Economic Performance, Political Institutions and Cabinet Durability in 28 European Parliamentary Democracies, 1945–2011

2013 ◽  
pp. 51-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Saalfeld
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies

The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 534-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Mershon
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Policy Space ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Christian Democratic Party ◽  
Break Up

Governments in Italy both change and remain the same. From 1946 to 1992 the Christian Democratic Party always held governing power. But almost no cabinet stayed in office more than a few years, and many governments collapsed after only a few months. How can instability coexist with stability in this way? How can governments break up at such low cost and with so little effect on alternation? These questions are rooted in—but not resolved by—the available game-theoretic literature on coalitional behavior. My answer is that politicians' purposive actions can reduce the costs of coalition. I argue that the costs of making, breaking, and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions and on the array of parties and voters in policy space. Institutional and spatial conditions structure politicians' opportunities and attempts to lower costs. Under some conditions, as I show, coalitions are cheap, and politicians can easily make coalitions even cheaper. The inference is that this framework comprehends both Italy's extremes and the degrees of stability found in other parliamentary democracies.

Theories and Empirical Applications of Legislative Debate

2021 ◽  
pp. 34-50
Author(s):  
Jonathan Slapin ◽  
Sven-Oliver Proksch
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Text Analysis ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Parliamentary Debates ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Parliamentary Debate ◽  
Wide Range

This chapter explores the theoretical mechanisms underpinning the participation of Members of Parliament (MPs) in legislative debates across a wide range of parliaments. It argues that researchers must examine both strategic interactions within political parties and political institutions to develop an understanding of which MPs take the floor and how researchers can use legislative speeches to measure the essential concepts of polarization, intra-party dissent, and representation. The chapter discusses the basic institutional framework that governs debate across parliamentary democracies, provides an overview of an intra-party theory of parliamentary debate, and considers various possible extensions of the theory. Finally, the chapter illustrates how scholars can integrate insights from theories of parliamentary debates and text analysis of parliamentary speeches.

The Dynamics of Public Support for Coalition Governments

1995 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 350-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Institutional Context ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Party Support ◽  
The Relationship

This article investigates the relationship between economic conditions and party support for coalition parties in Denmark and the Netherlands. The article argues that the simple reward-punishment model cannot fully account for changes in citizens' support for parties, given variable economic performance. Using aggregate public support data for political parties, the article shows that citizens differentiate between coalition partners depending on the parties' issue priorities. Instead of blaming or rewarding all coalition parties in a uniform fashion, citizens shift support from one coalition party to another, depending on the perceived competence of a party to deal with particular economic problems. The article finds that the structure of responsibility in parliamentary democracies ruled by coalition governments is more complex than is often assumed. Therefore, it is argued that students of economics and public opinion should pay particular attention to the institutional context in which citizens make choices.

scholarly journals International Monetary Cooperation and Democratic Institutions: The Importance of Executive-Legislative Relations in Germany and France, 1919-1929

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-36
Author(s):  
Chansoo Cho
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
International Political Economy ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Institutional Variables ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Monetary Cooperation ◽  
International Interaction ◽  
Monetary Order

This article examines how changes in• formal political institutions can affect the extent to which a nationally defined monetary policy is committed to an international monetary order by comparing the German and French cases during the period of 1919–1929. There is no dearth of studies that employ domestic political institutional variables to explain policy outcomes regarding international economic relations. And at the same time, for the past decade, a host of “second image reversed” works have improved our understanding of domestic-international interaction. While many scholars of international political economy have written about domestic sources of trade policy, increasing numbers of authors have devoted substantial attention to the explanatory power of domestic variables in monetary issues. Particularly, when accounting for variations on democratic commitment to international monetary cooperation, the importance of executive-legislative relations deserves special attention. Germany and France during the 1920s provide us with an interesting pair of comparison in that their parliamentary democracies had subtle differences in executive-legislative relations.

Divided We Fall: Opposition Fragmentation and the Electoral Fortunes of Governing Parties

2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ko Maeda
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Clarity Of Responsibility ◽  
Election Results ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Opposition Parties

This article introduces the concept of opposition fragmentation into the study of the determinants of election results. Empirical studies have demonstrated that anti-government economic voting is likely to take place where the clarity of responsibility (the degree to which voters can attribute policy responsibility to the government) is high. This argument is extended by focusing on the effects of the degree of opposition fragmentation in influencing the extent to which poor economic performance decreases the government’s vote share. With data from seventeen parliamentary democracies, it is shown that when there are fewer opposition parties, the relationship between economic performance and governing parties’ electoral fortune is stronger. Opposition fragmentation appears to be as strong a factor as the clarity of responsibility.

Ministerial and Parliamentary Elites in Multilevel Spain 1977–2009

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 887-907 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Rodríguez-Teruel
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Political Careers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Political Experience ◽  
Elite Recruitment

Abstract In decentralized European parliamentary democracies future governing elites often acquire political experience and attain top positions by passing through sub-national political institutions. In doing so, elites circumvent and reduce the importance of national parliaments. Previous research has advanced several explanations for this pattern: Europe's tradition of bureaucratic government; parties with open methods for selecting parliamentary candidates; the “presidentialization” and Europeanization of national political systems. Since its transition to democracy in 1977, Spain has had an exceptionally small proportion of former MPs in its national cabinets. I employ data for Spanish ministers between 1977–2009 demonstrating the passage of a large proportion of cabinet ministers through local and regional government levels rather than the national parliament, the Cortes Generales. I show that multilevel rather than parliamentary political careers characterize ministerial elite recruitment, and I discuss the consequences for Spain's parliamentary democracy.

Contentious Politics and Democratization: Comparing the Impact of Social Movements on the Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe

2003 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
John K. Glenn
Keyword(s):  
Social Movements ◽  
Political Participation ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Comparative Research ◽  
Contentious Politics ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
New Directions ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, I identify and analyze the interaction between two processes – mobilization and bargaining – by which democratic challengers can transform political institutions, bringing together insights from the literatures on social movements, which tends to analyze movement emergence, and democratization, which tends to analyze the design of democratic institutions. I compare the impact of social movements in the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, cases that offer a valuable opportunity to extend the literature on contentious politics beyond its origins in the study of Western parliamentary democracies. The analysis directs attention to an under examined arena of political contestation, agenda setting, or the process by which the demands of social movements are translated into issues for governments. The paper argues that the traditional dichotomy between institutional and non-institutionalized contention has obscured the ways that democratic challengers not only pressure states from the outside but transform them through new forms of political participation. Finally, it considers alternative explanations and suggests new directions for comparative research across different settings and times.

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