scholarly journals The AI and Robot Entity

2021 ◽  
pp. 173-176
Author(s):  
Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo

AbstractRobots are instruments of the human being who is intelligent and free. Aristotle defines being free as the one that is cause of himself or exists on his own and for himself (causa sui or causa sui ipsius). By contrast, the instrument is not a cause of itself and does not work by the power of its entity, but only by the motion imparted by the principal agent, so that the effect is not likened to the instrument but to the principal agent. From the Christian perspective, for a being to be free and a cause of himself, it is necessary that he/she be a person endowed with a spiritual and incorruptible soul, on which his or her cognitive and free activity is based. An artificially intelligent robotic entity does not meet this standard. As an artefact and not a natural reality, the AI/robotic entity is invented by human beings to fulfil a purpose imposed by human beings. It can become a perfect entity that performs operations in quantity and quality more precisely than a human being, but it cannot choose for itself a different purpose from what it was programmed for by a human being. As such, the artificially intelligent robot is a means at the service of humans.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (Issue 4) ◽  
pp. 119-124
Author(s):  
Innocent Sanga

Animal right is one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary world. A number of scholars have been discussing on whether the animals have rights like human beings or not. Through this debate, their opinions can be put into three groups; those who deny animal moral status, those who give some moral considerations to animals but deny them a fuller moral status, and those who extend rights to animals. This paper then gives a general overview on ‘Do Animals have Rights?’ It gives the meaning of the term “right” and explains whether the term right applies to animals too. It also portrays a drama whereby animals complain against sufferings imposed on them by human beings and a response given by a human being. It is also followed by philosophical debate on animal rights: pro and cons arguments. The Christian perspective is not left out. Finally, the paper ends with critical evaluations and conclusion. In evaluation of the debate on animal rights, the study found that, animals deserve to be treated well based on the argument that they have rights as animals. The main recommendation is that human beings should change their perception concerning animals by respecting animal.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (13) ◽  
pp. 125-144
Author(s):  
Jesús Víctor Alfredo Contreras Ugarte

Summary: Reflecting on the role humans take into nowadays society, should be of interest in all our social reflections, even for those that refer to the field of law. Any human indifferent and unconscious of the social role that he ought to play within society, as a member of it, is an irresponsible human detached from everything that surrounds him, regarding matters and other humans. Trying to isolate in an irresponsible, passive and comfortable attitude, means, after all, denying oneself, denying our nature, as the social being every human is. This is the reflection that this academic work entitles, the one made from the point of view of the Italian philosopher Rodolfo Mondolfo. From a descriptive development, starting from this renowned author, I will develop ideas that will warn the importance that human protagonism have, in this human product so call society. From a descriptive development, from this well-known author, I will be prescribing ideas that will warn the importance of the protagonism that all human beings have, in that human product that we call society. I have used the descriptive method to approach the positions of the Italian humanist philosopher and, for my assessments, I have used the prescriptive method from an eminently critical and deductive procedural position. My goal is to demonstrate, from the humanist postulates of Rodolfo Mondolfo, the hypothesis about the leading, decision-making and determining role that the human being has within society. I understand, to have reached the demonstration of the aforementioned hypothesis, because, after the analyzed, there is no doubt, that the human being is not one more existence in the development of societies; its role is decisive in determining the human present and the future that will house the next societies and generations of our historical future.


2021 ◽  
pp. 126-150
Author(s):  
Gerald McKenny

For Barth, responsibility is the characteristic feature of the human being as the hearer of God’s command. In its address to human beings, God’s command constitutes them as subjects who are answerable to it. Jesus Christ is the one to whom the command of God is addressed and who answers it; as such, he is the responsible subject on behalf of and in the place of other human beings. Yet in taking responsibility for other human beings in this way, God also makes them responsible—for being in their conduct those for whom God has taken responsibility. Insofar as God has taken responsibility for our responsibility, Barth rejects the tendency of modern responsibility to presume that everything is up to us. Yet insofar as God also makes us responsible, and thereby constitutes us as subjects, Barth retains another key feature of modern responsibility, which is its urgency. While answerability or accountability is the key aspect of responsibility, Barth also leaves room for the imputability of actions to agents and the liability of persons for the effects of their actions. One problem with Barth’s account of responsibility is that his insistence that we are constituted as responsible from outside ourselves, by God’s command, he leaves unclear how it is truly we who are responsible. Another problem is that if we are made responsible by the responsibility Jesus Christ has taken for us, it appears that only Christians know themselves to be responsible.


