The Sources of Bipartisan Politics in Parliamentary Democracies

2010 ◽  
pp. 145-164
Author(s):  
Thomas Bräuninger ◽  
Marc Debus
Keyword(s):  
Parliamentary Democracies

The Acceptance of Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Willumsen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Survey Questions ◽  
Ideal Policy ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Policy Incentives

The central argument of this book is that voting unity in European legislatures is not primarily the result of the ‘disciplining’ power of the leadership of parliamentary parties, but rather the result of a combination of ideological homogeneity through self-selection into political parties and the calculations of individual legislators about their own long-term benefits. Despite the central role of policy preferences in the subsequent behaviour of legislators, preferences at the level of the individual legislator have been almost entirely neglected in the study of parliaments and legislative behaviour. The book measures these using an until now under-utilized resource: parliamentary surveys. Building on these, the book develops measures of policy incentives of legislators to dissent from their parliamentary parties, and show that preference similarity amongst legislators explains a very substantial proportion of party unity, yet alone cannot explain all of it. Analysing the attitudes of legislators to the demands of party unity, and what drives these attitudes, the book argues that what explains the observed unity (beyond what preference similarity would explain) is the conscious acceptance by MPs that the long-term benefits of belonging to a united party (such as increased influence on legislation, lower transaction costs, and better chances of gaining office) outweigh the short-terms benefits of always voting for their ideal policy outcome. The book buttresses this argument through the analysis of both open-ended survey questions as well as survey questions on the costs and benefits of belonging to a political party in a legislature.

scholarly journals Professional activists? Party activism among political staffers in parliamentary democracies

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110273
Author(s):  
Pieter Moens
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
High Intensity ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Strong Commitment ◽  
Staff Recruitment

Although the position of the party on the ground has been weakened by cartelization, grassroots activists remain an important recruitment pool for political professionals. Based on unique survey data collected among the staff of 14 Belgian and Dutch parties (N = 1009), this article offers an in-depth analysis of party activism among this under-researched population. Introducing a new supply and demand framework, I argue that staff recruitment is shaped by candidate preferences (supply) and party preferences (demand). The findings demonstrate that most political staffers are high-intensity activists with a strong commitment to their party. Moreover, the theoretical model accurately predicts that non-activists are more common among policy and communication experts, ministerial staff, and those working for ideologically moderate parties. These findings show that paid staffers do not necessarily widen the gap between parties and activists. They also raise normative questions about internal congruence within parties in coalition governments.

scholarly journals A signed network perspective on the government formation process in parliamentary democracies

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Fontan ◽  
Claudio Altafini
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Formation Process ◽  
Signed Graph ◽  
Balance Theory ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Dynamical Models ◽  
Average Correlation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Signed Network ◽  
The Government

AbstractIn parliamentary democracies, government negotiations talks following a general election can sometimes be a long and laborious process. In order to explain this phenomenon, in this paper we use structural balance theory to represent a multiparty parliament as a signed network, with edge signs representing alliances and rivalries among parties. We show that the notion of frustration, which quantifies the amount of “disorder” encoded in the signed graph, correlates very well with the duration of the government negotiation talks. For the 29 European countries considered in this study, the average correlation between frustration and government negotiation talks ranges between 0.42 and 0.69, depending on what information is included in the edges of the signed network. Dynamical models of collective decision-making over signed networks with varying frustration are proposed to explain this correlation.

Parlamente in der Pandemie: Erste Erkenntnisse aus einem international vergleichenden Forschungsvorhaben

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 878-894
Author(s):  
Sven T. Siefken ◽  
Petra Guasti ◽  
Werner J. Patzelt ◽  
Osnat Akirav ◽  
Ken Coghill ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Infectious Disease ◽  
Historical Institutionalism ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
First Results ◽  
Legislative Activities ◽  
Parliamentary Oversight

During the pandemic, parliaments around the globe suffered a “double shock”: They had to adjust to the challenges of the infectious disease and uphold or (re-)establish their roles with regard to the executive . A closer investigation of 27 parliaments in different political systems gives a first in-depth comparative account for their initial reactions to the crisis . It is based on information from an ongoing collaboration of experts on parliaments and builds on a model of historical institutionalism . In some countries significant measures were taken, including restricting participation in parliamentary proceedings and moving some of them online . Committees served as a field of experimentation for digitalizing par­liaments . While only in a few countries legislative activities were strongly dominated by the pandemic, in most countries continuity across policy areas prevailed . More variety can be seen in institutional changes for parliamentary oversight . Communication activities intensi­fied with the pandemic, particularly from parliamentary leadership . These first results indi­cate that parliaments and established parliamentary democracies, in particular, were able to perform their functions despite unprecedented challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandem­ic .

