QBism from a Phenomenological Point of View: Husserl and QBism

Author(s):  
Laura de La Tremblaye
Author(s):  
Helena De Preester

This chapter argues that the most basic form of subjectivity is different from and more fundamental than having a self, and forwards a hypothesis about the origin of subjectivity in terms of interoception. None of those topics are new, and a consensus concerning the homeostatic-interoceptive origin of subjectivity is rapidly growing in the domains of the neurosciences and psychology. This chapter critically explores that growing consensus, and it argues that the idea that the brain topographically represents bodily states is unfit for thinking about the coming about of subjectivity. In the first part, four inherent characteristics of subjectivity are discussed from a philosophical phenomenological point of view. The second part explores whether a model of subjectivity in which interoception maintains its crucial role is possible without relying on topographical representations of the in-depth body, and giving due to the inherent characteristics of subjectivity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 265-273
Author(s):  
Eckhard Lobsien

Abstract What sort of object is a literary text? From a phenomenological point of view - phenomenology considered as both a radical theory of reading and a theory of radical reading - a range of answers arise, many of them tinged with deconstructive momentum. This paper aims at pointing out some basic issues in reading literary texts, offering ten theses on the enduring tasks of phenomenological literary theory.


PhaenEx ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 62-85
Author(s):  
Michael Staudigl

This paper examines the relationship between religion and violence from a phenomenological point of view. In the context of the so-called "return of the religious" and the crisis of contemporary social imaginaries, it deals with the supposedly disruptive and liberating potentials of religion in general, and religious violence in particular. The discussion revolves around the concept of "verticality" as developed by A. Steinbock and offers a generative interpretation of verticality's liberating and transformative potentials. The paper proceeds to demonstrate how religion and violence are interrelated on a variety of levels. In conclusion the author argues that we need to understand the relationship between religion and violence in terms of its contingent actualization and display but must avoid pitting it down as an essential feqture of religious systems of knowledge and practice.


1998 ◽  
Vol 53 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 157-170
Author(s):  
H. Baur

Abstract The glass transition caused by a finite cooling rate is a continuous non-linear dissipative process whose description requires a clear distinction between equilibrium and non-equilibrium quantities. The so-called Davies or Prigogine-Defay relations (in form of an equation as well as in form of an inequality) are not relevant in such a process. The determining quantities of the glass transition are -from a macroscopic phenomenological point of view -the fluidity of the melt and the partial free enthalpy of the microscopic vacancies in the melt. All of the characteristics of the dynamics of the glass transition are essentially due to these two quantities.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 963-963
Author(s):  
B.L. Buda ◽  
G.A. Tóth

Qui non zelat, non amat. One who does not burn, does not love - as Saint Augustine states. Jealousy is a troublesome emotion dominating mankind for time beyond all memory.However, it seems to be unclear, what constitutes normal jealousy and where the boundaries of pathological jealousy should be drawn. From the phenomenological point of view, psychiatrists' attention has always been focused on delusional jealousy, as a psychotic symptom. Obsessional jealousy, where the thought has the quality of obsessional ideation, is the topic of much fewer publications. The first clearly defined cases of obsessional jealousy were published by Mooney in 1965. In 1979, Cobb defined jealous ruminations as obsessive thoughts with the resultant compulsive rituals of checking on spouse. In 2007, Agarwal conducted a Medline search and retrieved no more than 20 relevant publications on this topic.In this presentation the authors discuss the cases of 3 young (21–27-year-old) women. In all cases, pathological jealousy with clearly obsessive characteristics was the leading or only psychiatric symptom. Two women were successfully treated with low doses of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (sertralin and fluvoxamine, respectively), while in one case, because of adverse SSRI effects, reversible inhibitor of monoamine oxidase A was administered. Obsessive jealousy, in contrast to delusive one, often affects young people, causing severe difficulties in gender socialisation, lowering the chances of finding an appropriate conjugal partner, hereby markedly worsening the quality of life. Proper differential diagnosis is, however, essential for choosing an adequate and successful treatment option.


Author(s):  
Xavier Calmet

In this paper, we investigate a possible energy scale dependence of the quantization rules and, in particular, from a phenomenological point of view, an energy scale dependence of an effective (reduced Planck’s constant). We set a bound on the deviation of the value of at the muon scale from its usual value using measurements of the anomalous magnetic moment of the muon. Assuming that inflation has taken place, we can conclude that nature is described by a quantum theory at least up to an energy scale of about 10 16  GeV.


Author(s):  
Agustín Serrano de Haro

Mi ensayo trata de mostrar que es insostenible la ficción de Rorty de una civilización avanzada científicamente cuyos habitantes no sintieran el dolor como una vivencia sufrida en primera persona y que únicamente lo captaran como una excitación objetiva de su sistema nervioso. Entre otras dudas relativas a que esa captación objetiva y exacta se hallaría en indefinida reconstrucción teórica y a que ella no puede ser la experiencia primera del dolor ni siquiera en esa otra galaxia, aduzco que tener un estado fisiológico no equivale por principio a captarlo y que captar determinados rasgos objetivos no puede equivaler por principio a sufrir, a padecer. Concluyo señalando que Rorty, en su empeño por impugnar las representaciones mentales, pierde de vista cómo la experiencia del dolor manifiesta sobre todo la condición originaria del cuerpo vivido.My paper tries to show that Rorty’s fiction of a scientifically developed civilization whose inhabitants should not feel pain as a first-person experience, but would grasp it rather as an objective state of their nervous system, is unsustainable from a phenomenological point of view. I point out several doubts concerning the facts that such an objective apprehension would be in an indefinite process of theoretical reconstruction, and that even in that other galaxy it could not be valid as the original pain situation (for example, among children). But then I focus on the principles that to have a physiological state cannot be equiva-lent to grasping it, and second that to grasp several objective features cannot be equivalent to suffering or to undergoing pain. I conclude by suggesting that Rorty’s eagerness to discard mental representations made him neglect the lived body as implied in everyday experience: the body, not the mind, comes to the fore in the experience of pain.


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