1998 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-156
Author(s):  
Henning Eichberg

Contradictions of Modernity. Conflicting Configurations and Societal Thinking in Grundtvig's »The Human Being in the World«A Worm - a God. About the Human Being in the World. Ove Korsgaard (ed.). With contributions of Niels Buur Hansen, Hans Hauge, Bosse Bergstedt, Uffe Jonas and Knud Bjarne Gjesing. Odense Universitetsforlag 1997.By Henning EichbergIn 1817, Grundtvig wrote »Om Mennesket i Verden« which can be regarded as a key to the understanding of his philosophy and psychology, but which is difficult to place in relation to his later folkelig, societal engagement. A recent reedition of this text together with some actual comments by Grundtvig researchers is an occasion to quest deeper about this relation.However, it is not enough to ask - as Grundtvig research has done for a long time - what Grundtvig wanted to say, but his text can be regarded as a document of how modem orientation in the world is characterized by conflicting linguistic and metaphorical patterns, which sometimes may tell another story than intended.On the one hand, Grundtvig's text speaks of a lot of dualistic contradictions such as life vs. death, light vs. darkness, truth vs. lie, God vs. devil, human fall vs. resurrection, body vs. spirit, nature vs. history and time vs. eternity. In contrast to the author's intention to produce clarity and lucidity - whether in the spirit of Christianity or of modem rationality - the binary constructions give rather a confusing picture of systematical disorder where polarity and polemics are mixed, antagonism and gradual order, dichotomy and exclusive either-or, paradoxes and dialectical contradictions. On the other hand,Grundtvig tries again and again to build up three-pole imaginations as for instance the threefold human relation to time, space and truth and the three ages of spiritual seeing, feeling and conceptualization resp. of mythology (childhood), theology (youth) and history (adult age). The main history, Grundtvig wants to tell in his text, is built up around the trialectic relation of the human being to the body, to the spirit and to itself, to the living soul.The most difficult to understand in this relation seems to be what Grundtvig calls the spirit, Aanden. Grundtvig describes it as Aandigt Samfund mellem Menneske og Sandhed, »the spiritual community between the human being and the truth«, and this may direct our attention towards samfund, meaning at the same time association, togetherness and society. Aanden is described by threefold effects - will, conscience and faith, all of them describing social relations between human beings resp. their psychological correlate. The same social undertone is true when Grundtvig characterizes three Aande-Livets Spor (»traces of spiritual life«): the word, the history and love. If »the spirit« represents what is larger or »higher« than the single human being and what cannot be touched by his or her hand, then this definition fits exactly to society or the sociality of the human being. Social life - whether understood as culture, social identity or folk (people) - is not only a quantitative sum of human individuals, but represents another quality of natural order. Thus it has its logic that Grundtvig places the human being in between the realms of minerals, plant and animal life on the one hand and the »higher« order on the other, which can be understood as the social existence.In this respect, the societal dimension is not at all absent in his philosophy of 1817. However, it is not enough to state the implicite presence of sociality as such in the earlier Grundtvigian thinking before his folkelig break-through. What was the sociality, more concretely, which Grundtvig experienced during the early modernity? In general, highly dichotomous concepts are dominating the modem discourse as capitalism vs. feudalism, materialism vs. idealism, modernity vs. premodemity, democracy vs. absolutism or revolution vs. restoration; Grundtvig was always difficult to place into these patterns. Again, it might be helpful to try a trialectical approach, transcending the dualism of state and market by civil society as a third field of social action. Indeed, it was civil society with its farmers' anarchist undertones which became the contents of Grundtvig's later folk engagement.


