Osculating Planes and Class of Curves with an Osculating Plane in the Strong Sense

Author(s):  
A. D. Alexandrov ◽  
Yu. G. Reshetnyak
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Osmond

This paper examines the electoral and ideological contest that has taken place between Welsh Labour and Plaid Cymru in the five National Assembly elections that have been held between 1999 and 2016. Both parties have found success when they have managed to combine effective leadership with a coherent programme and a strong sense of Welsh identity. However, the Welsh vote to leave the EU in the June 2016 referendum has dealt both parties a poor hand in speaking up for Welsh interests. Can they find a common cause in working together and also with Scotland to take Wales forward in a progressive constitutional direction?


Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood

Internalism implies that rationality requires nothing more than what in the broadest sense counts as ‘coherence’. The earlier chapters of this book argue that rationality is in a strong sense normative. But why does coherence matter? The interpretation of this question is clarified. An answer to the question would involve a general characterization of rationality that makes it intuitively less puzzling why rationality is in this strong sense normative. Various approaches to this question are explored: a deflationary approach, the appeal to ‘Dutch book’ theorems, the idea that rationality is constitutive of the nature of mental states. It is argued that none of these approaches solves the problem. An adequate solution will have to appeal to some value that depends partly on how things are in the external world—in effect, an external goal—and some normatively significant connection between internal rationality and this external goal.


2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Gildersleeve

The cultural association of Queensland with a condition of imagination or unreality has a strong history. Queensland has always ‘retained much of its quality as an abstraction, an idea’, asserts Thea Astley in her famous essay on the state's identity (Astley 1976: 263). In one of the most quoted descriptions of Queensland's literary representation, Pat Buckridge draws attention to its ‘othering’, suggesting that Queensland possesses ‘a different sense of distance, different architecture, a different apprehension of time, a distinctive preoccupation with personal eccentricity, and . . . a strong sense of cultural antitheses’ (1976: 30). Rosie Scott comes closest to the concerns of this present article when she asserts that this so-called difference ‘is definitely partly to do with the landscape. In Brisbane, for instance, the rickety old wooden Queenslanders drenched in bougainvillea, the palms, the astounding number of birds even in Red Hill where I lived, the jacarandas, are all unique in Australia’ (quoted in Sheahan-Bright and Glover 2002: xv). For Vivienne Muller, Buckridge's ‘cultural antitheses’ are most clearly expressed in precisely this interpretation of Queensland as a place somewhere between imagined wilderness and paradise (2001: 72). Thus, as Gillian Whitlock suggests, such differences are primarily fictional constructs that feed ‘an image making process founded more on nationalist debates about city and bush, centre and periphery, the Southern states versus the Deep North than on any “real” sense of regionalism’ (quoted in Muller 2001: 80). Queensland, in this reading, is subject to the Orientalist discourse of an Australian national identity in which the so-called civilisation of the south-eastern urban capitals necessitates a dark ‘other’. I want to draw out this understanding of the landscape as it is imagined in Queensland women's writing. Gail Reekie (1994: 8) suggests that, ‘Women's sense of place, of region, is powerfully constructed by their marginality to History.’ These narratives do assert Queensland's ‘difference’, but as part of an articulation of psychological extremity experienced by those living on the edges of a simultaneously ideological and geographically limited space. The Queensland landscape, I argue, is thus used as both setting for and symbol of traumatic experience.


1989 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Detmold

Law is practical. Legal reasoning is practical reasoning. We could make nothing of a judge who having listened to counsel's arguments and reflected about the law governing his case thought that the state of knowledge that he had achieved was the natural termination of his enterprise and submitted his conclusions to the editors of Halsbury's Laws of England rather than performed the action of giving judgment. The parties would be outraged, and rightly. And if the judge continued to do such a thing he would be dismissed. Legal reasoning is practical in the sense that its natural conclusion is an action (in the judge's case the action of giving judgment) rather than a state of knowledge. This is taking “practical” in a strong sense. By this definition thought is practical whose natural conclusion is an action (or decision against action): its strongest contrast is with theoretical thought whose natural conclusion is knowledge. But it also contrasts with hypothetical thought about action (say, my thinking it would be good to play cricket again). I do not call this practical because it does not conclude in an action or decision against action (others do; for example John Finnis in Fundamentals of Ethics; my reasons for differing in this matter will emerge). A judge's practical reasoning towards the action of giving judgment has priority for our understanding of law over that vast range of practically idle things that lawyers do, from the construction of digests like Halsbury to casual reflection about the rule in Shelley's case (of course there is one sort of doing involved in both these, but not legal doing). It is important here to be clear about this priority. It is a priority of practicality, not a priority of judges or lawyers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-15
Author(s):  
Peter G. Neumann

Mini-editorial (PGN) 2020 was a crazy year, with all kinds of risks on display. As usual, many of the lessons noted in past issues of SEN and RISKS have been largely ignored, and failures continue to mirror events from the past that have long been discussed here. Issues such as safety, security, and reliability always seem to need more foresight than they receive. Y2K con- tinues to hit somewhere each New Year's Day, when short- term remediations that demanded periodic upgrading have been forgotten. (I suppose old COBOL code will still ex- ist in year 2100, when there may be ambiguities relating to dates that could be 21xx or 20xx (although 19xx is unlikely), and the narrow windowing xes will fail even more dramati- cally.) Election integrity continues to be a real concern, where we are caught in the crosshairs between computer systems and networks that are not meaningfully trustworthy or au- ditable, and the nontechnological risks are still pervasive from unbalanced redistricting, creative dysinformation, poli- tics, Citzens United, and foreign interference. We need non- partisan scrutiny and defense against would-be subverters to overcome potential attacks and inadvertent mistakes. In pres- ence of potential risks in every part of the process, a strong sense of risk-awareness is required by voters, election officials, and the media (both proactively and remedially, as needed).


