Spinoza’s Epistemological Views

1972 ◽  
pp. 28-48
Author(s):  
J. J. MacIntosh

This paper analyzes Foucault’s early thinking (from 1954 to 1957) as it bears on psychology, anthropology and psychiatry. The author maintains that Foucault’s texts from that period can be mined for the origins of the Foucault methodology, early indications of its scope, and its first applications. Although Foucault opposed a phenomenology of epistemology and allied himself with the latter, a close reading of his early work reveals a paradoxical synthesis of phenomenological and epistemological views. The influences of Georges Canguilhem, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Ludwig Binswanger were decisive here.Foucault adopted the “practice-to-theory” vector from Canguilhem and grounded the history of psychology and psychiatry on the study of essential oppositions: normal - pathological, personality - environment, evolution - history. Merleau-Ponty’s theory allowed him to demonstrate that the ontological perspective of psychology and psychiatry does not match the subject of their research, which is the person and their experience. Foucault’s application of Binswanger and the idea of existence is to problematize the boundaries between psychology and psychiatry and their identity as sciences while formulating the problem of pathology and normality as crucial to their identification. He also considers mental illness as one of the forms of experience. Foucault thus goes beyond the boundaries of psychology and psychiatry to develop his archaeological method. In the Order of things and the Archaeology of Knowledge he makes two philosophical maneuvers: in the first, he rejects the subject; in the second he abandons the continuity of history. Foucault’s early psychological and psychiatric discourse is then the first harbinger of his trespassing the boundaries of disciplines and schools, combining perspectives, and scrutinizing the foundations of scientific practice. A critical dialogue with his own earlier thought is the source of Foucault’s birth as a philosopher.


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 137-151
Author(s):  
Dmitrij Gluscevskij

This article aims at proposing a way to identify humour by means of Greimassian semiotics and to single humour out as a unique object of semiotic analysis. Firstly, the article discusses the fundamental epistemological premises of semiotic text analysis through the analysis of texts by Greimas which were meant to further and legitimize his project of semiotics. Also, the already existing attempts at providing a semiotic definition of humour are critically evaluated while relating their problematic aspects with the implicitly defined field of semiotic interest. Finally, it is demonstrated that a productive semiotic description of a comic text is possible when the status quo epistemological views are revised and the traditional field of semiotic analyses is expanded accordingly.


1994 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-307
Author(s):  
Trevor Hogan

Until the seventies, Karl Barth's picture of Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) dominated the Anglo-phone reception of Troeltsch. In this reading, Troeltsch is the last of the great liberal protestant theologians who endeavoured to save Christianity by romanticising the Enlightenment. But that was Barth's Troeltsch. The past twenty years of Troeltsch studies have undermined this hegemonic view to recover a proto—postmodern thinker who recognised the profound cultural implications of the epistemological views embedded in modern science as in history and sociology. For Troeltsch the implications of epistemological relativity and historical relativism required the historicisation of the essence of Christianity. It also required a reformulation of the central doctrines of Christian faith; this was Troeltsch's theological project. Finally, it required a search for a modern form of Christian faith which authenticated personal mysticism and achieved normative Christian community life within a broader domain of a secular social democratic polity.


Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Paddy Jane McShane

AbstractMy aim in this paper is to argue against what I call “epistemic” pessimism about moral testimony. Epistemic pessimists argue that moral testimony fails to transmit epistemic warrant as non-moral testimony does. I reject epistemic pessimism by defending the No Difference Thesis, that there is no in principle difference between the transmission of epistemic warrant by moral and non-moral testimony. The main thrust of my argument is that there is a good prima facie case to be made for the thesis, namely, that it is supported by all of the major current epistemological views of testimonial warrant, both reductionist and non-reductionist. After making this case, I consider five pessimist attempts to undermine the No Difference Thesis, and argue that none of these attempts succeeds. So, in the absence of any other compelling criticisms, we are justified in rejecting epistemic pessimism and accepting the No Difference Thesis.


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 488-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Zarhin ◽  
Maya Negev ◽  
Simon Vulfsons ◽  
Sharon R. Sznitman

Few empirical studies have explored how different types of knowledge are associated with diverse objectivities and moral economies. Here, we examine these associations through an empirical investigation of the public policy debate in Israel around medical cannabis (MC), which may be termed a contested medicine because its therapeutic effects, while subjectively felt by users, are not generally recognized by the medical profession. Our findings indicate that beneath the MC debate lie deep-seated issues of epistemology, which are entwined with questions of ethics and morality. Whereas some stakeholder groups viewed evidence-based medicine and mechanical objectivity as the only valid knowledge base, others called for recognition of a particular experience-based knowledge, championing regulatory, administrative, or strong objectivity. Stakeholders’ interpretations of what should be considered as ethical courses of (in)action corresponded to their epistemological views, with most criticizing the regulators for relying on regulatory subjectivity instead of objectivity. Our in-depth mapping of this arena allowed us not only to shed light on the emergence of the new entity called “medical cannabis” but also to reexamine the link between epistemology, ethics, and action and to elucidate how heterogeneous groups view the validity and objectivity of knowledge and the interface between medicine, science, and policy.


2004 ◽  
Vol 31 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 345-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avi S. Lifschitz

Summary A belief in a firm correspondence between objects, ideas, and their representation in language pervaded the works of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727–1781) in 1750. This conviction is particularly manifest in Turgot’s sharp critique of Berkeley’s philosophical system and his remarks on Maupertuis’s reconstruction of the origin of language. During the 1750s Turgot’s epistemological views underwent a change, apparent in two of his contributions to the Encyclopédie: the entries Existence and Étymologie (1756). These articles included a reassessment of Berkeleyan immaterialism, facing an ultimate crisis of definition and representation. A similar development may be traced in contemporary works by Condillac and Diderot. Turgot’s Encyclopédie entries also envisaged a new science, an archeology of the human mind aided by the examination of linguistic development and change. This entailed the scientific verification of conjectures in any historical account of ideas, turning etymological and psychological inquiries into what Turgot termed ‘experimental metaphysics’.


Nuncius ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-136
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Leporiere

Abstract This paper investigates and contextualizes the contribution made by the Italian physiologist Filippo Bottazzi (1867–1941) to research on mediumistic phenomena in Europe at the beginning of the 1900s, focusing on his investigation of the claims of Eusapia Palladino’s powers, a well-known Italian physical medium who inspired the “conversion” of Cesare Lombroso. Bottazzi’s work, conducted between 1906 and 1909, is compared to that of colleagues in Italy and elsewhere and analysed in the light of the scientific methodology that he used in his research as a physiologist. This paper will review the events that led Bottazzi to take an interest in mediumship, and analyse how he designed and conducted his experiments and the conclusions that he drew from them. Particular attention will be focused on the methods and the scientific instruments that he used in his psychical research, which were in keeping with his Positivist epistemological views, as is shown by an essay on the scientific method that he wrote in the same period.


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