2014 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Riaan Rheeder

God did not create once and then put an end to it. Testimony from Scripture shows that God continuously establishes or creates new things. Humans can therefore expect to always see and experience new things in creation. With this pattern of reasoning, one can anticipate that the human being as image of God will continuously establish new things in history. Although nature has value, it does not have absolute value and therefore it can be synthesised responsibly. The thought that humans are stewards of God is no longer adequate to, theologically put into words, the relationship human beings have with nature. New biotechnological developments ask for different answers from Scripture. Several ethicists are of the opinion that the theological construction of humans and created co-creators can help found the relationship of the human being to nature. Humans developed as God’s image evolutionary. On the one hand, this means humans themselves are a product of nature. On the other hand, the fact that humans are the image of God is also an ethical call that humans, like God, have to develop and create new things throughout history. Synthetic biology can be evaluated as technology that is possible, because humans are the image of God. However, it should, without a doubt, be executed responsibly.Sintetiese biologie eties geëvalueer: Die skeppende God en medeskeppende mens. God het nie net eenmaal geskep en daar gestop nie. Uit Skrifgetuienisse kan afgelei word dat God voortdurend nuwe dinge tot stand bring of skep. Daarom kan die mens verwag om gedurig nuwe dinge in die skepping te sien en te beleef. Hiermee saam kan verwag word dat die mens as beeld van God voortdurend nuwe dinge in die geskiedenis tot stand sal bring. Alhoewel die natuur waarde het, het dit nie absolute waarde nie en kan dus verantwoordelik gesintetiseer word. Die gedagte dat die mens rentmeester van God is, is nie meer voldoende om die mens se verhouding tot die natuur teologies te verwoord nie. Nuwe biotegnologiese ontwikkelinge vra na ander antwoorde vanuit die Skrif. Verskeie etici is van mening dat die teologiese konstruksie van die mens as geskepte medeskepper kan help om die mens se verhouding tot die natuur te begrond. Die mens het deur ’n evolusionêre proses tot God se beeld ontwikkel. Aan die een kant beteken dit dat die mens self ’n produk van die natuur is. Aan die ander kant is beeldskap ook ’n etiese oproep dat die mens, soos God, nuwe dinge in die geskiedenis moet ontwikkel en skep. Sintetiese biologie kan gesien word as tegnologie wat moontlik is omdat die mens na die beeld van God geskape is. Sonder twyfel moet sintetiese biologie egter verantwoordelik beoefen word.


Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. J. MacIntosh
Keyword(s):  

1. The problem: Here are three plausible but incompatible propositions:(1) The answer to Locke's question (23):Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night … I ask … whether the day and the night man would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato ?is yes.(2) I am a human being. More generally, human persons are human beings.(3) Identity is not relative.


1991 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Madell

The central fact about the problem of personal identity is that it is a problem posed by an apparent dichotomy: the dichotomy between the objective, third-person viewpoint on the one hand and the subjective perspective provided by the first-person viewpoint on the other. Everyone understands that the mind/body problem is precisely the problem of what to do about another apparent dichotomy, the duality comprising states of consciousness on the one hand and physical states of the body on the other. By contrast, contemporary discussions of the problem of personal identity generally display little or no recognition of the divide which to my mind is at the heart of the problem. As a consequence, there has been a relentlessly third-personal approach to the issue, and the consequent proposal of solutions which stand no chance at all of working. I think the idea that the problem is to be clarified by an appeal to the idea of a human being is the latest manifestation of this mistaken approach. I am thinking in particular of the claim that what ought to govern our thinking on this issue is the fact that human beings constitute a natural kind, and that standard members of this kind can be said to have some sort of essence. Related to this is the idea that ‘person’, while not itself a natural kind term, is not a notion which can be framed in entire independence of this natural kind.


Author(s):  
Juan Pablo Aranda Vargas

La pregunta sobre la distinción entre el reino animal y la especie humana es tan antigua como la razón misma. Dos extremos pueden ser identificados: la idea del ser humano como dictador de la naturaleza, que gobierna la vida y la muerte de las especies según su utilidad al proyecto humano; y la conceptualización del ser humano como administrador de la naturaleza, como responsable de su desarrollo armónico. El Concilio Vaticano II marcó un viraje hacia la segunda alternativa. En este contexto, la tauromaquia —como ejemplo paradigmático— puede ser cuestionada desde el catolicismo posconciliar y, más específicamente, desde la ecología integral de Francisco. The inquiry about the distinction between human beings and animals is as old as hu- man reason. We can identify two extreme positions: the conceptualization of the human kind as a dictator over nature who rules the species’ life and death according to its utility to the human project, and the view of the human being as nature’s administrator, as the one in charge of its harmonic development. The Second Vatican Council oriented the Catholic Church towards the second alternative. In this context, bullfights –a paradigmatic example– can be questioned by post-conciliar Catholicism and, more speci cally, from Francis’ integral ecology. 


