Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Policies: The Risks of Executive Branch Lawmaking That Fails to “Take Care”

Author(s):  
Nancy Kassop
2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katie Keith ◽  
Joel McElvain

Since its enactment, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has faced numerous legal challenges. Many of these lawsuits have focused on implementation of the law and the limits of executive power. Opponents challenged the ACA under the Obama Administration while supporters have turned to the courts to prevent the Trump Administration from undermining the law. In the meantime, Congress remains gridlocked over the ACA and many other critical health policy issues, leaving the executive branch to adopt its preferred policy approach and ultimately leading to lawsuits. This article briefly discusses the history of litigation over the ACA and some reasons why this litigation has been so enduring. The article then identifies other areas of health policy that are or could be future targets for litigation. Finally, the article comments on the potential impact of the courts on future health reform efforts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-24
Author(s):  
Ronald J. Pestritto

AbstractFollowing the Roosevelt administration’s implementation of New Deal programs in the 1930s, the federal courts began to interpret the Constitution in a way that accommodated the rise of the “administrative state,” and bureaucratic policymaking continues to persist as a central feature of American government today. This essay submits, however, that the three pillars supporting the administrative state—the congressional delegation of Article I powers to the executive branch, the combination of powers within individual administrative entities, and the insulation of administrators from political control—might be reconsidered by the courts in the near future. After showing that the constitutionality of the administrative state has come under recent judicial scrutiny, the essay turns to the administrative law principle of deference, and argues that a reassessment of the Chevron doctrine seems imminent. Finally, the essay examines federal courts’ heavy use of “hard look” review as a means of curtailing agency discretion during recent administrations, and concludes that this judicial practice stands in uneasy tension with republican principles.


Author(s):  
Stephen Skowronek ◽  
John A. Dearborn ◽  
Desmond King

This chapter considers depth in staff, exploring the role of White House officials tasked to bridge the president’s personal direction with the institutional presidency and the executive branch at large. These staffers are normally part of the presidential party, collectively representing the different wings of the president’s electoral coalition. In the Trump administration, the White House staff jostled for influence and favor throughout the president’s first year. Trump bristled at their efforts to establish regular processes and to control the flow of information. The president saw management of that sort as an impingement on his authority to act on his own instincts and to direct his subordinates at will. Differences over the issue of trade afford a brief, but sharp, illustration of the tension between an institutional presidency and the personal direction of a unitary executive.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-117

On December 4, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court permitted the most recent version of President Trump's executive action restricting the entry of nationals from certain countries to take effect. The decision stayed nationwide injunctions granted by two federal district courts on constitutional and statutory grounds. This version of Trump's “travel ban,” (EO-3), issued on September 24, 2017, restricts the entry of nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—all of whom had been restricted under previous orders—as well as North Korea, Venezuela, and Chad. While litigation continues in the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the Trump administration fully implemented EO-3 by December 8.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael K. Gusmano ◽  
Frank J. Thompson

Abstract Within the American system of shared power among institutions, the executive branch has played an increasingly prominent policy role relative to Congress. The vast administrative discretion wielded by the executive branch has elevated the power of the president. Republican and Democratic presidents alike have employed an arsenal of administrative tools to pursue their policy goals: high-level appointments, administrative rule making, executive orders, proclamations, memoranda, guidance documents, directives, dear colleague letters, signing statements, reorganizations, funding decisions, and more. Presidents Obama and Trump employed most of these tools in an effort to shape the implementation and outcomes of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) during its first decade. This article focuses on the Obama and Trump administrations' use of comprehensive waivers to shape ACA implementation. The Obama administration had mixed success using waivers to convince Republican states to expand Medicaid. Compared to Obama, the Trump administration has found it harder to accomplish its policy goals through waivers, but if the courts support the Trump administration's work requirement and 1332 waiver initiatives, it would enable the president to use waivers to achieve an ever broader set of goals, including program retrenchment.


