scholarly journals Social cognition in anorexia nervosa: Specific difficulties in decoding emotional but not nonemotional mental states

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (9) ◽  
pp. 883-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Brockmeyer ◽  
Judith Pellegrino ◽  
Hannah Münch ◽  
Wolfgang Herzog ◽  
Isabell Dziobek ◽  
...  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Figà Talamanca

Abstract Joint action among human beings is characterized by using elaborate cognitive feats, such as representing the mental states of others about a certain state of affairs. It is still debated how these capacities evolved in the hominid lineage. I suggest that the consolidation of a shared practice over time can foster the predictability of other’s behavior. This might facilitate the evolutionary passage from inferring what others might know by simply seeing them and what they are viewing towards a mutual awareness of each other’s beliefs. I will examine the case for cooperative hunting in one chimpanzee community and argue that it is evidence that they have the potential to achieve common ground, suggesting that the consolidation of a practice might have supported the evolution of higher social cognition in the hominid lineage.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162095377
Author(s):  
Lisa J. Stephenson ◽  
S. Gareth Edwards ◽  
Andrew P. Bayliss

When two people look at the same object in the environment and are aware of each other’s attentional state, they find themselves in a shared-attention episode. This can occur through intentional or incidental signaling and, in either case, causes an exchange of information between the two parties about the environment and each other’s mental states. In this article, we give an overview of what is known about the building blocks of shared attention (gaze perception and joint attention) and focus on bringing to bear new findings on the initiation of shared attention that complement knowledge about gaze following and incorporate new insights from research into the sense of agency. We also present a neurocognitive model, incorporating first-, second-, and third-order social cognitive processes (the shared-attention system, or SAS), building on previous models and approaches. The SAS model aims to encompass perceptual, cognitive, and affective processes that contribute to and follow on from the establishment of shared attention. These processes include fundamental components of social cognition such as reward, affective evaluation, agency, empathy, and theory of mind.


2015 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 499-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suman Ambwani ◽  
Kathy R. Berenson ◽  
Lea Simms ◽  
Amanda Li ◽  
Freya Corfield ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 579-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cora E Mukerji ◽  
Sarah Hope Lincoln ◽  
David Dodell-Feder ◽  
Charles A Nelson ◽  
Christine I Hooker

ABSTRACT Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to reason about others’ mental states, is central to healthy social development. Neural mechanisms supporting ToM may contribute to individual differences in children’s social cognitive behavior. Employing a false belief functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, we identified patterns of neural activity and connectivity elicited by ToM reasoning in school-age children (N = 32, ages 9–13). Next, we tested relations between these neural ToM correlates and children’s everyday social cognition. Several key nodes of the neural ToM network showed greater activity when reasoning about false beliefs (ToM condition) vs non-mentalistic false content (control condition), including the bilateral temporoparietal junction (RTPJ and LTPJ), precuneus (PC) and right superior temporal sulcus. In addition, children demonstrated task-modulated changes in connectivity among these regions to support ToM relative to the control condition. ToM-related activity in the PC was negatively associated with variation in multiple aspects of children’s social cognitive behavior. Together, these findings elucidate how nodes of the ToM network act and interact to support false belief reasoning in school-age children and suggest that neural ToM mechanisms are linked to variation in everyday social cognition.


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather C. Lench ◽  
Aaron B. Taylor ◽  
Shane W. Bench

2009 ◽  
Vol 24 (S1) ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
G. Lahera

Theory of Mind (ToM) is defined as the cognitive ability to infer mental states to oneself and to others, in terms of thought, emotion and intention. There are many studies about ToM in schizophrenia, but a paucity of them about ToM in bipolar disorder, despite the suggesting relationship between ToM and emotions. Some affective patients were included as control group in schizophrenia studies, but these samples were small and heterogeneous. Some authors have found ToM deficit in manic and depressed patients, but there is also some evidence of a ToM deficit even in a state of euthymia, associated to other cognitive deficits, mainly in executive function. Multiple factors could be involved in this ToM deficit, but these studies open the way for a line of research about the cognitive mechanisms underlying the psychosocial disadjustment that these patients present. Mentalization skills could be more decisive for keeping a job or a social network than other neurocognitive variables, and BD remains a very important cause of psychosocial disadvantage. In this workshop we will debate the relevance of these findings in BD and the potential therapeutic consecuences.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. A. Kirk ◽  
A. O. Cohen ◽  
W. Sinnott-Armstrong ◽  
L.T. Harris

AbstractDehumanized perception strips people of their humanity by ignoring their mental states. Evidence has accumulated to suggest many individuals do not spontaneously attribute mental states towards certain social groups, such as the homeless, and drug-addicted (Fiske et al., 2002, Harris & Fiske, 2006; 2007; 2011). These groups tend to elicit differential BOLD signal within areas associated with social cognition. To investigate the versatility of this response, two experiments were conducted: a mixed design study (20 participants); and a repeated-measures design (11 participants). These investigated the malleability of social cognition following a contact intervention with the homeless. Both experiments had participants make emotional judgements toward eight different social groups whilst under fMRI. The two studies found mixed evidence, demonstrating altered response to homeless people in regions such as the mPFC, Insula, IPL, and MTG following social contact. This lends some support to the use of contact as an effective intervention.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Guazzelli Williamson

During adolescence, our bodies, brains, and behaviors undergo marked developmental changes. Adolescents often become increasingly aware of their social worlds and use this stage of development to develop skills to help them navigate this changing landscape. Up until recently, an overwhelming majority of research on social cognition–specifically on understanding the mental states of others–has focused on childhood. In this chapter, I demonstrate that adolescence is an important developmental period for the refinement and sophistication of social cognitive processes that began developing during childhood. I also discuss the development of more advanced and distinct social cognitive processes. Additionally, I review the available literature on the developmental trajectories of advanced social cognition across adolescence–including individual differences, cultural considerations, and implications for adolescent health and wellbeing. Finally, I describe how future research may begin to address current knowledge gaps on this topic.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document