2003 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-125
Author(s):  
Anja Stokholm

Om forholdet mellem skabelse og syndefald hos Grundtvig og Luther[Grundtvig and Luther: on the Relationship Between Creation and Fall]By Anja StokholmTheologically speaking, two circumstances determine human life: on the one side, Creation and the creativity of God, on the other the Fall of Man and human sinfulness. Because God’s good creation is continuous, a positive understanding of the status and existence of natural Man is possible; but because Man is fallen and sin destroys creation, a negative perception of human life must also be acknowledged. Useful comparison may be made between the ideas of Grundtvig and Luther on this ambiguous relationship. One may ask of each: was the image of God in Man destroyed at the Fall or does the likeness of God remain a reality even in the fallen human being? Is it possible for natural Man to understand the Gospel and the Christian life? Can the understanding of the Gospels only have a negative character because it is reached from out of consciousness of sin; or can this understanding have a positive character because, sin notwithstanding, momentary experiencing of the truth of the Gospels may be granted? Are the views of Grundtvig and Luther too divergent to be reconciled?Regin Prenter maintained that their two positions closely corresponded, arguing that Grundtvig consistently developed Luther’s reformatory principles rejecting the possibility of human beings gaining justice or salvation by their own merit, and thereby also accepted that only in consciousness of the fallen condition of the world, the subverted nature of humanity, and sin, could the Gospel’s promises be received. Prenter’s harmonisation of Grundtvig and Luther, however, gives insufficient weight to the differences. Luther contends that the image of God in Man is lost, that Man is wholly sinful and unjustified; that just as inward spirit and outward flesh are discrete and cannot mix so are the justified and the unjustified states; and it follows that the unjustified human being is to be perceived a flesh alone. In so far as continuous creation, and manifestations of the positive such as the human capacity to recognise and comply with the demands of the law, are to be found in the world, these arise not from the inner resources of human beings but from the unmerited gift of God.Grundtvig too emphasises the seriousness and destructive nature of sin; but he insists that a remnant of the image of God persists in humanity - for instance in Man’s capacity to live in faith, hope and love, and to nurture the Word (that is, speech); and that its manifestation is a token of God’s continuing, and good, creation. Crucially important is Grundtvig’s conception that the image of God is located in the human heart, for this implies that goodness and the positive phenomena of creation express human life and nature in their true and proper form, and thus Grundtvig is able to identify natural human life, governed by the heart, as a positive context within which the word of the Gospel is indeed comprehensible. In differentiation, then, from Luther, Grundtvig maintains that natural Man also has a spirit and can be the agent of love and of goodness.Is this position incompatible with Luther’s doctrine on justification? Does the notion of goodness imply that Man can and must contribute to his own salvation? Grundtvig is careful to maintain that positive qualities such as love and goodness are a creation of God in Man, not an autonomous human achievement; and that the grace of God’s continuing creation in Man does not render salvation unnecessary. Man still needs the redeeming creation of Christ.Thus there are considerable differences between Grundtvig and Luther; but Grundtvig’s ideas are to be seen as a renewal and an independent continuation of Luther’s principal doctrine: that God alone can accomplish salvation. Yet acknowledgement and awareness of the differences, which arise in part through the different times and circumstances in which these independent thinkers worked, is conducive to a productive dialogue between the two.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 19-34
Author(s):  
Lyn Holness

AbstractSpeaking of Mary's womb, Hans Urs von Balthasar draws attention to the place where the Word 'staked out' a space in a human being in order there itself to become man (human), as the child of a mother. In similar vein we are directed to the mystery that Catholic and Orthodox Christians have always overtly recognized: Mary's unique place among human beings as the one who 'contains the uncontainable God.' If this mystery lies at the heart of our faith, then at the heart of that heart is God's grace. In grace God selects a poor, Galilean girl to be the locus of what Christians believe to be the most extraordinary thing that has ever happened. There is much to learn about 'grace, space and race' through reflection on what occurred in Mary's womb, not least in the relationship between immanence and transcendence. This and other themes which have their origin here provide both the imagery and the theological undergirding for other themes – more concrete, specific, and contemporary – that we might explore in a theology of place in (South) Africa today.


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