Subject Illegal mining. Significance The army this month announced the capture of two suspected members of the Clan del Golfo crime group (otherwise known as the Urabenos) in Buritica, Antioquia. The group is thought to be attempting to revive illegal mining in the area, which the government has targeted as part of a recent drive to tackle the crime. Despite increased security efforts nationwide, and the demobilisation of rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), however, little immediate improvement is anticipated. Impacts Gold mining firms are particularly at risk of illegal miners and will invest heavily in security. Gaining project licences may become more difficult if communities associate mining with destructive, unregulated operations. Environmental activism may contribute to the spread of illicit mining as permits for large-scale projects face mounting legal challenges. Security funding could come under further strain should the Trump administration curtail US financial support to Colombia.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-142

In the fall of 2019, the Trump administration reached several trade arrangements, some of them tentative, with important U.S. trade partners. On October 11, 2019, China and the United States announced a preliminary trade deal subject to finalization—one that came after more than a year of escalating tariffs. Just a week earlier, the United States had signed two trade agreements with Japan, one regarding tariff reductions and the other regarding digital trade. None of these deals appear to require subsequent congressional approval in the eyes of the executive branch, unlike the earlier United States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA), which was signed in November 2018 and whose fate in Congress appears promising as of mid-December of 2019. In addition to these trade arrangements, the fall of 2019 saw several developments in trade relations between the United States and the European Union tied to the long-running trade disputes.


Author(s):  
Stephen Skowronek ◽  
John A. Dearborn ◽  
Desmond King

This chapter considers depth in knowledge, focusing on rules-based protections for knowledge-based authority in the executive branch. Rules provide firmer footing for depth than norms do, but even rules strain under presidents bent on political control. With the so-called war on science ramping up again in the Trump administration, questions about whether and to what extent rules protect government research and expertise from the unitary executive have been pushed front and center. Here we consider four cases in which knowledge-based authority was besieged, focusing on the National Weather Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and the executive branch’s response to the coronavirus pandemic.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-170
Author(s):  
V. I. Bartenev

This paper identifi es and explains key changes in the U.S. aid policies towards Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) under Donald Trump. It seeks to validate two widespread arguments — the one about the current administration’s revision of pivotal principles of providing foreign assistance, and the other one — about an accelerated disengagement of the United States from the MENA region since 2017. The paper consists of four sections. The fi rst section explores the transformation of the U.S. strategic thinking and regional context under the Trump administration and then posits fi ve hypotheses about possible changes in the volume and composition of the U.S. assistance to the MENA region (in comparison with the fi nal two years of the Obama administration), as well as the diff erences in the executive branch and the Congress’s positions. The second section explains particularities of the statistical data and the methods of its exploration, the third section presents the results of hypothesis testing using aggregated data on aid fl ows to the region, and the fi nal section explains these results, sometimes unexpected, using the data disaggregated by country. Three of fi ve hypotheses proved wrong based on the aggregate data. First, the Trump administration did not cut assistance to the MENA more substantially than to other regions of the globe. Second, it did not ringfence aid accounts which helped yield direct dividends to the U.S. businesses. Third, the Republican Congress was clearly less willing to support the executive’s aid chocies under a new Republican President than during the last years of a Democrat Barack Obama’s second term. Only two hypotheses proved correct — one about a prioritization of security and military assistance under Donald Trump and the other one — about disproportionate cuts of democracy promotion assistance. Such an unexpected result calls for refi ning both aforementioned arguments and taking into account the dissimilarities in the dynamics of assistance to diff erent countries. The United States tends to practice a diff erentiated approach in dealing with two largest Arab aid recipients (Egypt and Jordan) and with other Arab countries. The assistance to Cairo and Amman is ringfenced and protected, while aid to other recipients, including security assistance and FMF grants, is prone to quite drastic cuts. This diff erentiation is explained by the fact that cooperation with Egypt and Jordan rests not only on more solid strategic foundations but also on a strong support within the United States — both from the defense contractors interested in large export contracts and from an infl uential pro-Israel lobby. The U.S. will not abandon this highly diff erentiated approach after the 2020 elections but the structure of assistance to the MENA region might undergo quite a dramatic transformation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-303 ◽  

Despite the passage of several statutory deadlines, by February 2018 the Trump administration had imposed no Russia-related sanctions pursuant to certain provisions of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), suggesting at one point that the threat of sanctions alone would be sufficient to deter further malfeasance. Then, on March 15, 2018, more than five months after the passage of an initial statutory deadline, the Trump administration announced that it would impose sanctions on five entities and nineteen individuals for their involvement in “malign” cyber activities on behalf of the Russian government.


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