Author(s):  
Maya Bielinski

There is a new generation of scholarship in the humanities, and it is rooted in twenty-first century technology. In response to what some have called the "crisis in humanities," scholars have begun to tackle their research questions armed with digital tools and a strong sense of collaboration in order to think across disciplines, allow for greater accessibility, and ultimately to create bigger impact. Digital Humanities, or DH, is this exciting and growing field--or maybe methodology--used by humanities scholars to share and create scholarly content.Despite the growing fervour for DH across Canada, many scholars at Queen's have yet to take advantage of the opportunities for research and teaching afforded by DH. I believe that by bringing together Digital Humanities practitioners at Queen's University, more scholars, faculty, and students would learn about and engage in dialogue about fostering and furthering DH scholarship across all disciplines. The best way to begin, I believe, is by hosting THATCamp at Queen's. The Humanities and Technology Camp is an open, inexpensive meeting where humanists and technologists of all skill levels learn and build together in sessions proposed on the spot.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (jai2021.26(1)) ◽  
pp. 10-20
Author(s):  
Shevchenko A ◽  
◽  
Sosnitsky A ◽  

The main problem today in the research and development of AI is the lack of a scientific definition of Intelligence, since it is impossible to do something incomprehensible. This fundamentally delegitimizes all developments in this area and science as a whole as a product of exclusively intellectual activity, and any scientific use of the term «Intelligence» in its strict sense is unreasonable. In this paper, this problem is solved by transition to a more general universal paradigm of cognition, which allowed us to deduce the desired definition and universal formalism of Intelligence in its strong sense. Unlike previous publications, the ontology and properties of Intelligence are specified here as necessary components of Intelligence, which are subject to subsequent concretization and materialization in different niches of existence. The results of the work are of both fundamental and applied general scientific importance for all technical and humanitarian applications of Intelligence


Author(s):  
Rose Lindsey ◽  
John Mohan ◽  
Sarah Bulloch ◽  
Elizabeth Metcalfe

This chapter reviews existing research on attitudes to voluntary action. Despite the importance of this topic, public attitudes have received even less consistent consideration over time than voluntary action itself. This chapter summarises information from the National Survey of Volunteering (1981 and 1991) and the British Social Attitudes Surveys (from the 1990s) on the virtues of voluntarism, and the relationship between voluntary action and government policy. However, given the later gaps in the statistical record, the emphasis in the chapter is firmly upon two key Mass Observation Project directives, implemented 16 years apart, in 1996 and 2012. Writers have a strong sense of where the boundary should lie between statutory responsibility and voluntary initiative; and demonstrate particular concerns of and criticisms about the use of volunteers to substitute for paid staff, and to undercut the position of the lowest-paid members of society. Writers also discuss strong concerns about the ways in which governments take the contribution of volunteers for granted, leading to scepticism about individual and community capacities to take on further social responsibilities. We argue that the rationales on which appeals for greater voluntary effort are made are crucial to the success of these appeals.


1862 ◽  
Vol 7 (40) ◽  
pp. 495-515
Author(s):  
Thomas Laycock

1. The question propounded.—The members of the Association under whose auspices the ‘Journal of Mental Science’ is published, having done me the honour to elect me an honorary member of their body, I think I cannot better express my strong sense of the compliment thus paid to me, than by a cordial co-operation with them in their labours for the advancement of mental science. The subject I have ventured with this object to bring under their notice, is one of the highest importance to their professional success; it is to determine how far a mental science in the true meaning of the term science is possible, and capable of practical application to mental pathology, therapeutics and hygiène, and the needs of society in general. For more than twenty-five years, I have carefully studied mental science in these its practical relations, and have from time to time made my views public. My friend Dr. J. S. Bushnan, has questioned the value and validity of those views in the journal, on two recent occasions', with special reference to two of my latest publications.* It appears from his last communication, (‘Journal of Mental Science,’ October, 1861), that he has come to the conclusion that my systematic views elaborated after so much labour and thought, and carefully applied, not only to the practice, but also to the teaching of both the practice of medicine in general, and of psychiatry in particular are, “in no sense practical.” This, to me, startling conclusion, has led me to examine into the mode by which my friend and critic came by the notion, and I find that either he or I must be under a singular misapprehension, both as to what is scientific and practical, and as to how it may be attained. I know of no other method for testing where the error lies, than a comparison of Dr. Bushnan's principles and method with mine, in reference to the objects for which the journal is established. Now Dr. Bushnan states his doctrine very explicitly at the outset.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 254-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nwamaka Okeke-Ogbuafor ◽  
Tim Gray ◽  
Selina Stead

Purpose This paper aims to understand what two apparently contrasting concepts of communality and place attachment say about the quality of community life in the Niger Delta. Design/methodology/approach The research for this paper relied on extensive qualitative and quantitative data: qualitative data were collected from five oil-rich and three oil-poor communities across Ogoniland, while quantitative data were collected from four of these communities. Thematic content analysis was used to interpret the qualitative data, while the quantitative data were analysed through Excel. Findings Most participants from both oil-rich and oil-poor communities strongly reject a social sense of communality and strongly endorse a geographical sense of place. Practical implications The wider implication of this finding is that proponents of community development (CD) have a choice between either the cynical option of noting that Ogoni’s strong sense of place means that they will tolerate limited CD, or the noble option of noting that Ogoni’s strong sense of place is a solid foundation on which to build sustainable CD by empowering citizens to create their own future. Originality/value The originality of this study is twofold. First, it shows the complexity of people’s sense of community encompassing widely different and possibly contradictory elements. Second, it reveals the strength and persistence of people’s attachment to place despite its physical shortcomings.


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