scholarly journals Election proximity and representation focus in party-constrained environments

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge M. Fernandes ◽  
Cristina Leston-Bandeira ◽  
Carsten Schwemmer
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Context ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Party Size ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Electoral Cycle ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Constrained Environments ◽  
Written Questions ◽  
Elected Representatives ◽  
Over Time

Do elected representatives have a time-constant representation focus or do they adapt their focus depending on election proximity? In this paper, we examine this overlooked theoretical and empirical puzzle by looking at how reelection-seeking actors adapt their legislative behavior according to the electoral cycle. In parliamentary democracies, representatives need to serve two competing principals: their party and their district. Our analysis hinges on how representatives make a strategic use of parliamentary written questions in a highly party constrained institutional context to heighten their reselection and reelection prospects. Using an original dataset of over 32000 parliamentary questions tabled by Portuguese representatives from 2005 to 2015, we examine how time interacts with two keys explanatory elements: electoral vulnerability and party size. Results shows that representation focus is not static over time and, in addition, that electoral vulnerability and party size shape strategic use of parliamentary questions.

Legislative Governing Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies

1989 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
MILDRED SCHLESINGER
Keyword(s):  
Correlation Analysis ◽  
Third Republic ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Multiparty Systems ◽  
Leadership Group ◽  
Two Measures ◽  
Legislative Committees

A neglected aspect of parliamentary democracies that do not conform to the British model is the relation between executive and legislative leadership. In multiparty systems with strong legislative committees, committee chairmen constitute a governing coalition comparable to the cabinet. Given the coalitional nature of each leadership group, their partisan composition may not be identical; nor need they be equally stable. These are matters of importance for the operation of government. This article examines the relations between the two coalitions in the primordial parliamentary democracy, the French Third Republic. Using correlation analysis, I found a weak partisan relation between the two coalitions during the five legislatures of the interwar years. Using two measures of stability, durability and the continuity of coalitions beyond formal tenure, I found the legislative coalition always more stable. Institutional rules and the multiparty system helped account for these differences. Nevertheless, there was enough variation from legislature to legislature to show that electoral rules and results had an impact. Variations resembled those in the American republic. Periods of greater similarity in partisan composition coincided with greater effectiveness or stability for the executive; periods of divided control coincided with lesser executive stability. This was of consequence for the making of policy.

Economic Trends and Government Survival in West European Parliamentary Democracies

1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 875-887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Warwick
Keyword(s):  
Gross Domestic Product ◽  
Economic Indicators ◽  
Partial Likelihood ◽  
Likelihood Method ◽  
Domestic Product ◽  
Indicator Values ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Economic Trends ◽  
Complexity Hypothesis ◽  
Oil Crisis

In this study, I investigate the linkage between trends in key economic indicators (inflation, unemployment, and growth in gross domestic product) and government survival in 16 postwar European parliamentary democracies. The partial likelihood method, which allows for variation in indicator values over the lifetimes of individual governments, constitutes the basic analytic tool. The findings reveal overall causal roles for both inflation and unemployment, as well as important differences in these roles between socialist and bourgeois governments and between pre-oil crisis and post-oil crisis eras. Most significant, the introduction of these indicators to the analysis helps to resolve the debate between two rival explanations of governmental stability, the bargaining complexity hypothesis and the ideological diversity hypothesis, in favor of the latter.

Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
SONA NADENICHEK GOLDER
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Electoral Coalitions ◽  
Vast Literature ◽  
Coalition Size ◽  
Government Coalition

Political parties that wish to exercise executive power in parliamentary democracies are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to election or they can compete independently and form a government coalition afterwards. While there is a vast literature on government coalitions, little is known about pre-electoral coalitions. A systematic analysis of these coalitions using a new dataset constructed by the author and presented here contains information on all potential pre-electoral coalition dyads in twenty industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Finally, they are more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.

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