The Men of 1830: Remembering the National Congress in the Belgian House of Representatives, 1844–1930

Author(s):  
Marnix Beyen

Significance The deal aims to create a Government of National Accord (GNA) to end the political crisis between the internationally recognised House of Representatives (HoR) based in Tobruk and the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC). However, there is strong opposition to the deal, not least from the presidents of the rival legislatures. Impacts The GNA will need to address concerns that it will be dominated by western Libyans, especially Misratans. Left unaddressed, this could open the door for renewed calls of autonomy or secessionism from the eastern Cyrenaica province. None of the Libyan factions will prioritise fighting ISG, but they will defend their territories.


Significance The deal aims to create a 'Government of National Accord' to resolve the rivalry between the two competing parliaments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). Although the HoR signed the deal, the GNC refused to accept it. Yet several other important GNC allies signed the agreement. This skirted outright failure of the UN peace process, but gives the mooted unity government a very shaky basis on which to proceed. Impacts Fissures within the Muslim Brotherhood and the GNC will likely dilute their influence in Libya. The UN Security Council will increase pressure on rejectionists to come into the fold or face sanctions and isolation. The deal may well result in peaceful, functioning areas, such as Misrata, keen to attract investment. However, other areas, such as Benghazi, will likely continue to see violence, which would cloud prospects for investment in stable areas.


Significance If a negotiated settlement is reached between the Libya Dawn bloc aligned with the General National Congress (GNC), and General Khalifa Haftar's Dignity bloc, loosely associated with the House of Representatives (HoR), its success during implementation will depend considerably on what happens to armed groups and militias. Small arms and light weapons have proliferated in Libya since the conflict in 2011 and the overthrow of the four-decade-old regime of former leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. Impacts Hardline elements opposed to a unity government will encourage actions to undermine the negotiations and any agreement. Statements in the name of ISG in Libya may also target the proposed new government. Low- to mid-level insecurity will remain the norm in Libya. Competition for local power will lead to further disruptions of some oil operations. Effective demobilisation and disarmament will not happen before 2016 at the earliest.


Significance They will probably discuss the final draft of the peace agreement between the two main rival political blocs: the pro-Islamist Libya Dawn bloc led by the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) parliament, and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) supported by the anti-Islamist Dignity bloc led by General Khalifa Haftar. Efforts to reach agreement on creating a single government -- the Government of National Accord (GNA) -- have been bulding over the past year. This has stoked rejectionists and spoilers on both sides, although an increase in local ceasefire initiatives has increased the prospects of a deal. Impacts Any new government would likely move quickly to sign deals with foreign companies on construction, electricity and water provision. However, it would likely be split between those preferring to work with European and Turkish or US and UK companies. Fragmentation and the need to meet urgent political deadlines, such as on the constitution, will hamper the GNA's effectiveness.


Africa ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 382-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Ayodele Langley

Opening ParagraphThe Gambia was the last of the four English-speaking West African colonies to organize a local branch of the National Congress movement. As in Sierra Leone the local committee was dominated by ‘middle class’ Creoles, although active Muslim members included Sheikh Omar Fye, who played a leading role in local politics up to the early 1950s and was a leading spokesman of the Muslim community in Bathurst. Other Muslim members were Njagga Saar, a local carpenter; Omar Jallow, described as a ‘prominent agriculturist’; Amar Gaye Cham, vice-president of the 1923-4 local executive committee and a dealer. Creoles active in the local committee came largely from the mercantile and legal professions. Isaac J. Roberts, who was president of the 1925-6 committee, was a prominent solicitor of Sierra Leone descent. He was a merchant before going to England to read law; he practised in Bathurst and Lagos despite the loss of his eyesight which occurred during his student days in England. He represented the Gambia at the Lagos Session of the NCBWA in 1930. He died in Freetown in April 1933 at the age of eighty-two. M. S. J. Richards, one of the vice-presidents of the 1923-4 local executive committee, was a local trader; J. A. Mahoney (later Sir John Mahoney and Speaker of the Gambia House of Representatives) was formerly a government employee who later worked for the French firm C.F.A.O. as a mercantile clerk; the Hon. S. J. Forster, first president of the local committee, came from a distinguished Creole family and served for several years on the Legislative Council; J. E. Mahoney was the nephew of S. J. Forster and was also a trader. B. J. George, local secretary of the committee from 1921 to 1923, and delegate to the Freetown Session in 1923, was a commission agent; Henry M. Jones was a wealthy trader and was one of the Gambian delegates to the NCBWA London committee in 1920-1; until the 1921 slump and the depression of the 1930s, ‘Pa ’ Jones was influential in both business circles and in local politics. Other prominent Creole traders associated with the local committee were E. F. Small, delegate to the Accra Conference and the London committee; E. A. T. Nicol, E. J. C. Rendall, and E. N. Jones.


2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (10) ◽  
pp. 917-921
Author(s):  
Antonio Pedro Mirra ◽  
Adriana Pereira de Carvalho

Summary Introduction: In the tobacco control program, educational, socioeconomic, ecological and legislative actions should be planned. Legislative actions should include the federal, state and municipal spheres, have a primarily preventive purpose and federal reach. Objective: Survey of bills presented in both legislative houses at federal level, House of Representatives and Senate (which together form the National Congress) and the resulting laws. Method: In the period from 1965 to 2015, 254 bills were filed with the House of Representatives and, from 1971 to 2015, 68 others were presented to the Senate. Results: In the House of Representatives, of the 254 bills, 68.9% were archived/rejected/returned, 14.9% did not have a result, 12.2% are currently being processed/analyzed by commissions, 2.0% refer to the inclusion of amendments/law annexes, 1.2% were transformed into legal norm/proposition of origin and 0.8% were transformed into laws. In the Senate, of the 68 bills, 19.1% were filed, 33.8% did not have a result, 4.4% were currently being processed, and 42.7% referred to changes in the law. Anti--tobacco actions were more prevalent in the periods 1979-1984 by the AMB, 1985-2007 by MS/INCA, and in 2008-2015 by the ACT. Conclusion: Tobacco control legislation has progressed constantly, with the provocation of legislators from both Houses triggered by the MS/INCA and civil entities committed to smoking control, such as a number of non-governmental organizations (especially the AMB and the ACT).


Significance The fight has been hampered by the contest between the GNA and two rival administrations -- the now-sidelined Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) and the eastern, Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). Some armed groups support the rival administrations, but others are outside their control and are pursuing their own agendas. Impacts International diplomatic pressure for an agreement between the GNA and Haftar may grow. However, progress on security will hinge on developing and implementing a single framework for national and local security forces. Meanwhile, sporadic attacks against political targets will be a risk in Tripoli and other cities. Disruptions in oil and gas production are likely, even after restarts.


2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 53-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Rehfeld

Every ten years, the United States “constructs” itself politically. On a decennial basis, U.S. Congressional districts are quite literally drawn, physically constructing political representation in the House of Representatives on the basis of where one lives. Why does the United States do it this way? What justifies domicile as the sole criteria of constituency construction? These are the questions raised in this article. Contrary to many contemporary understandings of representation at the founding, I argue that there were no principled reasons for using domicile as the method of organizing for political representation. Even in 1787, the Congressional district was expected to be far too large to map onto existing communities of interest. Instead, territory should be understood as forming a habit of mind for the founders, even while it was necessary to achieve other democratic aims of representative government.


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