ties. This has taken place in a context of contestation of state and community elites by the marginalized peoples living in these border areas.

Introduction

Tribes may or not join jihad, they may or not adopt some sort of Salafism. But when they do it they both give a new form to tribal traditions and experience an internal social transformation. Turning Salafis allows to claim membership of a supra tribal but virtual community while objecting to the state that tribesmen are holier than the state. Jihad allows to reformulate their opposition to the local state by referring to a global entity above this state: al Qaeda or ISIS. In the meantime jihad gives an opportunity for a younger generation and/or dominated clans to take the leadership. In both cases neither Salafism nor jihad erase tribal loyalties or rivalries: they allow tribes to recast their identity in a global world.

The Global and the Local

This chapters analyses the rise of al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch and underlines the importance of local narratives for the success of any movement in Yemen. In the beginning, the relationship between al-Qaeda and Yemen’s tribes used to be marked by mutual suspicion, because al-Qaeda mainly adhered to the mother organization’s global strategy and was little or not at all attuned to the local context in Yemen. Only since the late 2000s, after the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi branch of al-Qaeda into AQAP, al-Qaeda began to undergo an internal change that, together with the expansion of the Shia Ḥūthīs in Yemen’s Zaydi heartland, enormously contributed to al-Qaeda’s acceptance among the Sunni tribes of Yemen. By positioning itself as savior-defender against the Ḥūthī threat, al-Qaeda managed to successfully plug into local complaints and to develop certain “soft touches” by latching onto community problems such as conflict resolution, corruption, poverty and marginalization.

Tribes and Political Islam in the Borderland between Egypt and Libya

This chapter deals with political, social, economic and cultural patterns that are involved in the development of political Islam and Islamism among the Awlad ‘Ali Bedouin in the borderland of Egypt and Libya. It argues that the rise of political Islam and jihadism among the Awlad ‘Ali is not a result of their form of social organization as a tribal confederation but related to broader developments in the Middle East. Although it is true that there are jihadist networks within tribes in a number of societies in the Middle East, and that some factions of certain tribes have forged political and military alliances with jihadist movements, the same could be said about any other social group, class or milieu in the Arab Middle East. Instead, the rise of Islamism is presented as part of the competitive character of a heterarchichal order in the borderland.

Conclusion

Based on the different case studies gathered in this volume, the conclusion argues that the weakening or collapse of state power, deep socio-economic transformations and civil warfare, as well as the subsequent crisis of tribal leadership and community cohesion have constituted a fertile ground for the development and rooting of jihadist groups in various tribal areas of the Middle East and Africa. The sense of threat that members of local tribes experienced in a changing environment has led to forms of cooperation when tribesmen and jihadists had a common interest in building bridges between the local and the global, beyond and sometimes against the state. Direct threat has also been key to the expansion of global jihadist forces in tribal areas.